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The conventional wisdom regarding the cyclical behavior of macroeconomic policy is that 
both fiscal and monetary policies are countercyclical or acyclical in most advanced 
economies, but procyclical in many emerging and developing countries. Procyclical 
policies are conducted by fiscal authorities cutting (raising) budget deficits and by the 
monetary authorities raising (cutting) interest rates during recessions (booms). Such 
policies are deemed sub-optimal since they will tend to reinforce the cyclical fluctuations, 
aggravating the busts and exacerbating the booms. These characteristics have sparked a 
debate on how to achieve policy discipline to boost macroeconomic performance. Motivated 
by this debate, the main purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the core determinants of 
procyclical policies and to assess their consequences on macroeconomic performance. 
In Chapter 2, by using data from 137 countries for 1970-2014, we show that fiscal 
procyclicality has become the norm rather than the exception in many countries. More 
specifically, over the last 45 years, a substantial number of emerging and low-income 
developing countries are trapped within procyclical policy, in the sense of not being able 
to move from procyclical to countercyclical fiscal policy. We also show that even after 
controlling for the endogeneity of “government quality” and other determinants of 
procyclicality, there is a causal relation running from better “government quality” to more 
countercyclical or less procyclical policy. 
We then focus on the cyclical properties of monetary policy in Chapter 3. We find that 
many countries, specifically emerging and low-income developing countries have also 
faced challenges in implementing countercyclical monetary policies. We document that 
over the last 55 years, a large number of countries consistently followed procyclical 
monetary policy or have recently turned procyclical. We then aim to address the question, 
why this has been the case.  We show that procyclical stop-and-go policies are intensified 
in the presence of “fear of free floating”, that is, monetary authorities’ reluctance to avoid 
large swings in the exchange rates. We also find that our results are robust to the 
endogeneity of “fear of free floating” and other determinants of procyclical monetary 
policy. 
In Chapter 4, we explore whether procyclical macroeconomic policy stances – being 
contractionary in bad times and expansionary in good times – have consequences for the 
rest of the economy. We provide empirical evidence that observed procyclical fiscal and 
monetary policy have significant macroeconomic costs; procyclical countries have lower 
rates of economic growth, higher rates of output volatility and inflation volatility. 
In Chapter 2 and 3, we also show that over the last decades some emerging countries have 
been able to escape the procyclicality trap and become countercyclical. During the global 
financial crisis 2008-09, these countries pursued countercyclical macroeconomic policy to 
counter the sharp drop in economic activity. However, our cross-country evidence in 
Chapter 5 provides little evidence for a central role of countercyclical policy to cushion 
against the global financial shock. We find that pre-crisis level of short-term external debt 
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Understanding business cycles and their associations with macroeconomic policies 
remain primary challenges for economists. The traditional Keynesian models of the 
business cycle calls for a countercyclical policy that is contractionary during the period 
of economic acceleration and expansionary during the time of recession to stabilise 
output fluctuations. There is by now, a large and growing literature that analyse the 
cyclical properties of macroeconomic policy. The conventional wisdom that emerges 
from literature is that macroeconomic policies – both fiscal and monetary are 
countercyclical or acyclical in most advanced economies and vice versa in developing 
countries. For example, fiscal and monetary policies are predominantly procyclical in 
Latin America and other emerging and developing countries1. Procyclical policies take 
the form of fiscal authorities increasing taxes and reducing government spending, and 
monetary authorities increasing interest rates during downturns and the opposite 
during booms. This feature of policy deprive emerging and developing countries of 
important macroeconomic stabilisation tools and amplify fluctuations in the business 
cycle.  
Why would emerging and developing countries pursue procyclical policies that might 
aggravate the business cycle? There are three explanations in the existing literature. 
The first is a financial markets related argument suggesting that emerging and 
developing countries’ ability to adopt countercyclical policies are severely hampered 
by creditworthiness/sustainability in the world capital markets, lack of financial 
integration and shallow domestic financial systems. According to this hypothesis, 
these countries have limited access to international credit markets and they may not 
be able to borrow in an economic downturn or can do so only at high-interest rates, or 
maybe even forced to pay back during the recession, leading to contractionary 
macroeconomic policies (see, for example, Gavin and Perotti, 1997). This situation 
mainly arises from the shallow nature of domestic credit markets hence dependence 
                                                          
1 On the monetary policy procyclical evidence, see, for example, Kaminsky et al. (2004); Calderón et al. (2004a&b); Yakhin (2008); Takats 
(2012); McGettigan et al. (2013); Vegh and Vuletin (2012); and Duncan (2014). On the fiscal policy procyclical evidence, see, for example, 
Gavin and Perotti (1997); Lane (2003); Kaminsky et al. (2004); Talvi and Végh (2005); Ilzetzki and Végh (2008); Woo (2009); Halland and 
Bleaney (2011); Frankel et al. (2013) and McManus and Ozkan (2015). 
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on external sources and periodic occurrences of capital flow reversals in these 
countries. Indeed, “sudden stops” in capital flows to emerging markets are regularly 
observed with the resulting collapse of investment, sharp real depreciations of the 
domestic currency, and sharp fiscal stagnation (see, for example, Calvo and Reinhart, 
2000). The slowdown in economic growth exacerbates fiscal solvency, which in turn, 
calls for additional contractionary policy. The macroeconomic policy cycle and the 
capital flow cycle thus tend to reinforce each other, or, as Kaminsky et al., (2004) put 
it, “when it rains, it pours” in these economies. This suggests that access to the 
international credit market is limited during bad times and the need for fiscal 
adjustment is greater. In sum, procyclical capital flows reinforce procyclical 
macroeconomic policies.  
The second source of procyclicality in emerging and developing countries is traced to 
political-economy constraints, political distortion, and absence of strong political and 
legal institutions. The explanation is related to the notion that good times encourage 
the corrupt government's rent-extracting activities. Voters do not prefer entrusting 
fiscal surplus to the “less-than-benevolent” government (see, for example, Alesina and 
Tabellini, 2005). As a result, fiscal resources will be wasted by the rent-seeking groups, 
rather than being saved for rainy days. As a consequence, voters push fiscal 
authorities to achieve excessive public spending during booms, as far as possible to 
“get their share of the cake”. The interaction between voters’ asymmetric information 
and political agency problem leads to lower taxes or higher public expenditure during 
expansions. This public pressure forces the fiscal authorities into procyclical policies, 
whenever rent-seeking motivations and imperfect information are sufficiently strong.  
A third explanation of procyclicality of fiscal policy relates to political economy factors 
the first of which is linked to the underlying power dispersion in the economy. Tornell 
and Lane (1999) develop a political economy model in which they analyse fiscal policy 
formulation in an environment where power blocs of interest interplay in an economy 
with weak political infrastructure. They argue that the intensity of fiscal spending 
increases during upturns. For example, in the event of a temporary improvement in 
output, fiscal expenditure can increase more than proportionally, or they put it 
“voracity effect”, relating output volatility to power dispersion. The competition among 
the power blocs for the same share of tax revenue leads to a more than proportionate 
reallocation effects when output increase (i.e., common pool problem). The presence of 
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“common pool” problem creates procyclicality because, when the economy is 
performing well, no group will be eager to give up their share of claims on the revenue. 
Hence, the government would permit individual groups to increase their 
appropriation demand by a greater amount and overspend rather than save the 
windfall of revenue in the form of a budget surplus.  
Another political economy factor underlying fiscal procyclical is linked to the political 
polarisation of preferences associated with social income inequality. Woo (2009) 
proposes that lack of equality across social groups makes voters hostile and weaken 
the support for the incumbent. Similarly, a high degree of social inequality may make 
it hard for policymakers who represent diverse socioeconomic groups to agree upon 
ideal policies. In the presence of such varying preferences, heterogeneous 
policymakers may have greater incentives to reduce social inequality. Policymakers 
prefer to conduct expansionary fiscal policy during good times to reduce inequality. 
Thus fiscal policy becomes procyclical at the presence of “polarised preferences”.  
In contrast to the substantial literature on fiscal cyclicality, there is very little in the 
existing literature on the puzzling behaviour of procyclical monetary policy in 
emerging countries. Two main issues highlighted in the literature are, first, the 
presence of substantial foreign currency denominated debt or “liability dollarisation” 
and second, credit market worthiness (or the quality of the balance sheet) (see, for 
example, Calvo, 1999 and Lane, 2003). Calvo and Reinhart (2002, p.2) and Kaminsky 
et al., (2004) argue that emerging countries do not adopt countercyclical stabilisation 
policies because when the economy contracts, it experiences capital outflows. Rapid 
capital outflows trigger currency depreciation, which turns sudden reversals of capital 
inflows during crises episodes, referred to as “sudden stop” phenomenon (see, for 
example, Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). Monetary authorities are then forced to raise 
interest rates to compensate for the effect on the exchange rate, instead of leaving the 
currency to float freely, or, as Calvo and Reinhart (2002) put it, “fear of free floating”. 
During crises episodes, the fear becomes severe, when the currency depreciates 
rapidly, and balance sheet effect (i.e., fear of bankruptcy of domestic firms indebted 
in foreign currency) plunge the economy into deeper crisis by encouraging further 
capital outflows. As a result, the need to raise interest rates to defend domestic 
currency would prevent financially fragile economies to conduct countercyclical 
monetary policy.  
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In summary, it is largely agreed that emerging and developing countries pursue 
procyclical policy due to weak institutions, political-economy concerns, foreign 
currency denominated liabilities, shallow domestic financial systems, time-varying 
external credit constraints, weak exchange rate and the risk of full-blown crises. 
However, procyclical policies are deemed sub-optimal since they will tend to reinforce 
the cyclical fluctuations, aggravating the busts and exacerbating the booms. 
Economists suggest that such policies should be avoided and might partially explain 
the higher volatility of inflation and output in these countries (see, for example, Lane, 
2003). These characteristics have sparked a debate on how to achieve policy discipline 
to boost macroeconomic performance. Motivated by this debate, the main purpose of 
this thesis is to evaluate the core determinants of procyclical policies – both fiscal and 
monetary policy and to assess the consequences of procyclical policies on 
macroeconomic performance. We also examine the effectiveness of macroeconomic 
policy response during the global financial crisis to cushion against the crisis shocks. 
Below we will briefly discuss each Chapters’ empirical methods, findings and our 
contributions. 
In Chapter 2, we attempt to both provide empirical evidence on the cyclical properties 
of fiscal policy and second to uncover the potential reasons for this cyclical stance of 
fiscal policy. The first mandatory step in any such investigation is to determine the 
cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. The simplest measure of fiscal cyclicality is the 
correlation between the cyclical components of fiscal instruments and output that are 
filtered by Hodrick-Prescott method. Other studies have adopted time series 
regression approach where cyclical components of the fiscal indicator are regressed on 
cyclical components of output and the estimated coefficient is considered to be the 
measure of cyclical properties of fiscal policy. Based on such methods, the literature 
reveals that most of the developing countries tend to pursue procyclical policy. The 
empirical studies implicitly assume that the causality runs from business cycle 
fluctuation to fiscal policy (see, for example, Rigobon, 2004).  
In Chapter 2, we address the reverse causality issue by following instrumental 
variable techniques to explore the time-series cyclical properties of fiscal policy for a 
large sample of 137 countries (30 advanced, 59 emerging and 48 low-income 
developing countries). Along with the instrumental variable techniques, we also 
consider two conventional methods from the earlier studies for an alternative 
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measurement of fiscal cyclicality and provide a systematic account of how the choice 
of alternative methods affect fiscal cyclicality. It is also important to note that most 
empirical studies examine the cyclical properties of fiscal policy by utilising panel data 
approach (see, for example, Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008 and others) that has 
not fully exploited the time-series properties of individual country data.  
Our empirical analysis in Chapter 2 suggests that majority of the advanced economies 
follow countercyclical fiscal policy, while most of the emerging and low-income 
developing countries’ fiscal policy is profoundly procyclical. We also investigate how 
the cyclical behaviour has changed over the last 45 years for our sample countries. We 
find that more than 55% of our sample countries have been trapped within the 
procyclical fiscal policy cycle, in the sense of not being able to move from procyclical 
to countercyclical fiscal policy. We refer to this group of countries as “procyclicality 
trap” countries. Not surprisingly, the majority of the emerging and low-income 
developing countries fall under this category.  
Chapter 2 then asks a critical question, more precisely for “procyclicality trap” 
countries, why do these group of countries run procyclical fiscal policy and why have 
they remained in the trap over the last 45 years? Most common answer from the 
literature is that these countries have less creditworthiness; having limited access to 
international credit market to borrow during bad times, which prevents them from 
enacting expansionary policies in downturns (see, for example, Gavin and Perotti, 
1997 and Kaminsky et al., 2004). We argue that this explanation begs two critical 
questions. First, why do these countries fail to self-insure themselves by accumulating 
reserves during booms? Second, why would foreign capital markets not provide loans, 
even in bad times, if they were assured that the borrowing would help the country to 
recover from the crisis and eventually pay back their debt?  
To answer both of the questions, we rely on political economy arguments by 
incorporating “government quality” for these group of countries. To this effect, we 
construct a composite index of “government quality” for each individual country by 
combining three measures from novel sources: political corruption (proxy for the rent-
seeking behaviour), release of macroeconomic information by the government (proxy 
for the information transparency) and egalitarian democracy index (proxy for the 
social inequality). We find that our constructed “government quality” index is 
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positively and significantly correlated (around 0.80) with credit ratings, indicating 
that low government quality reduces creditworthiness. Thus countries with low 
government quality face greater borrowing constraints in conducting countercyclical 
policy. We also find that “procyclicality trap” countries have consistently lower 
government quality compared to other countries. 
The above findings suggest that government quality is one of the major determinants 
of procyclical fiscal policy. One of our novel contributions in Chapter 2 is in the 
quantitative analysis. Relying on a comprehensive set of data for 137 countries, our 
cross-country and panel analysis document that government quality is strongly 
negatively associated with the degree of fiscal procyclicality, underlying a strong link 
running from better government to a less procyclical stance. We propose that better 
government quality is required to shift from the “procyclicality trap” to countercyclical 
policy. Our results are robust to additional explanatory variables, potential 
endogeneity, alternative specification and outlier’s sensitivity.  
Although substantial work is carried out on the potential determinants of procyclical 
fiscal policy, little empirical attention has been devoted to cyclical properties of 
monetary policy. In particular, there is very little work on the potential reasons for 
procyclical monetary policy. To address this issue, in Chapter 3, we empirically 
investigate the cyclical behaviour of monetary policy to explore why some countries 
exhibit procyclical monetary policy. Two interrelated objectives underlie our analysis 
in Chapter 3. First, we empirically investigate the cyclical properties of monetary 
policy, and second we examine the potential determinants of these cyclical properties. 
The simplest measure of monetary policy cyclicality is the correlation between the 
cyclical components of monetary policy instruments and output that are filtered by 
Hodrick-Prescott method. In Chapter 3 in addition to the correlation approach, we 
attempt to estimate monetary policy stances by utilising the Taylor rule for each 
country for which data are available.  
Our empirical analysis of the monetary cyclicality of 100 countries (29 advanced, 46 
emerging and 25 low-income developing countries) over the period 1960-2014 in 
Chapter 3 suggests that procyclical monetary policy is widely observed across the 
emerging and developing countries. More specifically, these countries raise interest 
rate in bad times and reduce it during good times. On the contrary, we find that 
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majority of the advanced economies consistently follow countercyclical monetary 
policy. We also investigate how the cyclical behaviour has changed over the past 
decades for our sample countries. We document that over the last 55 years, a 
substantial number (19% of the sample) of emerging and low-income developing 
countries are trapped in a procyclical monetary policy cycle (in the sense of not being 
able to move from procyclical to countercyclical policy) or have recently turned 
procyclical (8.24% of the sample) who used to conduct countercyclical policy. 
The second objective in Chapter 3 is related to the question of why these group of 
countries are implementing procyclical monetary policies. Most common answer from 
Kaminsky et al., (2004) is that capital inflows to developing countries are procyclical 
– that is, they tend to borrow in good times and repay in bad times due to their 
diminished creditworthiness in bad times. This procyclical access to international 
capital market reinforces monetary policy procyclicality. In this proposition, during 
downturns countries have experienced sharp depreciations (typically characterised by 
significant capital outflows) as they are cut off from the international credit markets 
(i.e., “sudden stop” phenomena proposed by Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). This would 
force the monetary authorities to raise the interest rates to defend the domestic 
currency, when the required change in interest rate is in the opposite direction. The 
fear is that a rapid currency depreciation would plunge the economy into deeper 
recession by stirring further capital outflows and leading to bankruptcy (i.e., balance 
sheet crisis) of domestic firms indebted in foreign currency (i.e., liability dollarisation). 
As a result, the need to raise short-term interest rates to prevent currency devaluation 
may preclude monetary authority to conduct countercyclical policy.  
We take the above theoretical predictions to the data, which is one of our novel 
contributions in Chapter 3. We follow Calvo and Reinhart (2002) method to construct 
an indicator for “fear of free floating” for our sample countries. Our empirical findings 
document that procyclical stop-and-go policies are intensified in the presence of “fear 
of free floating”, that is, reluctance to avoid large swings in the exchange rates. Our 
results are robust to additional explanatory variables, tests of possible endogeneity 
and alternative specifications.  
In Chapter 4 we ask a critical question; does it matter whether a country adopts 
procyclical policy rather than a countercyclical one? Standard Keynesian theory 
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advocates that macroeconomic policies should act as a stabilisation tool. A country 
should pursue countercyclical policy – both fiscal and monetary policy to stabilise the 
business cycle. A countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy stance with policy actions 
against the cycle is expected to act as a stabilisation tool to keep the output 
movements on a non-fluctuating path. On the contrary, procyclical policies reinforce 
cyclical fluctuations, aggravating the busts and exacerbating the booms. This feature 
of fiscal and monetary policy deprived emerging and developing countries of important 
macroeconomic stabilisation tools and might partially explain the higher volatility of 
inflation and output in these countries (see, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). 
The procyclical policy is typically presumed to be harmful to economic growth. It is 
surprising that in contrast to the wealth of the literature on the sources of procyclical 
policy, the potential cost of such sub-optimal policies – both fiscal and monetary 
policies have been largely ignored in the existing literature. A small number of 
exceptions includes, McManus and Ozkan (2015) who find that procyclical countries 
have lower rates of economic growth, higher rates of inflation and a higher rate of 
output volatility. However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no attempt, 
to examine the cost of procyclical monetary policy on macroeconomic performances. 
Chapter 4 complement and improve some of the previous evidence in the following 
dimensions. First, we use a larger sample that incorporates not only the advanced 
countries but also a wider sample of emerging and low-income developing countries 
in analysing the cyclicality of monetary policies. Second, we examine not only the 
consequences of fiscal procyclicality but also the potential cost of pursuing procyclical 
monetary policy.  
Our cross-country evidence in Chapter 4 suggests that procyclical (countercyclical) 
countries have lower (higher) rates of economic growth, higher (lower) rates of output 
volatility and inflation volatility. We check the robustness of our findings by using 
GMM method to control for the potential endogeneity of procyclical policy with that 
macroeconomic outcomes. We find that our results are robust to additional 
explanatory variables and outlier’s sensitivity.  
In Chapter 2 and 3, we also show that over the last decades a good number of emerging 
countries have been able to escape the procyclicality trap and become countercyclical. 
During the global financial crisis 2008-09, many emerging economies pursued 
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countercyclical policy to cushion against the global financial shock (see, for example, 
Blanchard et al., 2010). This is a remarkable departure from the earlier crisis episodes 
during which emerging countries had to cut government spending due to less 
creditworthiness and had to increase interest rates to defend the value of the domestic 
currency to maintain capital inflow. However, in Chapter 5, we find little evidence for 
a central role of countercyclical policy to cushion against the global financial shock 
and trade collapse. 
Our empirical work in Chapter 5 suggests that pre-crisis level of short-term external 
debt and collapse in the export demand played a key role in the intensity of the crisis. 
The standard explanation of the transmission of the global crisis highlights the role 
played by the global financial and trade linkages. The original shock originated in the 
financial system of the United States led to the interruption in the financial system 
of several emerging and advanced economies. In turn, the disruption in the global 
financial system steadily transferred to emerging countries’ real economy, with the 
financial crisis along with a contraction in economic activity and significant decline in 
capital inflows and international trade in 2008-2009. The most affected emerging 
countries were those that had to rely on external capital inflows, large current account 
deficits and a sizable short-term debt denominated in foreign currency (see, for 
example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011 and Ozkan and Unsal, 2017). Along with the 
financial shock, these countries had also experienced a sharp decline in their export 
on the eve of the crisis (see, for example, Berkmen et al., 2009). 
In Chapter 5, we also investigate the question of whether the cross-country severity 
of the crisis is systematically related to pre-crisis external debt and crisis time trade 
collapse. More specifically, we examine 38 emerging countries’ external balance sheets 
(i.e., liability side) based on the maturity structure (i.e., long and short-term). Second, 
we analyse the role of pre-crisis level of gross external debt by the sectors (i.e., 
government, central bank, bank and non-bank private sector). Third, we also 
investigate the financial sectors’ vulnerable position (i.e., external leverage position 
and foreign rollover risk) in the pre-crisis period. Fourth, we develop crisis time 
trading partners’ export demand index to account for the trade collapse proposition.  
Using cross-country data from 38 emerging countries, our analysis shows that reduced 
export demand had a positive impact on output losses during the crisis (2008-09) and 
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short-term external debt in 2007, specifically financial sectors’ short-term external 
debt were important determinants in explaining the intensity of the crisis. Our 
analysis also suggests that countries with more leveraged domestic financial sectors, 
combined with foreign rollover risk tend to be inflicted by greater losses during the 
crisis. Surprisingly, we find little evidence for a central role of fiscal and monetary 
policy to cushion against the output loss in the crisis. Our results are robust to 
additional explanatory variables and outlier’s sensitivity.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 estimates cyclicality 
properties of fiscal policy and examines potential causes of procyclical fiscal policy. 
Chapter 3 repeats the same exercise for monetary policy by estimating the cyclical 
behaviour of monetary policy and examines potential determinants of procyclical 
monetary policy. Chapter 4 explores the potential costs of pursuing such procyclical 
policy. Chapter 5 examines the role of trade and external debt in the global financial 
crisis. Chapter 6 provides the conclusions, main economic policy recommendations, 
and a discussion on the agenda for future research. A further description of some of 
the methods implemented in this thesis, along with the variables and data 
descriptions and list of countries are provided in the appendices.     









How should fiscal policy be conducted to stabilise the economy over the business cycle? 
The traditional Keynesian model of the business cycle suggests that fiscal authorities 
should conduct countercyclical fiscal policy that is contractionary during the period of 
expansions and expansionary during downturns to stabilise output fluctuations2. At the 
other extreme, from a neoclassical point of view, fiscal policy should aim to minimise 
distortions. According to Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing hypothesis, fiscal policy (tax rates) 
should remain constant or essentially neutral over the business cycle, as long as the shock 
on the tax base or spending shock is temporary (and respond to unexpected events that 
affect the fiscal authorities’ budget constraints). Neoclassical theory prescribes that the 
balanced budget should be positively associated with output fluctuation, as it absorbs 
changes to tax revenues, caused by shocks to the tax base, as well as changes in other 
expenditure and revenues. Hence, if fiscal authorities followed Keynesian prescriptions, 
over the business cycle one should observe a negative correlation between government 
spending and output, and a positive correlation between tax rates and output. In sharp 
contrast, if fiscal authorities followed Barro’s hypothesis, those correlations should be 
essentially zero.  
Despite the absence of unanimous views, most economists agree with the normative 
approach of countercyclical fiscal policy to smooth out the business cycle fluctuations. 
Surprisingly, however, the empirical evidence consistently reveals that the fiscal policy is 
often expansionary during booms and contractionary during recessions in many countries. 
There is by now, a large and growing literature, which has reached similar conclusions; 
industrial countries tended to follow the fiscal policy that is countercyclical or at worst 
acyclical. On the other hand, emerging and low-income developing countries tended to 
pursue procyclical fiscal policy by violating the Keynesian’s prescription; they have cut 
taxes (or raised spending) during the period of expansion and cut spending during the 
                                                          
2 Throughout this Chapter following Kaminsky et al., (2004), a procyclical fiscal policy is defined to involve lower (higher) government 
spending and higher (lower) tax rates in bad (good) times. Conversely, a countercyclical fiscal policy involves higher (lower) government 
spending or lower (higher) tax rates in bad (good) times.   
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period of recession3. Most economists suggest that such procyclical policies that amplify 
fluctuations in real output should be avoided, for these economies suffer from prolonged 
recession in bad times and inflationary pressures in good times. Thus, there is widespread 
agreement that procyclical fiscal policies are harmful as it leads to macroeconomic 
instability4. Motivated by the consequences of procyclical fiscal policy, our goal in this 
chapter is twofold: first, we attempt to provide empirical evidence of the cyclical properties 
of fiscal policies and second to uncover the potential sources of these cyclical stances on 
fiscal policy. To attain these goals, we utilise annual data from 137 developed, emerging 
and low-income developing countries over the period 1970-20145.  
With regards to our first goal, to estimate fiscal cyclicality, the conventional approach 
utilises a simple correlation between the cyclical components of government expenditure 
and output that are filtered by the Hodrick-Prescott or Baxter-King filtering method6, 
where a positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. 
While a positive/negative association between the cyclical components of output and 
government expenditure certainly gives no signal of reverse causality, the empirical 
studies implicitly assume that the causality runs from business cycle fluctuation to fiscal 
policy. Other studies follow a time-series regression-based approach, where a measure of 
government expenditure is regressed on a measure of output, and the estimated 
coefficient is considered to be the key indicator of fiscal cyclicality7. It should be noted that 
the estimation method can yield an unbiased estimation of fiscal cyclicality only if output 
is exogenous to fiscal policy. However, there is substantial evidence that in the short-run 
fiscal policy does have an impact on output8. 
In this chapter, we reinvestigate the conventional cyclicality results proposed by the 
previous literature and estimate the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy through the 
instrumental variable technique. We find that the endogeneity problem is embedded in 
the correlation between macroeconomic policies and output growth. We handle this issue 
by proposing an instrument (i.e., trading partners’ export demand) for the output growth. 
We also consider two conventional methods for alternative measure of fiscal cyclicality 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Gavin and Perotti (1997); Kaminsky et al., (2004); Talvi and Végh (2005); Alberola and Montero (2007); Ilzetzki and 
Végh (2008); Woo (2009); Erbil (2011); Halland and Bleaney (2011); Frankel et al., (2013); and McManus and Ozkan (2015). 
4 See, for example, Talvi and Végh (2005); Woo (2009); and McManus and Ozkan (2015). 
5 The country group classification is from Nielsen (2011, p.20). 
6 See, for example, Kaminsky et al., (2004); Talvi and Végh (2005) and Frankel et al. (2013) follow a simple correlation based approach. 
7 See, for example, Alesina and Tabellini (2005); Woo (2009); Afonso et al., (2009) and Holland and Bleaney (2011) follow regression based 
approach.   
8 Reverse causality was first discussed by Gavin and Perotti (1997). Rigobon (2004) emphasizes for the endogeneity problems and re-examines 
on Kaminsky et al., (2004) cyclical measurement techniques. 
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and provide a systematic account of how the choice of different alternative estimation 
methods affects the estimated cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. 
After an exhaustive battery of time series econometric tests over the period 1970-2014, 
the evidence provided in this chapter clearly suggests that procyclical fiscal policy is 
observed across the globe and should be viewed as the norm rather than the exception. 
Indeed, for a sample of 137 countries (30 advanced, 59 emerging and 48 low-income 
developing countries), we find that, in line with the previous literature, a majority of the 
advanced countries follow countercyclical or acyclical fiscal policy. In sharp contrast, the 
majority of the emerging and low-income developing countries run procyclical fiscal 
policies. We show that our findings are robust to alternative time-series specifications to 
control for reverse causality. We also investigate how the cyclical behaviour has evolved 
over the past few decades for our sample countries. Interestingly, over the last 45 years, 
we find that a substantial number of emerging and low-income developing countries have 
been trapped within the procyclical fiscal policy stance, in the sense of not being able to 
move from procyclical to countercyclical fiscal policy. We refer to these group of countries 
as “procyclicality trap” countries.  
To address our second goal, we ask this critical question; why are so many emerging and 
low-income developing countries caught within a trap of procyclical fiscal policy over the 
past few decades? A most common answer from the literature relies upon their access to 
the international credit market9. It is widely argued that during bad times, many 
developing countries are unable to borrow, or can only do so with high-interest rates, 
therefore this group of countries have to cut spending; but in good times, they have better 
access to international credit and choose to use it. However, the following questions 
remain. First, why did this group of countries’ fiscal authorities fail to self-insure 
themselves by accumulating extra tax revenues during good times, so that they are less 
likely to face credit constraints in bad times? Second, why do this group of countries face 
credit constraints in international capital markets during recessions, if the lenders knew 
that the borrowing would help the country to recover from the crisis and would optimally 
smooth the cycle, so that the borrowers can repay them back?  
To answer the above two questions, we rely on the analysis of political landscape. More 
specifically, we consider three major political factors: transparency, corruption and 
                                                          
9  For example Gavin and Perotti (1997) were the first to discuss the Latin American countries’ facing credit constraints from the international 
capital market; then Sutton and Catão (2002), Riascos and Végh (2003) and Kaminsky et al., (2004) pointed out that this is not a Latin 
American phenomenon only; borrowing constraints are common in many emerging and low-income developing countries.  
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egalitarian democracy on the following grounds. First, a county’s transparency relates to 
its moral hazard problem between the international lenders and its fiscal authorities. The 
international investors can observe the state of the economy, however, at the presence of 
lack of transparency the true size of the fiscal authorities’ hidden off balance sheet 
liabilities may not be revealed. It therefore follows that countries with less transparency 
are likely to face more limited access to international credit markets, particularly during 
downturns, restricting their ability to run countercyclical policies10.   
Second, the presence of corruption is also likely to reinforce borrowing constraints. Credit 
rating agencies, for example, use measures of corruption as an indicator of a country’s 
ability to peruse stable macroeconomic policies. It should be noted that the index of 
corruption can also be interpreted as a credit constraint measure, because of its high 
correlation with sovereign risk11. It has been widely argued that corruption enhances 
political agency problems or creates political distortion, with unfavourable implications 
for macroeconomic outcomes12. In the presence of endemic corruption, incumbent 
politicians face a trade-off between pleasing voters and extracting political rent. 
Additionally, in the absence of economic transparency politicians can hide the true size of 
the fiscal deficit to not only voters but also to international lenders, who therefore also 
fail to observe the intensity of corruption, and hence have a moral hazard problem. Voters, 
therefore, rationally do not trust the benevolent government and they attempt to “starve 
the leviathan” to reduce the scale of corruption. In this case, voters prefer additional 
spending or tax cuts during the good times fearing that the extra revenue in the upturn 
would otherwise be wasted or not used to retire debt and they do not want to leave the 
excess tax revenue to “less-than-benevolent” government. This forces the government to 
conduct procyclical policy that arises from voters’ demands.  
Our third variable – egalitarian democracy – is related to social inequality and hence to 
political instability13. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when the rights and freedoms of 
voters are protected equally across all social groups, and resources are distributed equally 
across all social groups. Lack of equality across the social groups makes voters hostile and 
weaken the support for the incumbent. However, at the presence of high level of social 
                                                          
10 Macroeconomic transparency (e.g. monetary and fiscal policy) has received increasing attention in recent years. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and The OECD have implemented the Code of Best Practice for Fiscal Transparency. The World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund publish the reports on standard and codes (ROSC) for the Code of Best Practice for Fiscal Transparency on a regular basis 
for a broad range of countries.  
11 To quote, Alesina and Tabellini (2005, p. 20), “The correlation coefficient between the variables S&P Rating and Control of Corruption is 
0.92 In fact, these variables are correlated by construction. For instance Standard and Poor’s may look (directly or indirectly) to perception 
of corruption as one of their inputs in assigning ratings to countries, and perceptions of corruption may in turn be influenced by foreigners’ 
views of a country’s credit-worthiness.  As a result, it is very hard to disentangle the effects of one versus the other.” 
12 See, for example, Tornell and Lane (1999); Lane (2003); Talvi and Végh (2005); Alesina and Tabellini (2005); and Woo (2009). 
13 See, for example, Woo (2009) and Drazen (2000). 
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inequality, it may be difficult for policymakers (i.e., representative of diverse 
socioeconomic groups) to agree upon an ideal economic policy. In the incidence of such 
varying preferences, policymakers may have higher motives to reduce the social 
inequality. This forces government to take expansionary fiscal policy during good times 
due to economic surpluses, resulting in procyclical policy stance14. It is indeed true that 
in a democratic environment government are accountable and they try to satisfy voters’ 
demands through appropriate fiscal action, otherwise they will be removed from power. 
Social inequality is therefore often associated with political instability15. High level of 
political instability may make it more difficult for the incumbent to remain in power for a 
long period of time. With a shortened expected tenure governments may enact short-term 
policies at the cost of macroeconomic stability. Countries with such characteristics may 
not be able to tap into external finance during downturns and may be forced to run 
contractionary fiscal policy.  
Based on the above discussion, we develop a composite index by combining measures of 
transparency, corruption and egalitarian democracy. Motivated by the work of Rothstein 
and Teorell (2008), we view this index as a reflection of “government quality”. We find a 
strong positive correlation between credit rating and government quality16; countries with 
better (worse) government quality receive with high (low) credit rating, impacting the 
severity of borrowing constraints. This is because a country facing credit constraints due 
to low country credit rating may not be able to borrow during recessions limiting the scope 
of countercyclical fiscal policy17.  
In this chapter, we argue that quality of government is a key determinant of fiscal policy 
cyclicality. Our empirical work is closely related to Alesina and Tabellini (2005) where 
politicians are assumed to hide the true size of the deficit to voters and international 
lenders, who therefore fail to observe the level of political corruption (see, for example, Alt 
and Lassen, 2006; Andersen and Nelsen, 2010). We test the relevance of this mechanism 
in our empirical work, allowing a degree of transparency, where voters and international 
lenders may be able to observe the true size of the deficit, by using both corruption and 
transparency in composing the government quality index18. Additionally, Woo (2009) 
                                                          
14 See, for example, Woo (2009). 
15 In the rational government budget cycle literature, for example Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) propose that voters face an 
adverse selection problem and this leads to distortion in fiscal policy just before the election.   
16 Figure A2.1 shows a strong positive correlation (𝜌 = +0.80) between government quality and country credit rating. 
17 See, for example, Gavin and Perotti (1997); Riascos and Végh (2003); Alesina and Tabellini (2005) and Frankel et al., (2013). 
18 It is true that countries with high levels of transparency may still experience corruption and these variables cannot be substituted for each 
other. According to Transparency International (2017), corruption is defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” and it can be 
classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs. In contrast they defined that 
transparency is about shedding light on rules, plans, processes and actions. Transparency ensures that public officials, civil servants, managers, 
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proposes that social inequality leads to polarisation that is also linked to the procyclicality 
bias. We complete our government quality index by considering an additional friction in 
this environment, covering not only the equality, but also the citizens’ voting power to 
replace the government.  
Relying on a novel set of data for 137 countries over the period 1970-2014, we find 
significant support for our hypothesis. We find that on average advanced economies as a 
group have better government quality compared to emerging and low-income developing 
countries. Moreover, the advanced world has experienced sustained improvements in 
government quality over the recent decades. In sharp contrast, our findings show that 
quality of government has been relatively stagnant for emerging and low-income 
developing countries, more specifically, for that group of countries who are in 
“procyclicality trap”. We find government quality is strongly negatively associated with 
the degree of fiscal procyclicality, indicating a strong underlying link running from better 
government to a less procyclical outcome.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section briefly discusses the 
underlying evidence from the previous literature on fiscal cyclicality and the underlying 
reasons of fiscal procyclicality. Section 2.3 presents the measurement techniques used to 
identify the cyclicality characteristics of fiscal policy and government quality, and also 
presents the empirical strategies to identify the determinants of fiscal procyclicality. 
Section 2.4 presents descriptive statistics of cyclicality of fiscal policy and government 
quality. Section 2.5 relates and discusses the systematic outcomes of government quality 
to the derived cyclicality measurements. Robustness and extension of the analysis are 
also presented in Section 2.5. Finally, Section 2.6 provides concluding remarks.  
2.2 Evidence on fiscal cyclicality and the causes of fiscal 
procyclicality 
Gavin and Perotti (1997) were the first to draw attention to the fact that Latin American 
countries exhibit procyclical fiscal policy. Talvi and Végh (2005) then showed that 
procyclical fiscal policy is not limited to Latin American countries, rather fiscal policy 
seemed to be overwhelmingly procyclical across the developing world, just as fiscal policy 
is acyclical in industrialised countries. In fact, Talvi and Végh’s find that the correlation 
between cyclical component of government spending and GDP is positive for every 
                                                          
board members and businessmen act visibly and understandably, and report on their activities. It means that the general public can hold them 
to account. It is the surest way of guarding against corruption and helps increase trust in the people and institutions.  
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developing country in their sample. In sharp contrast, the correlation for G7 countries is 
found to be zero. Using a different methodology, Braun (2001) reaches similar results for 
developing countries, although he finds that fiscal policy is countercyclical in OECD 
countries. In the same vein, Lane (2003) shows that procyclical fiscal policy is evident in 
developing part of the world, whereas this characteristic is relatively absent in OECD 
countries. Kaminsky et al., (2004) jointly examine the procyclicality of capital flows, fiscal 
and monetary policy, and find that many countries, specifically developing countries 
exhibit procyclical fiscal policy. However, the earliest evidence of Hallerberg and Strauch 
(2002), and Gali and Perotti (2003) propose that procyclicality mainly arises from 
subcomponents of government consumption and in overall discretionary government 
expenditure (i.e., the part that is directly controlled by fiscal authorities) in the European 
Union and OECD countries.  
Thornton (2007) empirically investigate fiscal policy in 37 African countries and finds the 
real government expenditure in 32 of these countries to be overwhelmingly procyclical. 
Ilzetzki and Végh (2008), who investigate a different data-set for 49 countries find similar 
results. They conclude that procyclical fiscal policy is in fact truth and not friction. Recent 
work by Frankel et al., (2013) propose new evidence and they show that over the last 
decades, about one-third of the developing world has been able to escape from 
procyclicality trap or “graduation” takes place, as this group of countries become more 
countercyclical in the recent decade compared to their earlier fiscal stances. However, 
they propose that a significant portion of developing countries fall into the trap of 
procyclicality and this phenomenon has become a part of the conventional wisdom.  
Why would developing countries conduct procyclical fiscal policy that might aggravate the 
business cycle? Several explanations have been proposed to explain the puzzling 
behaviour of procyclical policy in developing countries. Existing work proposes three types 
of explanations: (a) restrictions on access to international credit markets that preclude 
developing countries from borrowing during bad times, (b) institutional weaknesses and 
political distortions encouraging rent-extracting activities, which in turn, result in 
excessive public spending during expansions not to leave fiscal surplus with the “less-
than-benevolent government”, (c) heterogeneity of political preferences or “polarization” 
related to social and income inequality. 
The most common explanations are based on incomplete international credit markets or 
credit constraints. Gavin and Perotti (1997) first pointed to the procyclical fiscal policy by 
showing that Latin American countries face “precarious creditworthiness”. According to 
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this hypothesis, developing countries have limited access to international credit markets 
and they may not be able to borrow in economic downturn and maybe even required to 
pay back, leading to contractionary fiscal policy. They also find that IMF emergency credit 
supply during these periods is higher compared to other periods and fiscal procyclicality 
is strongly associated with initial level of budget deficit. Gavin and Perotti (1997) 
considered these findings as an indication of creditors’ willingness to supply credit during 
bad times to support the budget deficit. These propositions are consistent with Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000)’s observation of “sudden stops” in capital inflows to emerging markets, 
leading to collapse of investment, sharp real depreciation, and sharp fiscal stagnation as 
the countries are cut off from international capital markets. Similarly, Calderón and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2008), propose that liberal access to foreign and domestic credit markets 
supports countries to run countercyclical fiscal policy. Riascos and Végh (2003) and 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) argue that inadequate financial depth and 
incomplete capital markets could explain the procyclicality stance as the consequence of 
a Ramsey problem without having to impose any additional frictions.  
The second class of explanations focus on institutional weaknesses and political 
distortions rather than market failure. Tornell and Lane (1999) develop a political 
economy model in which the “common pool” problem that arises from multiple interest 
groups competing for a share of general tax revenue significantly impacts upon the 
cyclicality of fiscal policies. The presence of “common pool” problem generates 
procyclicality because, when the economy is performing well, no group will be eager to 
give up their share of claims on the revenue. The competition among the interest groups 
for the same share of the tax revenue leads to a more than proportionate reallocation 
effects when output increases. Although the dispute of fiscal policy cyclicality is not 
directly stated in their model, it follows that with potential tax revenue increases during 
booms, government expenditure will be prone to be procyclical. 
In a similar vein, Talvi and Végh (2005) find that large variability in fiscal revenues are 
in themselves the cause of fiscal procyclicality, because such variability distorts political 
incentives. The authors predict that the political pressure to spend out of a fiscal surplus 
is an increasing convex function of the size of that surplus. Hence, the large tax base 
variability, as widely observed in developing countries, is likely to be associated with more 
procyclical fiscal spending. These arguments lead on to Alesina and Tabellini (2005), who 
show that voters prefer lower taxes during good times rather than keeping the excess tax 
revenue with “less-than-benevolent” government. Alesina and Tabellini (2005) also 
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provide empirical support for the proposition that procyclicality is positively associated 
with rent-seeking behaviour.  
An alternative explanation is linked to institutional quality. Calderón et al., (2004a&b) 
analyse fiscal behaviour of 20 emerging economies and find that procyclicality of fiscal 
policy is positively associated with weak institutional quality. Calderón and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2008) update the database to 115 countries and propose that countries with high 
levels of institutional quality exhibit less procyclical stance. A similar argument is 
suggested by Inchauste et al., (2004); they show that procyclicality tends to be less 
frequent in high-income countries where the political power is less concentrated, with 
higher institutional quality and larger public sectors. A recent study by Frankel et al., 
(2013) analyses 94 countries in which they propose that about one-third of developing 
countries have been able to move from procyclical to countercyclical fiscal policy. They 
argue that institutional quality has been one of the major determinants in that transition.  
A third explanation presents a slightly different public choice argument. Woo (2009) 
proposes that greater heterogeneity of preferences (or polarisation) of social groups is a 
key source of fiscal procyclicality. He argues that lack of equality across the social groups 
makes voters hostile and weaken the support for the incumbent. Hence, a high degree of 
social inequality may make it difficult for politicians who may represent diverse 
socioeconomic groups to agree upon ideal fiscal policies. In the presence of such varying 
preferences, heterogeneous politicians may have greater motives to reduce social 
inequality. Policymakers prefer to conduct expansionary policy during good times to 
reduce the inequality. Woo (2009) measures the social inequality by income and 
educational inequality, and these variables are consistently positively correlated with the 
procyclical fiscal policy for a cross-country tests for 96 countries.  
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Identifying fiscal policy cyclicality 
We start by examining the cyclical properties of fiscal policy for individual countries. The 
previous empirical literature on fiscal cyclicality uses various fiscal policy indicators, and 
there is no methodological unanimity on how the fiscal cyclicality should be measured19. 
                                                          
19 As Fatás and Mihov (2010) mention, the diversity of empirical findings on the sources of fiscal procyclicality may be an indication of this 
variety in the way that the cyclicality of fiscal policy is measured. 
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However, there is a common ground in the type of fiscal policy instruments to be used and 
in measuring the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. 
The simplest measure of fiscal cyclicality is the correlation between the cyclical 
components of government expenditure and output that are filtered by Hodrick-Prescott 
method to focus only on the detrending cyclical components. Previous empirical work on 
fiscal cyclicality uses this method to identify the cyclicality of fiscal policy (see, for 
example, Frankel et al., 2013; Kaminsky et al., 2004; Talvi and Végh, 2005 and others). 
However, it can be argued that correlation coefficient can be ambiguous if countries have 
a different level of volatility for both government expenditure and output (see, for 
example, Forbes and Rigobon (2002). In this regards, Alesina and Tabellini (2005), Woo 
(2009) and McManus and Ozkan (2015) follow time-series regression-based estimation 
method where a measure of fiscal action is regressed on output and other control 
variables, and the estimated coefficient from time-series regression is taken to indicate 
the cyclicality of fiscal policy.   
Fiscal policy cyclicality is usually measured by fiscal instruments (e.g. government 
expenditure and tax rates) rather than fiscal outcomes (e.g. tax revenue, fiscal balance 
and other fiscal instruments) that are endogenous and their cyclicality is likely to be 
ambiguous (see, for example, Kaminsky et al., 2004). Even though such instruments have 
been used in the literature (see, for example, Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Calderón and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003; Alesina and Tabellini, 2005 and others). According to Ilzetzki and 
Vegh (2008), the estimated cyclical properties may not be appropriate, specifically because 
of the cyclicality of tax revenues. The authors argue that even if the policy is acyclical (i.e., 
tax rates and government expenditure are independent of the business cycle), the fiscal 
balance would be a surplus in upturns (as the tax rate expands) and in deficit in 
downturns (as the tax rate contracts). An econometrician by investigating the fiscal 
balance may thus bring erroneous conclusion by proposing that the fiscal policy is 
countercyclical (i.e., fiscal authorities trying to smooth out the business cycle), but in 
reality, fiscal authorises are engaged in a neutral policy and smoothing both tax base and 
government expenditure. Similarly, the cyclicality behaviour of fiscal balance will 
estimate ambiguous cyclicality posture of fiscal policy (neoclassical prescription of Barro, 
1979)20.  
                                                          
20 Emphasising on fiscal balance may also lead to the wrong conclusion when comparing the fiscal policy cyclicality across country groups. 
For example, several studies conclude that fiscal policy is countercyclical in advanced countries as opposed to that in developing world because 
the correlation between the business cycle and fiscal balance is positive in advanced countries and less-or-negative in the developing world 
(see, for example, Gavin and Perotti, 1997 and Alesina and Tabellini, 2005). According to Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008), this implication is not 
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Given the variety of empirical methodologies in the related literature, we propose three 
different estimation methods to examine the relationship between fiscal instruments and 
output. Our first specification is comparable to the ones used by Woo (2009), Alesina and 
Tabellini (2005), and is defined by equation (2.1) which is estimated for each country 
separately for the period 1970-201421.  
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑖𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                     (2.1) 
The term ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑡 is the change in the log of real government consumption expenditure. 
The term 𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 (output gap) is the log deviation of real GDP from its Hodrick-
Prescott trend to focus only on the cyclical components22. Since there is no readily 
available data of tax rates for the individual countries, we restrict out analysis to the 
spending side. Unlike Kaminsky et al., (2004), we select a measure of central government 
expenditure over government spending. It is argued that government spending includes 
interest payments and transfers, which can add noise to this estimation method (see, for 
example, Halland and Bleaney, 2011). We therefore use general public expenditure as our 
fiscal policy measure. We also choose public expenditure over the fiscal budget to avoid 
the bias introduced by the simultaneous relation between output gap and the fiscal 
budget. Our choice is motivated both by empirical evidence showing that government 
spending does not react much to the cycle, as well as by the theoretical arguments that 
the political process in most countries does not permit for immediate changes in 
discretionary expenditure (see, for example, Fatás and Mihov, 2003). The budget deficit, 
on the other hand, is mainly influenced by macroeconomic conditions with serious 
endogeneity implications23.   
In specification (2.1) the two control variables are the lag of real government expenditure 
(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑡−1), which allows for long-term mean reversion consistent with fiscal sustainability 
and correct for the first order autocorrelation problem and 𝑇𝑖𝑡 a time trend. The estimated 
coefficient ?̂?𝑖 measures the elasticity of fiscal cyclicality for each of the country 𝑖. A positive 
(negative) value of ?̂?𝑖 indicates that government take procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal 
policy.  
                                                          
reasonable because it might be circumstances that tax rates and government expenditures behave similarly but tax revenues are more 
procyclical in the advanced world than in developing countries. 
21 Earlier empirical works estimate the cyclical properties of fiscal policy by taking panel approach (see, for example, Calderón and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2008 and others). In our analysis, we try to explore the time-series properties of data for each country separately. 
22 We follow the recommendation of Alberola and Montero (2007) for annual data and set the Hodrick-Prescott filter’s parameter for 
smoothness 𝜆 = 100, which is referred to as ‘de facto’ industry standards and delivers wider cycle (see, for example, Maravall and Rio, 2001).  
23 As argued by Fatás and Mihov (2003) and quantitative analysis proposed by Chalk (2002). 
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Our second specification is similar to Halland and Bleaney (2011) and McManus and 
Ozkan (2015), as is in equation (2.2) and is estimated for each country for the period 1970-
2014. 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑌𝐶 = ?̅?𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖 𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                                                         (2.2)  
where, ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑌𝐶 is the log deviation of real government consumption expenditure from its 
Hodrick-Prescott trend and output gap (𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡) defined as the log deviation of real 
GDP from its Hodrick-Prescott trend. The estimated coefficient of ?̂?𝑖 from the specification 
(2.1) does not have the advantage of using the detrended statistics of government 
expenditure, and it will implicitly incorporate the government expenditure trend. This 
problem may lead to an upwardly (downward) biased estimation of ?̂?𝑖 assuming an 
upward (downward) trend in government consumption expenditure. Specification (2.2) 
attempts overcome this problem, where government expenditure and output are both 
deviations from trend. Additionally, the Hodrick-Prescott filter allows us to consider only 
the cyclical components of both variables.  
We correct for the first-order autocorrelation in the residuals (𝜇𝑖𝑡) by using a standard two 
steps Prais-Winsten technique based on country specific estimation24. The following 
transformation takes place in specification (2.2) during the estimation process for 
individual country 𝑖. 
𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝜇𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                             (2.3) 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑌𝐶 = ?̅?𝑖(1 − 𝜌𝑖) + 𝜌𝑖∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑡−1
𝐶𝑌𝐶 + ?̅?𝑖 (𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑖𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜗𝑖𝑡                            (2.4) 
The estimated ?̅?𝑖
̂  measures the elasticity of the cyclical element of real GDP to the cyclical 
(discretionary) element of government consumption expenditure, where a positive 
(negative) value of ?̅?𝑖
̂  denotes procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy.   
One issue with the estimation of (2.1) and (2.2) is that they could provide us with an 
unbiased estimation of the cyclicality of fiscal policy only if the output is exogenous to 
fiscal policy. If output itself reacts to fiscal policy, as in most macro models, a simple OLS 
regression of fiscal policy on output will lead to a biased estimation, which captures the 
size of the fiscal multiplier rather than the policy reaction function. However, there is a 
large literature indicating that in the short-run fiscal policy does have an impact on 
                                                          
24 However, during the estimation process for the specification (2.2), we find that some countries’ error term 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is not only correlated in first-
order; it can be correlated with second, third order and so forth. To identify the correct order of autocorrelation among the error term, we first 
estimate the specification (2.2) and investigate correlogram Ljung-Box Q-statistics of the partial autocorrelation function (PAC) to detect the 
correct order 𝑧. After that, we estimate AR (𝑧) model to correct autocorrelation problem among the error term 𝜇𝑖𝑡 for the specification (2.2). 
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output (see, for example, Ilzetzki and Vegh, 2008). Another argument proposed by 
Rigobon (2004) in his observations on Kaminsky et al., (2004) findings. The author points 
out that advanced economies and developing countries follow different fiscal policies due 
to both groups of countries are exposed to different kind of external shocks. In short, the 
estimation of ?̂?𝑖 and ?̅?𝑖
̂  is valid only if output is exogenous to government expenditure.  
Hence, we follow Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) and Gali and Perotti (2003) and estimate 
?̂?𝑖 and ?̅?𝑖
̂  by using an instrument that can deal with the reverse causality issue in a large 
sample of countries. The key problem is finding a valid instrument that needs to be 
correlated with 𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 with no direct effect on the dependent variable (i.e., 
government expenditure). We argue that country’s trading partners’ export demand has 







                                                                                              (2.5) 
where 𝑖 denotes the domestic country who are exporting to their trading partners 𝑗 (or 
foreign country). 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖⁄  measures domestic country 𝑖’s average exports expressed as 
a share of its real output (i.e., trade openness). 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑗𝑡  measures real output growth in 
foreign country 𝑗 in period 𝑡, 𝜔𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the fraction of export from domestic country 𝑖 going to 
foreign country 𝑗 in period 𝑡26. 
For brevity of our analysis for rest of the chapter, we estimate the specification (2.2) to 
measure the cyclicality of fiscal policy by using two-stage least square (TSLS) method for 
each country separately. We also estimate specification (2.1) by using TSLS method (the 
instrument 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 for 𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡). However, we have found that estimated results 
for model (2.1) are broadly similar to model (2.2). In this case, we proceed the analysis 
based on the model (2.2). The TSLS method is defined by specification (2.7) and it is 
estimated for each country separately. Due to data availability for the instrument 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡, we estimate ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 for 30 years period (1985-2014) for each country to 
measure the cyclicality of fiscal policy. Our first stage regression model is defined by: 
                                                          
25 This instrument is earlier used by Jaimovich and Panizza (2007, p.13) to investigate the cyclical properties of fiscal policy for a panel of 95 
countries. In our analysis, we utilize this instrument to investigate the cyclical properties of fiscal policy for each country separately by 
exploring time-series properties of data. 
26 Precisely weight 𝜔𝑖𝑗,𝑡 =
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑗
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑𝑖
, where 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 is defined as domestic country’s 𝑖 export to its trading partner country 𝑗 and 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑𝑖 is defined as each country’s 𝑖 export to rest of the world. Note that specification (2.5) use a time-invariant measure 
of exports over GDP because a time-variant measure would be affected by real exchange rate fluctuations, and, therefore, by domestic factors. 
This is not the case for the fraction of exports going to a given country 𝜔𝑖𝑗,𝑡, because the variation of the exchange rate that is due to domestic 
factors has an equal effect on both the numerator and denominator. 
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𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋𝑖 + 𝜎𝑖𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡                                                                                              (2.6) 
Second stage regression is defined as: 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑌𝐶 = ?̅?𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉
𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + ?̅?𝑖𝑡                                                                                                       (2.7) 
In the model (2.7), estimated ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 measures cyclicality of fiscal policy for each of the 
country 𝑖, where reverse causality issues of the model (2.2) have been handled by using 
instrumental approach27. Similar techniques proposed for the model (2.2) have been 
implemented on the model (2.7) to detect autocorrelation problem of the error term (?̅?𝑖𝑡) 
and corrected accordingly. A positive (negative) value of ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 specifies procyclical 
(countercyclical) fiscal policy. In our estimation process of fiscal cyclicality (?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉), 
the data for dependent, explanatory variables and instrument variables are collected from 
different sources; please refer Table A2.1 for their sources and data description. 
2.3.2 Government quality as a determinant of procyclical 
fiscal policy 
To explore whether there is a statistically significant link between the compiled cyclicality 
of fiscal policy and government quality, we estimate the following cross-country dimension 
of data for 137 countries over the period 1970-2014. The baseline regression model is as 
follows: 
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝐶𝑦𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑑̂ 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻)𝑖70 + 𝛼2𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡                            (2.8) 
where 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝐶𝑦𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑑̂ 𝑖𝑡 denotes the relevant estimated fiscal cyclicality indicators (?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and 
?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉) from the equation (2.1), (2.4) and (2.7) respectively. Each of the fiscal cyclicality 
indicators (?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂, and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉) enter the regression specification separately, and their results 
are tested and presented in an isolation of one another. Our baseline specification (2.8) is 
in line with Woo (2009) and includes 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻)𝑖70, log of initial real GDP per capita 
in 1970 to capture the potential impact of the level of economic development on fiscal 
cyclicality; 𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡, the government size (government expenditure to GDP) to capture the 
economic stabilisation impact of government size on output; 𝑋𝑖𝑡, the set of appropriate 
control variables. Our core variable of interest is a composite index of government quality 
(𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡), measured by the average of the normalized variables of corruption, transparency 
                                                          
27 In order to estimate by using TSLS method, the specification (2.1) and (2.2) must satisfy the order condition for identification, which 
indicates that there must be at least as many instruments as there are coefficients in the equations. There is an additional rank condition which 
must also be satisfied (see, for example, Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). To resolve this issue, along with 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡, we also include 
constant and lags of the regressors in the instrumental variable set.  
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and egalitarian democracy index. Based on our earlier arguments, we expect the 
coefficient 𝛼3 to be negative. The negative coefficient of 𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡 would confirm that an 
increase in government quality reduces the degree of procyclicality.  
Our preferred method is cross-country analysis over the panel estimation for two 
underlying reasons. The cross-country dimension allows us to address issues of 
endogeneity between complied cyclicality indicators and government quality. Succinctly, 
we use the cross-sectional variation in political characteristics to instrument for 
cyclicality of fiscal policy. Second, an empirical study purely based on time series data 
cannot use this information because country’s political characteristics (i.e., 𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡 for our 
analysis) do not systematically change very frequently (argued by Fatás and Mihov, 2003). 
Hence, we estimate specification (2.8) by exploiting the cross-country variability as 
opposes to within-country variability. However, to explore cross-country variabilities 
further, we will also use panel estimation method proposed by Calderón and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2008), Alesina and Tabellini (2005), and Frankel et al., (2013). The extension of 
the analysis and the estimation method along with their results will be discussed later.   
The data are collected from a wide range of sources; please refer Table A2.2 for their 
sources and elaborative definition. Given that heteroscedasticity is an important concern 
in cross-country regressions, we estimate specification (2.8) based on white-
heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix approach and report the standard errors 
accordingly. 
2.4 Descriptive statistics 
2.4.1 The prevalence of fiscal policy procyclicality 
We estimate the cyclicality of fiscal policy (?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉) using equations (2.1), (2.4) and 
(2.7) respectively. We utilize data from 137 countries (i.e., 30 advanced, 59 emerging and 
48 developing country) over the 1970-201428. Table 2.1 shows the average cyclicality of 
fiscal policy (?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉) based on data from all available years from each sample 
country; these statistics have then been aggregated across the country group 
classification. Results presented in Table 2.1 helps us to make two clear points. First, on 
average fiscal procyclicality are heavily observed across the globe. This is not only true 
                                                          
28 Although, previous literature uses much longer time series data back to 1960 (see, for example, McManus and Ozkan, 2015, Woo, 2009, 
and others). Only a minority of the sample countries have time series data for many years before 1970. In this case, we select 1970 as the 
starting point of the data for the whole set of countries, so that the fiscal statistics can be comparable among the countries and even between 
the countries’ income groups. Note also that our 45 years of time series data is still greater than most in the previous literature; for example, 
Alesina and Tabellini (2005) use 16 years of data, while Halland and Bleaney (2011) investigate 25 years of data.  
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for low-income developing countries, as it is also noticeable in emerging countries. On the 
contrary, advanced economies tend to follow acyclical, or slightly procyclical policy 
compared to other group. The findings indicate that there is an inverse relation between 
procyclicality with the countries’ level of development29. Second, there is a positive 
pairwise correlation among the estimated ?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉. However, the correlation between 
?̂?𝑖 and ?̅?𝑖
̂  is 0.813, which is higher than other pairwise correlations. ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 has relatively low 
correlation with the other measures and a higher standard deviation. This is probably 
because ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉is estimated from IV approach, when we instrumented the model (2.2)’s output 
gap (𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡) by trading partners’ export demand (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡). Nevertheless, ?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  
and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 have positive pairwise correlations among themselves, which indicates the 
consistency of measurement across ?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉.  
 
TABLE 2.1: CYCLICALITY OF FISCAL POLICY 1970-2014 
Country Group 
Estimated Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy 
?̂? ?̂̅? ?̂̅?𝑰𝑽 
Mean [St.Dev]  Observations Mean [St.Dev]  Observations Mean [St.Dev]  Observations 
All Country Group 0.68 [0.64] 137 0.66 [0.68] 137 1.11 [1.42] 128 
Advanced Economies 0.17 [0.38] 30 0.07 [0.37] 30 0.02 [0.60] 28 
Emerging Market 0.75 [0.51] 59 0.78 [0.56] 59 1.12 [1.41] 54 
Low Income Developing Economies 0.91 [0.75] 48 0.87 [0.81] 48 1.77 [1.38] 46 
CORRELATION MATRIX OF FISCAL POLICY CYCLICALITY 
 ?̂? ?̂̅? ?̂̅?𝑰𝑽 
?̂?  1   
?̂̅?  0.813 1  
?̂̅?𝑰𝑽  0.442 0.425 1 
Note: We estimate ?̂?𝑰 and ?̅?𝒊
̂ for 45 years (1970-2014) for individual country to measure the cyclicality of fiscal policy. Due to data availability for the instrument 𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑫𝑬𝑴𝑨𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕, we 
estimate ?̂̅?𝒊
𝑰𝑽 for 30 years period (1985-2014) for individual country to measure the cyclicality of fiscal policy. We take average and standard deviation of fiscal cyclicality indicators for 
each country group to present the above summery statistics. A simple correlation statistics is calculated by utilizing the country indicators of ?̂?, ?̂̅? and ?̂̅?𝑰𝑽. The country group classification 
is from Nielsen (2011).  
 
It is clear that fiscal procyclicality has been widespread in emerging and developing 
countries, compared to advanced world. However, these findings are coming from average 
data of ?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉, without country specific weight.  It can be argued that these results 
may be misleading because of considerable variation across the sample countries within 
each group. In this case, it is necessary to investigate the individual country’s cyclicality 
                                                          
29 This is the most common results found in the literature (see, for example, Woo, 2009; Kaminsky et al., 2004 and others). 
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of fiscal policy. We represent the estimated ?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 in Figures 2.1-2.3 respectively30. 
Results presented in Figure 2.1-2.3 allow us to propose one clear observations. The 
tendency of running procyclical fiscal policy (blue and red bars) is widely observed in 
emerging and developing countries compared to advanced world. For example, in Figure 
2.1, ?̂?𝑖  show that tendency of running high degree of procyclical fiscal policy (i.e., red bars, 
?̂?𝑖 ≥ 1, government spending is sensitive to output gap) is widely present in both emerging 
markets (15 out of 59) and developing countries (20 out of 48); conversely in advanced 
economies, this behaviour is almost absent (1 out of 30). The estimated cyclicality ?̅?𝑖
̂  reveal 
a similar profile (Figure 2.2).  
 
However, emerging and developing countries’ high procyclicality (red bars) characteristics 
are relatively more evident from ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉, compared to ?̂?𝑖 and ?̅?𝑖
̂  (Figure 2.3 vs. Figure 2.1-2.2). 
On the contrary, advanced economies’ cyclicality profile based on ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 is fairly similar to 
that coming from ?̂?𝑖 and ?̅?𝑖
̂  (Figure 2.3 vs. Figure 2.1-2.2). These results remain intact, 
when we instrumented model (2.2)’s output gap by trading partners’ export demand to 
estimate ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉. These findings indicate that advanced economies and developing countries 
follow different fiscal policies due to output movement that arises from external shocks 
(i.e., trading partneres’ export demand)31. Nevertheless, Figure 2.1-2.3 indicate advanced 
economies lie overwhelmingly on the left-hand side of the cyclicality specification, while 
the right is dominated by emerging and developing countries. 
2.4.2 The graduation hypothesis 
The above findings establish that fiscal policy procyclicality has been the norm rather 
than an exception in many emerging and low-income developing countries during the last 
45 years (1970-2014), while the advanced economies followed slightly procyclical or 
countercyclical policies. This section revisits the “graduation hypothesis” proposed by 
Frankel et al., (2013) who document a shift in the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy over 
the last decades (1960-99 vs. 2000-09). They argue that several emerging and developing
                                                          
30 Table A2.3-A2.5 provide cyclicality measures (?̂?𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 ) estimated for individual countries for the period 1970-2014, which updates 
the evidence presented by Kaminsky et al., (2004) and Frankel et al., (2013), both of which base their findings on simple correlations between 
the cyclical components of government spending and GDP. In our case, we use time-series estimation as basis of our cyclicality measures. 
31 As Rigobon (2004) points out that the external shocks on the developing countries are different from those hit advanced economies. The 
author also argues that emerging and developing countries fiscal shocks are dominated by output shocks that are mainly originated from 
external shocks. 
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economies have been able to overcome the problem of conducting the procyclical policy 
and became countercyclical in recent decades. Note that these results are based on 
country correlations between cyclical components of real government expenditure and 
real GDP32. To our end, we reinvestigate “graduation hypothesis” by taking the time-series 
regression-based approach in our sample to investigate how the cyclicality behaviour of 
fiscal policy has changed over the sample period. We find that our findings are still 
consistent with Frankel et al., (2013) regarding the “graduation hypothesis”. 
We follow Frankel et al., (2013) and divide the period 1970-2014 into two sub-periods: 
1970-1999 (pre-1999s) and 2000-2014 (post-1999s) for each country. We estimate the fiscal 
cyclicality ?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 for each country over the two sub-periods33. Figure 2.4 (Panel A, 
B and C) presents a scatter plot with pre-1999s’ fiscal cyclicality on the horizontal axis 
and post-1999s’ fiscal cyclicality on the vertical axis. Figure 2.4 divides into four quadrant 
along the zero axes for ?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉. By dividing the scatter plot into four quadrants, we 
can classify the countries into four categories34.  
a) Recent graduates (bottom-right): These are the countries that were procyclical during 
the pre-1999s period, and became countercyclical over the last decade (post-1999s). ?̂? 
(Panel A) indicate that in total 34 out of 137 sample countries have recently graduated. 
The majority of these are emerging (18) and developing (11) countries. Figure 2.4 
Panel B and C also convey the same message for ?̂̅? and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉. 
b) Established graduates (bottom-left): These are the countries that have always been 
countercyclical. It can be seen that 11 out of 137 sample countries have always been 
countercyclical over the time 1970-2014 (Panel A). Not surprisingly, the majority of 
the developed countries (7) belongs to this category. Panel B and C also denote similar 
findings for ?̂̅? and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉. 
c) Back to school (top-left): These are the countries that were countercyclical during pre-
1999s and turned to procyclical over the last decade (post-1999s). ?̂? indicate (Panel A) 
that a small group of countries (14 out of 137) fall into these categories. This small 
                                                          
32 Frankel et al. (2013) analyse 94 countries data for the period 1960-2009. 
33 As a result, we estimate ?̂?𝑖  and, ?̅?𝑖
̂  for 30-year horizon for pre-1999s period (1970-1999) and 15-year horizon for post-1999s (2000-2014). 
Due to data availability for the instrument 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 , we estimate ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 for 15-year horizon for pre-1999s period (1985-1999) and 15-
year horizon for post-1999s (2000-2014). This maximizes the number of observations for regressions whilst at the same time allowing for 
appropriate intervals for the variables to be measured over. Because we are testing for fiscal cyclicality, we need to observe at least two or 
three cycle. Alesina and Tabellini (2005) also point to the importance of observing a full business cycle in the sample and thus include at least 
16 years of data for each country.  McManus and Ozkan (2015) also follow a similar approach, where they estimate fiscal cyclical stance for 
15-year horizons using time series regression approach. The two sub-period cyclicality results are presented in Table A2.3-A2.5. 
34 We borrow the expression of the coordinate’s name from Frankel et al., (2013). 
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group of countries is split between advanced (6), emerging (3) and developing countries 
(5). Panel B and C visual image also convey the same result for ?̂̅? and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉. 
d) Procyclicality trap (top-right): These are the countries that continued to show 
procyclicality over the last forty-five years. Panel A shows that 78 out of 137 sample 
countries fall under this “procyclicality trap”. Not surprisingly, majority of them are 
emerging (36) and developing countries (30) fall under procyclicality trap. ?̂̅? and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 
conveys essentially the same message (Figure 2.4, Panel B and C). 
The emerging and developing countries overcoming the problem of procyclicality (i.e., 
graduation hypothesis) is a welcome development. However, Figure 2.4 feature a 
substantial number of emerging and developing countries (i.e., ?̂?=66, ?̂̅?=62, and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉=62) 
that are locked in the “procyclicality trap”, which are our major interest in this Chapter. 
On average, we observed that for these group of countries used to be less procyclical 
during pre-1999s, and fiscal policy became more procyclical during post-1999s (Table 2.2). 
We present the change of cyclicality of fiscal policy over the two sub-time periods: 
pre1999s to post1999s. We have found that on average ∆?̂?  is +0.19, ∆?̂̅? is +0.17 and ∆?̂̅?𝐼𝑉 
is +0.29, where positive (+) values of change confirm that these group countries’ 
procyclicality have increased over the 1970-2014 period and becoming more procyclical. 
(Table 2.2).  
2.4.3 The prevalence of government quality 
What explains the ability of emerging and developing countries that escape from the 
“procyclicality trap”? Clearly many macroeconomic and institutional factors come into 
play, and we believe that government quality is one of the major factors that can help 
countries overcome the problem. To this effect, we construct a composite index of 
government quality (𝐺𝑄) by taking average of three normalized variables: corruption 
(𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅), transparency (𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹) and egalitarian democracy index (𝐸𝐺𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂)35. It is 
important to note that our selected measures to compute 𝐺𝑄 index are entirely different 
from Frankel et al., (2013)’s institutional quality (𝐼𝑄) index. Indeed, they measure 𝐼𝑄 by 
considering investment profile, law and order, corruption, and bureaucratic quality from 
ICRG (International Country Risk Guide)36. There is no standard (or established) 
                                                          
35 The 𝐺𝑄 index calculation is based on 133 countries’ annual data covering the time 1970-2014. The 𝐺𝑄 index ranges between 0 (lowest 
government quality) and 1 (highest government quality). Table A2.2 provide more details on data description, construction method and their 
sources. Table A2.3-A2.5 provide the constructed value for 𝐺𝑄 index. 
36 Institutions as a system of rights, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that give rise to social and economic practices, assign 
roles to nodes of government and guide interactions among the political agents of the relevant nodes (see, for example Graham et al., 2003; 
Delmas and Young, 2009). In this regard, “institutions” are the tools or constitutive part of government that they will adopt to implement the 
policy. Better quality institutions can facilitative superior government practices. 
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approach to measure the 𝐺𝑄. In our approach, we try to incorporate only those variables 
that reflect how the government’s power and responsibilities are exercised. More 
specifically, we utilize Alesina and Tabellini (2005) (rent-seeking proxied by corruption), 
Andersen and Nelsen (2010) (for information transparency); and Woo (2009) (for social 
inequality) and incorporate related variables into our 𝐺𝑄 index to explore the link with 
procyclical fiscal policy. 
We present the calculated 𝐺𝑄 index in Figure 2.5, where the blue (red) bars indicate cases 
where the country’s 𝐺𝑄 is above (below) the sample average (0.48). Results presented in 
Figure 2.5 allow us to make one clear observation; advanced economies possess better 𝐺𝑄 
and their 𝐺𝑄 Index is above the sample average (blue bars) as expected and vice versa for 
emerging and low-income developing countries (red bars). On average advanced 
economies have the highest 𝐺𝑄 (0.75) compared to emerging economies (0.45) and low-
income developing countries (0.35) (Table 2.3).  
Next, we decompose 𝐺𝑄 measures in each country group into two sub-components; initial 
𝐺𝑄 (𝐺𝑄1970(𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿) and change of 𝐺𝑄 (∆𝐺𝑄). 𝐺𝑄1970(𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿), referring to the initial (or 
earliest) value of 𝐺𝑄 observed in 1970 and ∆𝐺𝑄 is the difference between the average 𝐺𝑄 
value and 𝐺𝑄1970(𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿). Table 2.3 results denotes that advanced economies have the 
highest level of initial 𝐺𝑄 (0.69) compared to emerging markets (0.40) and low-income 
developing countries (0.34). Additionally, highest ∆𝐺𝑄 values are reported for advanced 
world (0.07) compare to emerging (0.05) and developing countries (0.017), as is consistent 
with Fatás and Mihov (2003)’s arguments. Indeed, “procyclicality trap” countries’ average 
𝐺𝑄 values are significantly lower compared to that of the advanced world (i.e. as a 
benchmark). “Procyclicality trap” countries also have the lowest improvement in 𝐺𝑄 from 
the initial state of 𝐺𝑄 (Table 2.3). 
2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1 Government quality as a determinant of procyclical 
fiscal policy 
In this section, we show that over the last few decades (1970-2014) several emerging and 
developing countries have been under the “procyclicality trap” due to a lack of better 
government quality (𝐺𝑄). We first start by results of simple bivariate analysis. Figure 2.6 
illustrates scatter plot of 𝐺𝑄 and fiscal cyclicality (?̂?𝑖,?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉) over the period 1970-2014. 
We find a clear negative relationship between 𝐺𝑄 and fiscal cyclicality.




TABLE 2.2:  CHANGE OF  FISCAL CYCLICALITY OVER THE TIME 1970-2014 (PRE 1999s vs. POST 1999s) 
Country Group 
?̂? ?̂̅? ?̂̅?𝑰𝑽 
Pre-1999s Post-1999s ∆?̂? Pre-1999s Post-1999s ∆?̂̅? Pre-1999s Post-1999s ∆?̂̅?𝑰𝑽 
All Country Group 0.794 0.456 -0.338↓ 0.731 0.313 -0.418↓ 1.326 0.487 -0.838↓ 
Advanced Economies 0.211 0.097 -0.114↓ 0.150 0.014 -0.136↓ 0.227 -0.078 -0.304↓ 
Emerging Market 0.752 0.296 -0.456↓ 0.787 0.268 -0.519↓ 1.478 0.369 -1.108↓ 
Developing Economies 1.211 0.878 -0.333↓ 1.027 0.557 -0.470↓ 1.816 0.969 -0.846↓ 
Procyclicality Trap  0.943 1.132 +0.189↑↑ 0.919 1.091 +0.172↑↑ 1.024 1.333 +0.291↑↑ 
Note: We estimate ?̂?𝑰 and ?̅?𝒊
̂ for two sub-time period 1970-1999 (pre-1999s, 30 years) and 2000-2014 (post-1999s, 15 years) for individual country.  Due to data availability for the 
instrument 𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑫𝑬𝑴𝑨𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕, we estimate ?̂̅?𝒊
𝑰𝑽 for two sub-time period 1985-1999 (pre-1999s, 15 years) and 2000-2014 (post-1999s, 15 years) for each country. We then take average 
of the cyclicality indicators for two-sub time period (pre-1999s and post-1999s) for each country group to present the above summery statistics.  Change ∆ calculated from 2000-
2014 (post-1999s) average value minus 1970-1999 (pre-1999s) average value of ?̂?𝑰, ?̅?𝒊
̂and ?̅?𝒊
̂𝑰𝑽. The –ve (or +ve) value of ∆ indicates that country groups are moving from procyclical 













TABLE 2.3: CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT QUALITY(𝑮𝑸) OVER THE TIME 1970-2014  
Country Group 𝑮𝑸𝟏𝟗𝟕𝟎(𝑰𝑵𝑰𝑻𝑰𝑨𝑳) 𝑨𝒗𝒈. 𝑮𝑸 ∆𝑮𝑸 St.Dev of 𝑮𝑸 Sample 
All Country Group 0.437 0.481 0.044↑ 0.18 133 
Advanced Economies 0.689 0.758 0.070↑↑ 0.08 27 
Emerging Market 0.401 0.455 0.054↑ 0.12 58 
Low Income Developing 0.341 0.358 0.017↑ 0.11 48 
Procyclicality Trap ?̂? 0.419 0.464 0.045↑ 0.17 77 
Procyclicality Trap ?̂̅? 0.408 0.454 0.046↑ 0.16 71 
Procyclicality Trap ?̂̅?𝑰𝑽 0.418 0.456 0.038↑ 0.17 74 
Note: Government quality (𝑮𝑸) is a normalized index ranges between 0 (lowest government quality) and 1 (highest government quality). The index is calculated by taking the 
average of three components: political corruption, release of information by government and egalitarian democracy index. 𝑨𝒗𝒈. 𝑮𝑸 refer to the average government quality from 
1970-2014 for each country group. 𝑮𝑸 𝟏𝟗𝟕𝟎(𝑰𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍) refers average government quality in 1970 for each country group. ∆𝑮𝑸 =  𝑨𝒗𝒈. 𝑮𝑸 −  𝑮𝑸 𝟏𝟗𝟕𝟎(𝑰𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍). We take standard 
deviation of 𝑮𝑸 for each country group to present the St.Dev of 𝑮𝑸. The country group classification is from Nielsen (2011).  















The negative correlation implies that the lower (higher) the 𝐺𝑄 in a country, the more 
procyclical (countercyclical) is fiscal policy. The correlation dissimilarity are observed due 
to the variation of fiscal cyclicality (?̂?𝑖,?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉) estimation methods. Figure 2.6 also 
indicates that majority of advanced countries (blue dots) fall on the right-hand side, 
indicating a clear evidence of co-existing of high 𝐺𝑄 and low level of procyclicality or even 
countercyclicality of fiscal policy. On the contrary, majority of the emerging (orange dots) 
and developing countries (red dots) are located on the left. 
To formally explore whether there is a statistically significant link between the compiled 
fiscal cyclicality (?̂?𝑖,?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉) and 𝐺𝑄, we estimate the specification (2.8), and the results 
of which are presented in Table 2.4. Our baseline specification is similar to Woo (2009), 
hence we include the initial real GDP per-capita in 1970 (𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻) to control for the 
potential impact of the level of economic development and backwardness on fiscal policy. 
According to Woo (2009), less developed countries may have relatively insufficient tax 
revenue and expenditure systems that may reflect on their fiscal policy, and hence fiscal 
authorities become more likely to follow procyclical policy. Additionally, 𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻 may 
reflect the socio-political condition of the less developed world on fiscal outcome. Hence, 
𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻’s coefficients are expected to enter with a negative sign.  
Next, we include government size (𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃) measured by government expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP. 𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃 to capture the impact of government size on output (see, for 
example, Fatás and Mihov, 2003; Gali, 1994). It is argued that the strength of automatic 
stabilisers can be measured by using the size of the government (𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃). That is, countries 
with larger governments are more likely to exhibit countercyclical fiscal policy. Hence, 
𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃 coefficients are expected to enter the regression with a negative sign. 
Our key indicator is government quality (𝐺𝑄), which yields results as hypothesised earlier. 
The coefficients of 𝐺𝑄 enter with an expected negative sign that are statistically 
significant at the 1% to 10% level (Table 2.4), suggesting that an increase in 𝐺𝑄 reduces 
the degree of procyclicality. It is noticeable that the coefficient values of ?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 
differ from one another. Specifically, higher coefficient values are reported for  ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 
compared to ?̂?𝑖. The variation in the coefficient values mainly arise from different 
estimation methods constructing the fiscal cyclicality measures (?̂?𝑖,?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉). However, 
the impact of 𝐺𝑄 is statistically significant with correct negative (-) sign for all 
computations in all three cases. The OLS estimates in Table 2.4, Col 1 imply that 0.10 
unit of increase in 𝐺𝑄 reduces the fiscal policy procyclicality by 0.97%. We also explore the 




relation between individual parts of 𝐺𝑄 (𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅, 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹 and 𝐸𝐺𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂) and the 
compiled fiscal cyclicality (?̂?𝑖,?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉)37. 
We now further investigate “procyclicality trap” countries’ data; as is presented in Table 
2.4 as can be seen. The coefficient of 𝐺𝑄 for this group are statistically significant at the 
5% to 10% level with the correct negative sign (except, Table 2.4, Col 4 and 5).  The 
coefficient values for this group are relatively low compared to the full set of countries. 
These results are mainly due to a high variability (i.e., standard deviation) of 𝐺𝑄 within 
“procyclicality trap” countries, compared to the full sample of countries (see, Table 2.3).  
Similar to the above, we now decompose the index 𝐺𝑄 into its initial value 𝐺𝑄1970(𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿) 
and change of 𝐺𝑄 (∆𝐺𝑄). The initial institutional quality is expected to be positively 
associated with the economic performance (see, for example, Acemoglu et al., 2012). We 
therefore propose that initial 𝐺𝑄 should reflect on fiscal behaviour. Table 2.5 presents 
cross-country regression findings for the two sets of measures (𝐺𝑄1970(𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿) and ∆𝐺𝑄) 
along with control variables 𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻 and 𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃, from specification (2.8). The coefficient 
values of 𝐺𝑄1970(𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿) are statistically significant at 1% to 10% with correct negative 
sign except in Col 4 and 5. The negative coefficients of 𝐺𝑄1970(𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿) suggest that 
countries with better initial 𝐺𝑄 tend to exhibit less procyclical policy. The coefficient 
values of ∆𝐺𝑄 also enter with correct negative sign. However, none of the ∆𝐺𝑄 coefficient 
values are statistically significant.  
We also run a separate set of estimation by utilising specification (2.8) for “procyclicality 
trap” countries for the decomposed variables 𝐺𝑄1970(𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿) and ∆𝐺𝑄. We get statistical 
significant results with correct negative sign for 𝐺𝑄1970(𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿)  within this group of 
countries (Table 2.5). Some interesting results emerge by investigating the coefficient 
values of ∆𝐺𝑄 for this group of countries. The coefficient values (in an absolute term) for 
∆𝐺𝑄 are high for “procyclicality trap” countries compared to the whole sample (Table 2.5, 
procyclicality trap Col 4, 9 and 14 vs. all country sample Cols). This result points to the 
importance of 𝐺𝑄 improvements as a necessary step to overcome the fiscal procyclical trap.  
                                                          
37 To formally explore whether there is a statistically significant link between the individual parts of 𝐺𝑄 (i.e. political corruption 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅, 
transparency 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹 and egalitarian democracy 𝐸𝐺𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂) and the compiled fiscal cyclicality (?̂?𝑖,?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉), we estimate the baseline  
specification (2.8) but the independent variable 𝐺𝑄 is replaced by 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅, 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹 and 𝐸𝐺𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂, and the results of which are presented 
in Table A2.6. The coefficients of 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅, 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹 and 𝐸𝐺𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂 enter with an expected negative sign Table A2.6 show that higher 
𝐸𝐺𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂 reduce the tendency of running procyclical fiscal policy and the coefficient values of 𝐸𝐺𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂 are statistically significant at 
5% to 10% in majority of the specification. However, this effects is not found to be statistically significant for 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅 and 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹. The 
underlying reason is the higher positive correlation among the individual parts of 𝐺𝑄 – 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅, 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹 and 𝐸𝐺𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂 that may cause 
multicollinearity problems while we conduct the regression analysis (See, Table A.2.6 for the correlation matrix).  




We incorporate two other important control variables in our baseline specification (2.8). 
We first include trade openness (𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸). The argument is that countries that are more 
open to trade may experience greater external shock (i.e. trading partners’ export 
demand), which may need offsetting through fiscal adjustments. Rodrik (1998) in his well-
known paper argues that more open economies should have larger governments to smooth 
out fluctuations by conducting countercyclical fiscal policy. If so, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 coefficients are 
expected to enter with negative sign. However, results in Table 2.4 and 2.5 do not support 
these hypotheses.  
Second, we incorporate political instability (𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵) in the baseline regression 
specification (2.8). Woo (2009) shows that political instability may lead to procyclical fiscal 
policy. The argument is that political uncertainty may shorten the policymakers’ expected 
tenure and result in short-term policies, which may lead to procyclical fiscal policy. We 
follow the approach of Woo (2009) and develop a composite index for 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵. We utilize 
five variables to construct the index; which is measured by government crises, revolutions, 
military coups, constitutional changes, and politically motivated assassination38. The 
coefficients of 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵 are expected to enter with a positive sign. Table 2.4 and 
2.5, 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵 coefficient enter with correct positive sign but they are only statistically 
significant for ?̂?.  
Estimates presented in Table 2.4 and 2.5 suggest that the statistical significance and the 
size of coefficients of 𝐺𝑄, 𝐺𝑄1970(𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿)  and ∆𝐺𝑄 are robust to incorporating the two 
control variables 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 and 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵. We also investigate the robustness of the results 
to potential outliers. We, therefore, use weighted and reweighted OLS regression (WLS 
and RWLS method) to control for outliers39. Interestingly, however, the statistical 
significance and the size of the coefficients of 𝐺𝑄, 𝐺𝑄1970(𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿)  and ∆𝐺𝑄 remain much 
the same even after controlling for the outliers (Table 2.4 and 2.5, All RCol). 
2.5.2 Other determinants of procyclical fiscal policy 
While it seems natural to think that 𝐺𝑄 affect the way in which fiscal policy is conducted, 
our findings so far could reflect the effect of omitted variables that are related to 𝐺𝑄. To 
address this issue, we include a set of control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in the specification (2.8), the 
                                                          
38 We use the following weights to each of the variables, as proposed by Woo (2009). More precisely, 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵 = 0.04 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆 +
0.24 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 0.44 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑆 + 0.33 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐶𝐻𝐺 + 0.07 ∗ 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑁. The data description and the sources are presented in Table 
A2.2. 
39 Under the estimation process, two types of weights are used.  In Huber weighting, observations with small residuals get a weight of 1, the 
larger the residual, the smaller the weight. With biweighting, all cases with a non-zero residual get down-weighted at least a little.  The two 
different kinds of weight are used because Huber weights can have difficulties with severe outliers, and biweights can have difficulties 
converging or may yield multiple solutions.  Using the Huber weights first, helps to minimise problems with the biweights. 




results of which are presented in Table 2.6. Our control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are in line with Woo 
(2009) and Frankel et al., (2013), as widely discussed in previous literature and they also 
aim at capturing the alternative theories related to cyclicality of fiscal policy. The control 
variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are collected from a wide range of sources40. 
First, we use political constraint (𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑁) and checks and balances (𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐾𝐵𝐴𝐿𝐶) to 
account for institutional quality. We consider the degree of institutional constraints for a 
number of reasons. Higher institutional constraints act as a checks-and-balances 
mechanism, which may prevent the co-ordination failure among the politicians to 
determine the fiscal outcomes. Second, high level of institutional constraints may have 
implication for public finances. More specifically, institutional constraints as a reflection 
of better institutional quality can improve the tax collection system and provide better 
monitoring on public finance disbursement (see, for example, Woo, 2009). Such constraint 
can therefore help as an aggregate demand management tool (i.e. countercyclical fiscal 
policy). Third, when the institutional constrains are well established, keeping the conflict 
of interest among the policy makers in check, the “common pool” problems and fragmented 
policymaking may be less harmful in determining the fiscal policy (see, for example, 
Velasco, 1999; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Woo, 2009), hence allowing fiscal policy to smooth 
out the business cycle. The variable 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑁 measures the intensity to which the 
policymakers face political constraint in executing their policies (see, for example, Henisz, 
2002). Results presented in Table 2.6 (Col 1, 7 and 13) suggest that 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑁 coefficients 
enter with the expected negative sign, suggesting that higher 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑁 does reduce the 
scale of fiscal procyclicality. 
We also incorporate a measure of appropriate checks and balances (𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐾𝐵𝐴𝐿𝐶) face by 
politicians. Persson et al., (1997) argue that appropriate checks and balances alleviate the 
rent extraction behaviour of the politicians, hence improve the resources allocation 
process. Alesina and Tabellini (2005) also highlight the importance of the rent-seeking 
behaviour in relation to fiscal policy outcomes. They propose that political distortions 
arise from rent-seeking behaviour and in democratic regimes voters demand greater 
public expenditure to prevent governments from appropriating rents when an economy is 
performing well. Stronger checks and balances impose constraints on politicians. 
Politicians in democratic regimes are also held more accountable to the public, relative to 
an autocratic regime. In a more democratic regime, the expected returns to rent-seeking 
activities are lower. Thus, one can argue that improved checks and balances may lead to 
                                                          
40 Please refer Table A2.2 for their sources and elaborative definition. 




better fiscal policy outcome by decreasing harmful rent extraction effects on fiscal stance 
(see, for example, Alesina and Tabellini, 2005). In Table 2.6 (Col 2, 8 and 14) results show 
that 𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐶𝐾𝐵𝐴𝐿𝐶 coefficients enter with correct negative sign. The negative sign indeed 
suggests that better checks and balances reduce the tendency of running procyclical fiscal 
policy. However, this effects is not found to be statistically significant.  
Next, we control for political economy arguments related to the “common pool” problem. 
According to Velasco (1999) government resources (e.g. tax revenues) are a “common 
property”, out of which policymaker can finance expenditure on their preferred social 
welfare. He argues that a society is divided into several influential interest groups and 
each of which benefits from government spending on their preferred social area. At the 
presence of weak institutional quality, each interest group and their representatives may 
influence the fiscal authority to set net transfer on the group’s target expenditure at some 
desired level. Hence at the presence of common pool problem, the fiscal policy making 
become “fragmented” and interest groups try to fully internalise the benefits of the 
spending they propose.  
The “common pool” problem is typically associated with the number of participates in the 
cabinet (see, for example, Tornell and Lane, 1998). It is argued that overspending attitude 
and fiscal deficit mainly arise from the diversified opinion of the policymakers and co-
ordination failure regarding different economic objectives. According to this view, a fiscal 
deficit may arise because a group of politicians fail to internalise the implications of their 
expenditure financed through the common tax revenue. These problems become acute 
when there is a lack of coordination in the decision-making process with several political 
participates. Fragmented policy-making process combined with multiple objectives may 
create procyclical fiscal policy by triggering greater budget deficits in response to an 
increase in government revenue (i.e. by considering tax base variability). To examine this 
argument, we include 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 (size of the cabinet measured by the number of ministers) 
in our baseline specification (2.8). As is seen in Table 2.6 (Col 3, 9 and 15) 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 
coefficients enter with a correct positive sign, however, they are insignificant.  
We now consider three variables concerning the popular view of credit constraints 
impacting on procyclical fiscal policy. As in summarised above, it has been argued that 
procyclical policy arises due to cut-off from international credit markets in downturns, 
either because of incomplete international credit markets or credit constraints due to poor 
credit ratings (see, for example, Riascos and Végh, 2003; Gavin and Perotti, 1997 and 
others). According to this hypothesis, developing countries have limited access to 




international credit markets, and they may not be able to borrow in recessions and maybe 
even forced to pay back during crises, leading to contractionary fiscal policy. To test this 
hypothesis, we incorporate country credit rating (𝐶𝐶𝑅), as a measure of the borrowing 
constraints and access to international credit markets. We measure the 𝐶𝐶𝑅 by using 
Trading Economics Credit Ratings (2014), where greater values of 𝐶𝐶𝑅 imply better 
country credit ratings. Countries with better credit ratings have better access to credit 
markets to conduct fiscal policy in a countercyclical manner, hence 𝐶𝐶𝑅 are expected to 
enter with a negative sign, as is the case in Table 2.6 (Col 4, 10 and 16). The OLS estimates 
in Table 2.6, Col 4 imply that 1 unit of increase in 𝐶𝐶𝑅 reduces the fiscal policy 
procyclicality by 0.006%. 
Second, we control for the degree of financial depth and integration. We measure the 
financial integration by using the Chinn-Ito financial openness index (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) to 
measure country’s accessibility in international capital market. Greater values of the 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 indicate better access to international capital market or better integration to 
international capital markets. Riascos and Vegh (2003) and Frankel et al., (2013) argue 
that limited access to international capital markets (particularly in recession) may 
restrict the ability of fiscal authorities to conduct countercyclical policies. Results 
presented in Table 2.6 show that coefficients of 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 enter with correct negative sign 
and they are statistically significant at 1% to 5% level (except Col 17). The OLS estimates 
in Table 2.6, Col 5 imply that 0.10 unit of increase in 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 reduces the fiscal policy 
procyclicality by 0.55%. That is, countries with greater financial openness are indeed 
associated with less procyclical/more countercyclical policy.  
Lastly, we incorporate financial depth (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻) in specification (2.8) by using liquid 
liabilities over GDP. High-level of liquid liabilities may represent greater integration with 
foreign capital markets. Countries with a high level of liquid liabilities can be seen as to 
have the appropriate financial cushion to conduct countercyclical fiscal policy to smooth 
out the business cycle, particularly during downturns. In other words, it should be easier 
for fiscal authorities to conduct countercyclical policy in an environments where financial 
markets are deep and better integrated. Our measure of external liquid liability 
(𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻) is taken from IFS International Financial Statistics. The estimation results 
presented in Table 2.6 suggest that 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻 coefficients enter with correct negative 
sign and they are statistically significant at 1% to 10% level (except Col 18). The OLS 
estimates in Table 2.6, Col 6 imply that 1% of increase in 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻 reduces the fiscal 




policy procyclicality by 0.38%. Thus, high levels of external liquid liabilities allow a 
country to run less procyclical or more countercyclical fiscal policy.  
Results presented in Table 2.6 (Col 1 to 18) also show that government quality (𝐺𝑄) 
remains a strong determinant of fiscal procyclicality, even after accounting for important 
determinants that have been widely discussed in previous literature. This is the expected 
direction of empirical findings – higher level of government quality (𝐺𝑄) lead to lower level 
of procyclicality and it is statistically significant in majority of the specification (Table 2.6, 
Col 1 to 18). Moreover, the quantitative effect of 𝐺𝑄 becomes larger compared to other 
important determinates (i.e., 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑁, 𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐾𝐵𝐴𝐿𝐶, 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸, 𝐶𝐶𝑅, 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻) 
of fiscal procyclicality. 
2.5.3 Addressing the potential endogeneity of government 
quality 
In this section, we try to address the potential endogeneity of 𝐺𝑄 and cyclicality of fiscal 
policy by using an instrument variable (IV) approach. We address the potential 
endogeneity problems of cross-country analysis by using the baseline specification (2.8). 
We utilize two-step GMM estimation method as an IV regression to produce a consistent 
and efficient estimator in the presence of potential heteroscedasticity41. The estimation 
results are presented in Table 2.7.  
It can be argued that the possible negative relation between 𝐺𝑄 and fiscal cyclicality (?̂?𝑖, 
?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉) may arise from the fact that procyclical fiscal policies tend to destabilise the 
economy, which might worsen the government quality (𝐺𝑄). This argument received 
support from the growth literature; evidence suggests that there is a strong negative effect 
of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth, thus development (see, for example, Woo, 2009; 
McManus and Ozkan, 2015). In Chapter 4, we will also systematically argue that 
procyclical fiscal policy is costly for macroeconomic outcomes; for example, procyclical 
countries have lower rates of economic growth. That is, a negative impact of procyclical 
fiscal policy on development may be harmful for better government quality (𝐺𝑄), and not 
the other way around. Additionally, Frankel et al., (2013) propose that procyclical fiscal 
policies could accelerate the chances of governments to face debt sustainability issues, 
especially during downturns. These critical financial requirements could then lead to 
                                                          
41 We utilize GMM approach rather than conventional TSLS IV approach for the following reasons. The conventional approach of IV produces 
efficient estimation; however, it fails to present consistent standard errors. The issues can be handled partly by using Huber-White standard 
errors; yet, the IV approach fail to handle this problems at the presence of heteroscedasticity. 




expropriations (i.e. act of a government confiscating privately owned property), rejection 
of public contacts, and intervention in different nodes of governments hierarchy. 
Moreover, the turmoil closely associated with debt crises can increase the tendency of 
corruption in the political system; deteriorating overall efficiency of public administration, 
hence governance quality. That is, indirect causality may also run from cyclicality of fiscal 
policies to government quality (𝐺𝑄). 
We instrumented 𝐺𝑄 by using three different variables. First, we follow Acemoglu et al.,’s 
(2012) and instrument 𝐺𝑄 by using European settlements (𝐸𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇) in 1900. They 
propose that European mortality rates are negatively correlated with colonized countries’ 
institutional quality42. In other word, low settler mortality leads to better settlements that 
ensure better quality institutions, which reflects on current performance. The IV 
regression results in Table 2.7 confirm Acemoglu et al.,’s (2012) arguments. The first-
stage regression results show that 𝐸𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 coefficients are statistically significant at 
1% level with a correct positive sign (Col 1-3). The findings indeed suggest that countries 
with the early settlement of European Colony in 1900 have better government quality 
(𝐺𝑄). 
Second, we follow La Porta et al., (1999) to instrument average government quality (𝐺𝑄) 
by using country’s legal origin43. The legal traditions were originated in England, 
Germany, France, Scandinavian, and the Soviet Union but they spread around the world 
through conquest, colonisation, imitation, and voluntary adoption. There are substantial 
distinctions among social, civil and common law traditions (La Porta et al., 1999). Our 
objective is not to discuss these differences in depth rather we focus on only English 
common law (𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐿𝐴𝑊) and how it is distinct from others as a valid instrument for 
government performance44.  
The English common law traditions are entirely different with an old heritage; dating 
back to the 17th century. It has been shaped by the Parliament and the aristocracy at the 
expense of the Crown, and hence it has reflected a much greater extent, the intent to limit 
the power of the sovereign (see, for example, David and Brierley, 1978, p.303). As a result 
                                                          
42 For example, Belgian Colonisation (1876-1885) of the Congo regarded as “extractive states”. These institutions did not introduce much 
protection for the extractive action of government, nor did the institution provide with appropriate checks and balances against government 
expropriations (Acemoglu et al., 2012). On the other extreme, low settler mortality rates were in favour of the development of European 
settlements in many parts of the world. In this part of the world, many Europeans settled in a number of colonies creating “Neo-Europe” states, 
the settlers replicate the European institutions with checks of government power and its inappropriate use. A classic example includes United 
States, New Zealand, Australia and Canada. 
43 We divide our sample into English law, French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian law and Socialist law. Table A2.2 presents 
definitions and the data construction process. 
44 See, for example, Porta et al., (1999) for a comprehensive evaluation of the distinctions among French civil law, German civil law, 
Scandinavian law and Socialist law. 




of this influence, common law “put the emphasis on the private rights of individuals and 
in particular on the property rights” (Finer, 1997, p.1348). There is also the emphasis on 
restraining the government and on protecting the civilians against the government. An 
English common law (𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐿𝐴𝑊) tradition, then, can be taken as a valid instrument for 
the government quality (𝐺𝑄).  
Additionally, Scandinavian countries and Germany have not had many Colonies like the 
French and the British; hence their legal traditions are restricted to many un-colonised 
countries. Friedrich (1960) argued that the English common law tradition was superior 
to the French civil law, which was developed during the Napoleonic era to restrain judges' 
interference with state policies (see also, Lipset, 1994). We use English common law 
(𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐿𝐴𝑊) as a dummy variable 1 if a country follows English common law, and 0 
otherwise. The estimation results in Table 2.7 confirm the above arguments. The first-
stage regression results show that 𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐿𝐴𝑊 coefficients are statistically significant at 5% 
level with a correct positive sign (Col 1-3). The findings indeed suggest that countries with 
tradition British common law (𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐿𝐴𝑊) have better government quality (𝐺𝑄). 
Third, we instrumented 𝐺𝑄 by emphasising the importance of Colonial origin. More 
recently, La Porta et al., (1997, 1999 and 2008) stress the importance of Colonial origin 
on current institutions, and propose that the English common-law countries and former 
British Colonies have better developed financial markets and property rights. Similarly, 
Landes (1998, Chapters 19 and 20) and North et al., (1998) argue that former British 
Colonies (𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐿) flourished relative to the former French, Spanish, and Portuguese 
Colonies because of the good political and economic institutions and culture, values and 
norms that they have inherited from Britain. In this regard, a British Colonies (𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐿), 
then, can be taken as a valid instrument for the government quality (𝐺𝑄). British Colonies 
(𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐿) is a dummy variable that is 1 if the country is Colonised by British and 0 
otherwise. We fail to bring any robust conclusion for 𝐵𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐿 variables as their coefficients 
are not statistically significant and with wrong negative sign (Table 2.7. Col 1-3). 
After using the above listed instruments, Table 2.7 (Col 1 to 3 for all country sample) 
second-stage results strongly suggest that higher 𝐺𝑄 leads to a lower tendency of 
procyclical fiscal policy rather than the other way round. The estimated coefficients of 𝐺𝑄 
enter with correct negative sign and they are statistically significant at 5% to 10% level. 
We also investigate the sample countries under “procyclicality trap” separately using 
GMM approach to address endogeneity issue (Table 2.7, Col 4-6). The procyclicality trap 
countries’ 𝐺𝑄 coefficients are also statistically significant at 1% to 10% level (except, Col 




4), again suggesting that better 𝐺𝑄 is required to overcome the fiscal procyclical trap. The 
IV results presented in Table 2.7 are largely consistent with the OLS baseline regression 
results presented in Table 2.4, however the quantitative effect of 𝐺𝑄 on fiscal cyclicality 
become much larger with higher values of coefficient being recorded. 
Our instrumental variables satisfy two major requirements of GMM estimations: they 
must be orthogonal to the error term and correlated with the incorporated endogenous 
variables. Table 2.7 (Col 1-6) shows that F-test statistics indicate a test of the joint 
significance of the (excluded) instruments, which are presented in the first-stage 
regressions. The overidentification test presented in Hansen J-test statistics is presented 
to test whether the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term. The results are 
consistent with the presence of a general form of heteroscedasticity. The Hansen J-
statistics indicates that our proposed instruments satisfy the orthogonality conditions 
(except, Table 2.7, Col 4). 
2.5.4 Robustness checks 
We check the robustness of our results by utilising alternative measures of cyclicality from 
the earlier studies. In this approach, we use our baseline specification (2.8) but the 
dependent variable of cyclicality of fiscal policy  𝐹𝑖𝑠𝐶𝑦𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑑̂ 𝑖𝑡 is replaced by fiscal cyclicality 
index, which was developed by previous literature (i.e., Frankel et al., 2013; Talvi and 
Végh, 2005, Kaminsky et al., 2004; Alesina and Tabellini, 2005). This method helps us to 
examine the link between our constructed 𝐺𝑄 index and the earlier literature’s fiscal 
cyclicality index. Please note all the fiscal cyclicality indices are developed by utilising 
correlation approach, not a regression-based approach (except, Alesina and Tabellini, 
2005). One issue with the availability of the fiscal policy cyclicality measurement from the 
previous studies is the reduced number of observations compared to our cyclicality 
measurement. Nonetheless, the estimation results are conclusive and they are presented 
in Table 2.8.  
First, we use Frankel et al., (2013) cyclicality index (𝐹𝑉𝑉2013). They present the indicator 
based on country correlations between the cyclicality components of real GDP and real 
central government expenditures for a sample of 94 countries for the period 1960 to 2009. 
According to their index, a positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical 
(countercyclical) fiscal policy. Table 2.8 shows both OLS (presented in Col 1) and robust 
regression (controlled for outliers; presented in RCol 2) results. All estimated coefficients 




of 𝐺𝑄 are statistically significant at 1% level with correct negative sign. The findings 
confirm our earlier findings.  
Second, we consider Talvi and Végh (2005) cyclicality index (𝑇𝑉2005). Their index is 
similar to the 𝐹𝑉𝑉2013 index, but Talvi and Végh use general government expenditure 
compared to central government expenditure, and their sample size is 56 counties for the 
period 1970-1994. The estimated coefficients of 𝐺𝑄 are statistically significant at 5% to 
10% with correct negative sign (Table 2.8, Col 3) but it is not statistically significant when 
we control for outliers (RCol 4). The negative coefficient of 𝐺𝑄 indeed suggests that better 
government quality reduces the tendency to run procyclical policy. 
Third, we use Kaminsky et al., (2004) index, which is developed for 104 sample countries 
for 1960 to 2003. They present the indicator based on the correlation of real GDP growth 
with cyclical components of central government spending (𝐾𝑅𝑉2004𝐶𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃). According to 
their index, a positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal 
policy. They utilize an alternative measure the correlation of real GDP with cyclical 
components of inflation tax as a proxy for tax rate (𝐾𝑅𝑉2004𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑋). This index implies 
that a positive (negative) correlation indicates countercyclical (procyclical) fiscal policy. 
They also develop a composite index of fiscal cyclicality based on the correlation of cyclical 
components of real GDP and real government expenditures, the correlation between the 
cyclical components of real GDP and inflation tax, and the amplitude of the real 
government expenditure cycle. We denoted this indices by 𝐾𝑅𝑉2004𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋, whereby a 
positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. After 
using all the three cyclicality indices from Kaminsky et al., (2004), we find that 𝐺𝑄 
coefficients are statistically significant at 1% level and with correct negative sign for 
𝐾𝑅𝑉2004𝐶𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃 and 𝐾𝑅𝑉2004𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 (Table 2.8, Col 5-6 and Col 9-10). The negative 
coefficient of 𝐺𝑄 indeed suggests that better government quality reduces the tendency to 
run procyclical fiscal policy. 𝐺𝑄 coefficients enter with positive sign for 𝐾𝑅𝑉2004𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑋 
(Table 2.8, Col 7-8). The positive sign suggests that better government increases 
(decreases) tax rates in economic good (bad) times to avoid the procyclical fiscal policy.  
Finally, we utilise Alesina and Tabellini (2005) index, who consider the regression-based 
approach, where fiscal variables are regressed on statistical measures of output and other 
control variables. They utilize fiscal variables such as budget surplus and government tax 
revenue as a percentage of GDP and government spending as a share of GDP for each 
country. We denote the fiscal cyclicality index as 𝐴𝑇2005𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆 when using budget 
surplus as a measure of fiscal action and 𝐴𝑇2005𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑈𝐸 with government tax revenues. 




As is suggested by Alesina and Tabellini (2005), 𝐴𝑇2005𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆 index with negative 
(positive) coefficient values implies procyclical fiscal policies (countercyclical), and vice 
versa for 𝐴𝑇2005𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑈𝐸. We find that 𝐺𝑄 coefficients are statistically significant at 5% 
to 10% level (Table 2.8, Col 11-13) and with a correct positive sign. The positive sign 
indicates that countries with better government quality adjust the tax revenues (i.e. tax 
rate) and expenditures to stabilize the business cycle by conducting countercyclical fiscal 
policy. 
Results presented in Table 2.8 again show that government quality (𝐺𝑄) remains a strong 
determinant for fiscal procyclicality regarding sign and statistically significance, even 
after accounting for the alternative measures of fiscal cyclicality index from earlier 
studies. We also account for other determinants 𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻, 𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 and 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵 in 
the regression as a control variable, but their coefficients are occasionally significant. We 
also consider WLS and RWLS to control for outliers and denoted by RCol. Nevertheless, 
government quality (𝐺𝑄) remains a strong determinant of fiscal procyclicality concerning 
sign and statistical significance.  
2.5.5 Further extensions: addressing cross-country variability 
We have observed (Table 2.2 and 2.3) cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy and the 𝐺𝑄 impact 
of varied in different sample periods; 1970-1999 (pre-1999s) and 2000-2014 (post-1999s). 
Although there may be a noticeable improvement (deterioration) of fiscal policy cyclicality 
stances as the 𝐺𝑄 improves (deteriorates) across the sample group; however, large 
variations remain within the sample countries’ cyclicality and 𝐺𝑄 relationship.  
To explore further, we use panel data regressions to explore within-country variability as 
opposed to cross-country variability that we have already estimated by using specification 
(2.8). We attempt to capture the interaction between the measure of fiscal cyclicality and 




𝑃 𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖
𝑃𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖
𝑃(𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿𝑖
𝑃 (𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑡) +  𝛼𝑖 +
                         𝜂𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                          (2.9)  
As defined earlier ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑌𝐶 is the cyclical components of real government consumption 
and output gap (𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡) is the cyclical components of real GDP. Cyclical components 
are measured by log deviations from Hodrick-Prescott trend. Our key variable of interest 
                                                          
45 Our preferred method is similar to Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008), Alesina and Tabellini (2005) and Frankel et al., (2013). 




is government quality (𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡), as defined earlier. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of other controls that we 
have discussed in cross-country analysis, and 𝛼𝑖, 𝜂𝑡, 𝜉𝑖𝑡 are unobserved error terms.  
The interaction term in specification (2.9) between the government quality (𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡) with 
output cycle (𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡) will determine whether the 𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡 plays a role the way which fiscal 
authorities respond to business cycle fluctuations. More precisely, under the specification 





𝑃 +  𝛾𝑖
𝑃𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖
𝑃 𝑋𝑖𝑡                                                                                                (2.10) 
Specification (2.10) indicates that at the presence of better 𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡, we expect the interaction 
term coefficient 𝛾𝑖
𝑃 to be negative. More specifically, a negative value of the coefficient 
(𝛾𝑖
𝑃 < 0) will indicate the causal link running from stronger government quality to less 
procyclical or more countercyclical fiscal policy. In other words, countries with more 
procyclical fiscal policy need the higher quality of government.  
We estimate specification (2.9) by using yearly panel data, pulling all countries together 
for the period 1970-2014. As we include country fixed effects, the estimates only reflect 
within-country variations. We also use cross-sectional weighting matrix assuming the 
presence of cross-section heteroscedasticity. Please note, we estimate the specification 
(2.9) by utilising the OLS method, although there is the probability of potential 
endogeneity problem. The underlying reason is the lack of appropriate time variant 
instruments for 𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡 to perform GMM estimation. 
Table 2.9 (Col 1-2) present panel data regression results by interacting the 𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 with 
a measure of 𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡. The interaction term coefficients 𝛾𝑖
𝑃 enters with correct negative sign, 
and they are significant at 1% level (Table 2.9, Col 1-2). As is also presented in Table 2.9 
(Col 3-8), estimated coefficient 𝛾𝑖
𝑃 for “procyclicality trap” countries enter with correct 
negative signs and they are statistically significant at 1% level. The findings confirm that 
procyclical policy is more prevalent countries with lower government quality countries. 
Our main result from panel data continues to hold along with the cross-country regression 
results presented in Table 2.4. In sum, both panel and cross-country estimation results 
suggest that an increase in government quality (𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡) reduces the degree of procyclicality. 
Results presented in Table 2.9 (Col 9-16) also depict a causal link running from stronger 
𝐺𝑄1970(𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿) combined with the enhancement in ∆𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡 to less procyclical or more 
countercyclical fiscal policy.  




We incorporate three additional regressors (𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻, 𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 and 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵) as 
control variables. These variables are identical to cross-country regression specification 
(2.8), but now they are presented with an interaction term with 𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡. The 
interaction term allows us to capture cyclical characteristics of a country along with the 
economic condition captured by the proposed control variables. The interaction term 
coefficients of 𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻, 𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, and 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵 enter with correct sign in line with 
our cross-country regression results presented in Table 2.4 and 2.5. After incorporating 
the above control variables in the panel repression; the statistical significance and the 
sign of interaction term coefficients of 𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡, 𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡
1970(𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿)
 and  ∆𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡 remain the same 
(Table 2.9), which we have already observed in cross-country regression.  
We also carry out a comprehensive analysis of omitted variables in panel regression 
similar to earlier that are also major determinants of cyclicality of fiscal policy. To address 
this issue, we include set of control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡, which we have discussed in the cross-
country method, but now they are presented with an interaction term with 𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 in 
panel regression and the results are presented in Table 2.10. The interaction term allows 
us to capture cyclical characteristics of a country along with the political and financial 
indicators. The interaction term coefficients of control variables 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑁, 𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐾𝐵𝐴𝐿, 
𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸, 𝐶𝐶𝑅, 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, and 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻 enter with correct signs in line with our cross-
country regression results presented in Table 2.6. Table 2.10 show that the key variable 
term 𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡 remains a strong determinant of fiscal procyclicality. Having examined the 
cross-country variability using panel estimation process, we conclude that 𝐺𝑄𝑖𝑡 remains 
strongly negatively related to the cyclicality of fiscal policy, suggesting that better 
government quality is required to reduce the observed procyclicality.  
2.6 Conclusions 
We have shown that over the past few decades a substantial number of emerging and 
developing countries have been trapped in a procyclical fiscal policy stance, in the sense 
of not being able to escape from procyclical to countercyclical fiscal policy. Further, we 
have found that government quality is a critical determinant of the way fiscal policy is 
conducted, by formally linking the degree of fiscal procyclicality with government quality. 
Our empirical findings show that government quality is strongly and negatively 
associated with the degrees of fiscal procyclicality. The empirical findings remain robust 
to other determinants a large number of alternative specification. We have also used a 
different set of procyclicality index from previous literature and find that government 




quality remains an important determinant for cyclical characteristics of fiscal policy. 
Finally, we focused on cross-country variability via panel data estimation. Our findings 
suggest that there is a strong underlying link running from better government quality 
(i.e., low corruption, high transparency and high level of egalitarian democracy index) to 
less procyclical fiscal outcome.  
Our findings point to the importance of the theoretical arguments related to political-
economy constraints. Voters do not believe corrupt government with additional fiscal 
surpluses and demand increase in government expenditure during economic boom. 
Otherwise, they fear that fiscal resources would be wasted in corruption at the presence 
of low transparency and egalitarian democracy. For the similar reason voters do not 
permit government to accumulate fiscal surpluses, on the contrary voter demand a level 
of debt that forces the government to use the surpluses to payback the interest rather 
than use it for political rent. Therefore this political distortion, associated to the “starve 
the leviathan” argument, leads to a higher than procyclical fiscal policy. In addition, credit 
restrictions (i.e., restricted access to international capital markets) come into play 
indirectly because political distortion may force the government to take certain amount 
of debt that are at the limit of what government can repay back (i.e., debt sustainability), 
therefore at the constraints of international credit. 
Three policy implications can be drawn from our study. First, emerging and developing 
countries’ countercyclical policy is severely hampered by rent extraction behaviour and 
low transparency. Strengthening checks and balances may restrict the rent extraction 
behaviour by imposing constraints on politicians in a democratic regimes. Improved 
checks and balances may lead to better fiscal policy outcomes by decreasing harmful rent 
extraction effects on fiscal stance (see, for example, Alesina and Tabellini, 2005). Second, 
government should enhance the fiscal transparency to reduce the moral hazard problem 
between international lenders and fiscal authorities. At the presence of better 
transparency, the international lender can observe the true size of the fiscal authorities’ 
balance sheet liabilities and therefore countries with more transparency are less likely to 
face credit constraints, particularly during the downturns and helping them to run 
countercyclical policy. Third, in many countries there may be a scope for fiscal rules that 
limit the discretion for procyclical fiscal policy during upturns in the business cycle. The 
policy rules may improve both procyclicality bias and fiscal deficit at the same time. 




However, countercyclical policies that contribute to a deficit bias will not be sustainable46. 
Appropriate designed policy rules may help to cope with the political distortion for those 
group of countries that are behind to conduct countercyclical policies, and are in fiscal 
deficit. Policy rules may help to accumulate surpluses in good times by keeping surpluses 
out of the reach of political pressure associated with discretionary budgetary practices. 
The policy rules give credibility to the sustainability of deficits in downturns, if countries 
experienced fiscal surpluses in upturns. Because such deficits will be limited by the fiscal 
rules, and it is possible to overcome the problems of asymmetric information about fiscal 
policies, therefore improving the likelihood that fiscal deficits can be financed in recession 
to conduct countercyclical policy (see, for, example, Perry and Servén, 2008).  
The procyclical policy accentuates macroeconomic volatility, with harmful effects on 
growth. McManus and Ozkan (2015) demonstrate that procyclical fiscal policy is 
positively associated with output volatility and inflation volatility. In Chapter 4, we also 
find that procyclical fiscal policy is costly for the macroeconomic outcomes; in a sense, 
procyclical countries have lower rates of economic growth, higher rates of output volatility 
and inflation volatility. Escaping procyclicality trap, however, can be a long and arduous 
road and does require clear transparent policy making process and a strong political 
consensus. Improving government quality is not an easy process and often occurs slowly 
over a period. Additionally, appropriate checks and balances are needed to monitor the 
public decision-making process along with rent extraction behaviour that are important 
determinants for the cyclical properties of fiscal policy. In particular, countries with low 
government quality may improve on the policy making process by integrating stringent 
constitutional rules on policymaking.  
In this Chapter, we proxied government quality by measures of corruption, transparency 
and democratic equality. However, overall government quality is also related to socio-
economic conditions, government stability, internal conflict, external conflict, religious 
tensions and ethnic tensions, the rule of law, the quality of accountability, and the quality 
of bureaucracy among other measures. However, a comprehensive data set for a large 
sample of countries over a long horizon period is not available. In this case, there remains 
an important question regarding the most efficient ways to compose and measure the 
government quality and its’ link with fiscal policy. This will be an interesting avenue for 
future research.  
                                                          
46 Perry and Servén (2008) advised that fiscal rules that attempts to reduce the fiscal deficit and achieve fiscal solvency, while increasing 








TABLE 2.4: CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION OF FISCAL CYCLICALITY WITH GOVERNMENT QUALITY (𝑮𝑸), 1970-2014 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  CYCLICALITY OF FISCAL POLICY) 
 ESTIMATION METHOD: OLS 
 
Dependent Variable: Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy ?̂?𝒊 Dependent Variable: Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy ?̅?𝒊
̂ Dependent Variable: Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy ?̅?𝒊
̂𝑰𝑽 
All Countries Procyclicality Trap Sample All Countries Procyclicality Trap Sample All Countries Procyclicality Trap Sample 




















































































































































STATISTICS                
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 15.46% 20.20% 17.08% 8.42% 8.79% 19.00% 20.07% 16.71% 7.36% 8.96% 23.76% 22.92% 22.87% 9.33% 14.76% 
OBSERVATIONS 134 126 126 71 71 134 126 126 65 65 127 119 119 67 67 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
All data regression include intercept term. 
Col estimation is based on white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. 
RCol estimation is based on weighted and reweighted OLS regression to control for outliers. 
Procyclicality trap are the sample countries conducting procyclical fiscal policy in both sub-period 1970-1999 and 2000-2014. 








TABLE 2.5:  CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION OF FISCAL CYCLICALITY WITH INITIAL GOVERNMENT QUALITY (𝑮𝑸) AND CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT QUALITY (∆𝑮𝑸), 1970-2014   
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  CYCLICALITY OF FISCAL POLICY) 
 ESTIMATION METHOD: OLS 
 
Dependent Variable: Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy ?̂?𝒊 Dependent Variable: Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy ?̅?𝒊
̂ Dependent Variable: Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy ?̅?𝒊
̂𝑰𝑽 
All Countries Procyclicality Trap Sample All Countries Procyclicality Trap Sample All Countries Procyclicality Trap Sample 



















































































































































































STATISTICS                
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 15.40% 19.53% 17.24% 7.00% 7.23% 19.36% 19.75% 15.88% 5.72% 7.29% 24.06% 22.51% 21.81% 9.81% 15.34% 
OBSERVATIONS 134 126 126 71 71 134 126 126 65 65 127 119 119 67 67 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
All data regression include intercept term 
Col estimation is based on white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. 
RCol estimation is based on weighted and reweighted OLS regression to control for outliers. 
Procyclicality trap are the sample countries conducting procyclical fiscal policy in both sub-period 1970-1999 and 2000-2014. 





TABLE 2.6: CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION OF FISCAL CYCLICALITY WITH ADDITIONAL EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, 1970-2014  
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CYCLICALITY OF FISCAL POLICY) 
 
ESTIMATION METHOD: OLS 
Dependent Variable: Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy ?̂?𝒊 Dependent Variable: Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy ?̅?𝒊
̂ Dependent Variable: Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy ?̅?𝒊
̂𝑰𝑽 





























































































































































































     
-0.379 
(0.603) 
     
-0.369 
(1.039) 




     
-0.056 
(0.074) 
     
-0.069 
(0.094) 
    
CABSIZE   
0.004 
(0.008) 
     
0.013 
(0.011) 
     
0.025 
(0.019) 
   
CCR    
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
     
-0.008** 
(0.004) 




FINOPEN     
-0.547** 
(0.223) 
     
-0.652** 
(0.264) 




FINDEPTH      
-0.388*** 
(0.131) 
     
-0.298* 
(0.155) 
     
-0.458 
(0.306) 
STATISTICS                   
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 20.93% 19.24% 19.34% 36.53% 23.70% 22.26% 20.18% 19.79% 19.10% 29.72% 24.31% 21.01% 24.51% 23.06% 24.97% 30.85% 20.35% 23.31% 
OBSERVATIONS 118 115 120 93 113 125 118 115 120 93 113 125 112 112 113 89 108 119 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
All data regression include intercept term 
All the estimation is based on white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. 






TABLE 2.7: IV REGRESSION OF FISCAL CYCLICALITY WITH GOVERNMENT QUALITY (𝑮𝑸), 1970-2014 
PANEL A: GMM ESTIMATION (SECOND STAGE REGRESSION) 
 ALL COUNTRIES PROCYCLICALITY TRAP SAMPLE 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE Dependent Variable ?̂?𝒊 Dependent Variable ?̅?𝒊
̂ Dependent Variable ?̅?𝒊
̂𝑰𝑽 Dependent Variable ?̂?𝒊 Dependent Variable ?̅?𝒊
̂ Dependent Variable ?̅?𝒊
̂𝑰𝑽 


































































PANEL B: FIRST STAGE REGRESSION 








































STATISTICS       
CENTRED 𝑹𝟐 25.55% 26.62% 35.97% 16.83% 23.43% 34.49% 














WEAK IDENTIFICATION F-TEST ON 
JOINT SIGNIFICANCE OF EXCLUDED 
INSTRUMENTS2 
F= 24.11 F= 24.11 F= 21.02 F= 15.52 F= 16.05 F= 8.224 
OVERIDENTIFICATION TEST (J-
STATISTICS)3 
Null: The instruments are valid instruments 
Sargan Statistics = 2.789 
(P=0.248) 
Accept Null 
Sargan Statistics = 0.774 
(P=0.679) 
Accept Null 
Sargan Statistics = 2.675 
(P=0.262) 
Accept Null 
Sargan Statistics = 5.378 
(P=0.068) 
Reject Null 
Sargan Statistics = 3.703 
(P=0.157) 
Accept Null 
Sargan Statistics = 0.869 
(P=0.648) 
Accept Null 
OBSERVATIONS 96 96 90 51 45 46 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
All data regression include intercept term. See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
1 The test is essentially the test of the rank of a matrix:  under the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. A rejection of the null indicates that the matrix is full column rank, i.e., the model is identified. 
2 Weak identification arises when the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, but only weakly.  Estimators can perform poorly when instruments are weak, and different estimators are more robust to weak instruments 
(e.g., LIML) than others (e.g., IV); see, e.g., Stock and Yogo (2002) for further discussion. Under the null, the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regression, but only strongly. A rejection of null indicates that the excluded 
instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, but only weakly. 
3 The Sargan-Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions.  The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated 





TABLE 2.8: ROBUSTNESS CHECK: ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF FISCAL CYCLICALITY  
FROM Frankel et al. (2012), Talvi And Vegh (2005), Kaminsky et al. (2004), Alesina And Tabellini (2005) 
 FVV20131 TV20052 KRV2004 CGExp3 KRV2004 InfTax4 KRV2004 Index5 AT2005 Surplus6 AL2005 Revenue7 


















































































































































STATISTICS                
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 41.15% 43.11% 30.68% 38.25% 26.86% 25.06% 10.26% 12.22% 31.70% 34.88% 17.97% 22.16% 19.98% 16.22% 
OBSERVATIONS 80 80 52 51 84 84 87 87 84 84 76 75 69 68 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
All data regression include intercept term. 
Please note, Col estimation is based on white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance, and RCol estimation procedure by using Weighted and reweighted OLS regression method to control for outliers. 
See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
 
1 Country correlation between the cyclical component of real central government expenditure and real GDP for the time period 1960-2009. The cyclical component have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. A 
positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. The index is from Frankel et al. (2013). 
 
2 Country correlation between the cyclical component of real government expenditure and real GDP for the time period 1970-1994. The cyclical component have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. A positive 
(negative) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. The index is from Talvi and Vegh (2005). 
 
3 Country correlation between cyclical components of real central government expenditure and real GDP (1960-2003). A positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. The index is from 
Kaminsky et al. (2004). 
 
4 Country correlation between cyclical components of real GDP with inflation tax (1960-2003). A negative (positive) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. The index is from Kaminsky et al. (2004). 
 
5 Index of cyclicality of fiscal policy. It is a composite index that includes two measure of correlations of the cyclical components of fiscal policy instruments (real central government expenditure and the inflation tax). The 
index runs from 1 to -1. A positive (negative) index value indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. The index is from Kaminsky et al. (2004). 
 
6 Estimated time series relation between central government’s overall budget surplus as percentage of GDP and output gap, defined as the log deviation of GDP from Hodrick-Prescott trend. A positive (negative) coefficient 
value implies that a cyclical boom is associated with an increase (decrease) budget surplus, meaning that the behaviour of fiscal policy is countercyclical (procyclical). The index is from Alesina and Tabellini (2005). 
 
7 Estimated time series relation between central government’s overall tax revenue as percentage of GDP and output gap, defined as the log deviation of GDP from Hodrick-Prescott trend. A positive (negative) coefficient value 







TABLE 2.9: PANEL REGRESSION OF FISCAL CYCLICALITY WITH GOVERNMENT QUALITY (𝑮𝑸), 1970-2014 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CYCLICAL COMPONENTS OF REAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE) 
 ALL COUNTRIES 
PROCYCLICALITY 





































































































































        

















        



































































































STATISTICS                 
OVERALL 𝑹𝟐 40.45% 42.66% 43.50% 46.02% 42.07% 44.32% 39.27% 40.33% 41.06% 43.54% 42.15% 44.45% 42.64% 45.09% 39.52% 40.84% 
OBSERVATIONS 4756 3544 2753 2005 2521 1825 2537 1850 4648 3450 2692 1954 2466 1779 2479 1801 
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES 134 126 77 70 71 65 71 64 134 126 77 70 71 65 71 64 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
All data regression include intercept term. 
Least square estimation are performed using cross sectional country fixed effect and cross sectional weighting matrix assuming the presence of cross-section heteroscedasticity. 
For brevity constant, country fixed effect results, GEXP, TRADE, and PINSTAB terms are not reported.  
Procyclicality trap are the sample countries conducting procyclical fiscal policy in both sub-period 1970-1999 and 2000-2014. 








TABLE 2.10: PANEL REGRESSION OF FISCAL CYCLICALITY WITH ADDITIONAL EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, 
1970-2014 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CYCLICAL COMPONENTS OF REAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE) 
 ALL COUNTRIES 




























































































OUT_GAP * POLCON 
-0.016 
(0.149) 
     
OUT_GAP * CHEKBALC  
-0.014 
(0.019) 
    
OUT_GAP * CABSIZE   
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
   








OUT_GAP * FINDEPTH      
-0.411*** 
(0.046) 
STATISTICS       
OVERALL 𝑹𝟐 43.28% 47.01% 43.24% 51.79% 41.28% 42.66% 
OBSERVATIONS 3525 2981 3517 1383 3364 3291 
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES 124 120 125 58 123 124 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
All data regression include intercept term. 
Least square estimation are performed using cross sectional country fixed effect and cross sectional weighting matrix assuming the presence of cross-section heteroscedasticity. 
For brevity constant, country fixed effect results, GEXP, TRADE, PINSTAB, POLCON, CHECKBAL, CABSIZE, CCR, FINOPEN and FINDEPTH terms are not reported. 
See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 






Is fear of free floating responsible for 
procyclical monetary policy? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
How should monetary policy be conducted to stabilise the economy over the business 
cycle? Similar to fiscal policymaking, conventional wisdom suggests that countries should 
follow a countercyclical policy stance. This advice dates back to at least Wicksell (1907) 
and has proven enduring during the past century. The countercyclical monetary policy 
was recommended by the “Chicago Plan” to maintain a high level of employment (see, for 
example, Mints, 1946 and Friedman, 1948). The Keynesian IS-LM model proposed by 
Hicks (1937), also prescribes a countercyclical monetary policy stance. In this setting, 
monetary policy is required to restore the full employment and reduce the output gap. 
Phelps and Taylor (1977) and Fischer (1977) re-established the optimality of monetary 
policy stabilisation in a rational expectation framework. According to Taylor (1993) and 
much of the other New-Keynesian literature also call for countercyclical monetary policy 
towards economic stability (see, for example, Woodford, 2001; Giannoni and Woodford, 
2002) 
Again similar to fiscal policy, both the traditional Keynesian and New-Keynesian models 
of the business cycle calls for a countercyclical monetary policy that is contractionary 
during the period of economic acceleration and expansionary during downturns to 
stabilise output fluctuations. Accordingly, monetary authorities are expected to reduce 
policy rate in bad times and raise rates in good times. Existing literature document that 
advanced economies tended to follow the monetary policy that is countercyclical or at 
worst acyclical. On the other hand, emerging and low-income developing countries are 
shown to have pursued procyclical monetary policy by violating the Keynesian’s or New-
Keynesian’s prescription; they have increased interest rates during economic downturns 
and reduce it during the period of economic expansion47.  
It has been argued that this feature of policy deprived emerging and developing countries 
of important macroeconomic stabilisation tools, and might partially explain the higher 
                                                          
47 See, for example, Kaminsky et al., (2004); Calderón et al. (2004a&b); Yakhin (2008); Takats (2012); McGettigan et al., (2013); Vegh and 
Vuletin (2012); and Duncan (2014). 




volatility of inflation and output in these group of countries compared with advanced one 
(see, for example, Lane, 2003; McGettigan et al., 2013; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). 
Economists suggest that such procyclical policies that amplify fluctuations in real output 
should be avoided, for these economies suffer from prolonged recession in bad times and 
inflationary pressures in good times. This is especially the case given the prevalence of 
procyclical fiscal policies in these countries, as documented in Chapter 2. Motivated by 
the consequences of procyclical monetary policy, our goal in this chapter is twofold: first, 
we attempt to provide empirical evidence of the cyclical properties of monetary policies 
(i.e., countercyclical, acyclical or procyclical); second to uncover the potential sources of 
the cyclical stance of monetary policies. 
With regards to our first goal, we attempt to refine the earlier results along two 
dimensions. First, we control for the periods in which the monetary regime is not 
categorised as either managed floating or freely floating (e.g. monetary authorities follow 
crawling pegs or certain types of bands). More specifically, we use de facto exchange rate 
classification proposed by Ilzetzki et al., (2011), and restrict our sample to countries with 
a period of dirty floating or floating exchange rate regimes. Second, we exclude 
observations of very large nominal interest rates during hyperinflation episodes above the 
99th percentile to remove outliers. After carefully incorporating the two restrictions on 
the sample countries’ time frame and conducting exhaustive battery of time series 
econometric tests for 100 countries’ annual data (29 advanced, 46 emerging and 25 low-
income developing countries) over the period 1960-2014, we find that, very similar to the 
case with fiscal policy, procyclical monetary policy is observed across the emerging and 
developing countries, and it should be viewed as the norm rather than the exception. On 
the contrary, we find that majority of the advanced countries consistently follow 
countercyclical monetary policy.  
We also investigate how the cyclicality behaviour changed over the past few decades for 
our sample countries. Interestingly, over the last 55 years, we find that more than 40 
percent of our sample countries pursued countercyclical policy and the majority of them 
are advanced countries with inflation targeting regime. We have also observed that 
several emerging and developing countries have been able to overcome the problem of 
procyclicality recently. We also document that many of them are inflation targeters. In 
sharp contrast, we find that a substantial number of emerging and low-income developing 
countries (18.56 percent of the sample countries) have been trapped within the procyclical 
monetary policy, in the sense of not being able to move from procyclical to countercyclical 




monetary policy. We also observed that many emerging and developing countries turned 
into procyclical (8.24 percent of sample countries), who used to conduct countercyclical 
policy during 1960-1999. We have documented that these group of countries never 
adopted inflation targeting regime. 
Our second goal is related to the following critical question; why are emerging and low-
income developing countries caught within a trap of procyclical policy or, even worse, 
turned to procyclical monetary policy over the past few decades? More specifically, what 
drives this de-stabilizing procyclical policy behaviour? A common answer from the 
literature relies upon their access to the international credit market and lack of financial 
depth48. Again similar to the case with fiscal policy, it is widely argued that during bad 
times, many emerging and developing countries are unable to borrow, or can only do so 
with very high or excessive interest rates (see, for example, Gavin and Perotti, 1997). 
Alternatively, governments have to depend on central bank’s credit to finance state-owned 
entities or to support the budget deficit. The fiscal dependence makes it challenging for 
the central bank to retain the control of monetary policy49. At the presence of fiscal 
dominance, monetary policy is frequently subordinated to the requirements of an 
expansionary fiscal policy. More specifically, during downturns, a government with 
limited access to international credit markets may rely on money creation to finance a 
major fraction of government expenditures, forcing monetary authority to conduct 
procyclical monetary policy (i.e., increase the interest rate to ensure the external and 
internal credit supply).  
Even in good times, political pressures for procyclical fiscal policy are hard to resist, 
particularly when there is a genuine need for more government spending in the critical 
social area50. In fact, the main root of the debt crisis in many emerging and developing 
countries are all too often oriented in public sectors that go through sessions of high 
borrowing and spending, when the international capital is plentiful during good times51. 
Fiscal expansion during upturns leaves little scope for monetary authorities to conduct 
countercyclical policies during downturns. As they are “forced” to repay in bad times, in 
fact, coinciding with sudden reversals of capital flows, the so-called “sudden stop” of 
capital inflows52. As a result, sharp real depreciation follows as countries are cut off from 
                                                          
48 For example Gavin and Perotti (1997) were the first to discuss the Latin American countries’ facing credit constraints from the international 
capital market; then Catão and Sutton (2002), Riascos and Végh (2003) and Kaminsky et al., (2004) pointed out that this is not a Latin 
American phenomenon only; borrowing constraints are common in many emerging and low-income developing countries.  
49 A condition described by Sargent and Wallace (1981). 
50 See, for example, Talvi and Vegh (2005); Lane and Tornell (1999). 
51 See, for example, Reinhart et al., (2003) for an analysis of borrowing /default cycles. 
52 See, for example, Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002). 




international capital markets and need to repay their debt. Such circumstances force 
monetary authorities to raise interest rates to reverse capital outflows. Tighter rate also 
reduce the pressure on the exchange rate, instead of leaving the currency value to float 
freely (i.e., fear of free floating)53. This is a key concern for these countries as defaults and 
general debt servicing difficulties mount if the exchange rate is allowed to swing 
significantly. 
It is widely recognized that emerging and developing countries are exposed to the limited 
access to international capital markets, and have fragile domestic financial systems (i.e., 
high indebtedness in foreign currency). These features force authorities in these 
economies to raise rates in bad times and hence follow procyclical monetary policy. This 
evidence raises the question, are the emerging and developing countries able to overcome 
the monetary policy procyclicality trap? This question is applicable even for “recent 
graduate” countries’, who recently shifted from procyclical monetary policy to 
countercyclical policy. The argument is that the countercyclical monetary policy might not 
be optimal given such structural features; for example, a large fraction of short-term debts 
and foreign currency denominated liabilities. Under such circumstances, the adverse 
balance sheet effects of an exchange rate depreciation induced by the countercyclical 
policy could more than offset any potential cost of a procyclical policy54. 
In what follows we argue that at the presence of foreign currency debt, emerging and 
developing countries’ monetary authorities may want to maintain their credibility. The 
credibility issues may be manifested in multiple ways, including fear of free floating and 
sovereign credit ratings. The fear is the depreciation of domestic currency (typically 
characterised by rapid capital outflows) would force monetary authorities to raise interest 
rates to defend the domestic currency. The reluctance to allow the exchange rate to adjust 
significantly and rapidly is also manifest in the many episodes during which monetary 
authorities go to great lengths to avoid a devaluation. During economic crises, the fear 
becomes severe under financial autarky, when the currency depreciates rapidly and 
“balance sheet effect” (i.e. fear of bankruptcy of public and private sector) plunge the 
economy into deeper crisis by encouraging further capital outflows combined with “sudden 
stop” phenomenon. The need to raise interest rates to defend domestic currency would 
hamper the ability of monetary authorities to conduct countercyclical policy. A key 
contribution of this Chapter is to document that procyclical stop-and-go policies are 
                                                          
53 We borrow the expression “Fear of Free Floating”, of course, from Calvo and Reinhart (2000). 
54 As recent experience in European sovereign debt crisis, some euro countries, which perused countercyclical monetary policies over the past 
decades transformed to procyclical policies (see, for example, Takats, 2012). 




intensified when the economy features to “fear of free floating”, resulting in procyclical 
monetary policy.  
Our empirical work is motivated by Yakhin’s (2008) theoretical work. This New-
Keynesian model suggests that under full financial integration (i.e., when the economy 
can borrow and lend freely in the international capital markets), the optimal policy is 
countercyclical, while under financial autarky (i.e., when economy denied access in the 
international capital markets, the optimum policy is procyclical). The model also proposes 
that the transition from procyclical to countercyclical monetary policy is monotonic in the 
level of financial integration. The main force behind the results is that greater integration 
stabilises the exchange rate, which in turn, hampers its usefulness as a shock absorber 
and therefore calls for a countercyclical monetary policy to step in. Lack of integration, on 
the contrary, induces excess volatility of the exchange rate and central banks’ attempt to 
moderate its movement results in a procyclical monetary policy stance. We test the 
relevance of this mechanism in our empirical work; more specifically, we investigate how 
the level of “fear of free floating” affects the optimal monetary policy stance. In doing that, 
we uncover a key source of monetary procyclicality in the form of “fear of free floating”.  
To investigate this relationship, we follow Calvo and Reinhart (2002, p.4) to construct an 
indicator for “fear of free floating”. We find that on average advanced economies as a group 
have limited evidence of “fear of free floating”, with no evidence of it over the recent 
decades. In sharp contrast, we find that “fear of free floating”, is increasingly a defining 
characteristic of many emerging and developing countries. More specifically, it has 
increased over the last decade for that group of countries who are in “procyclicality trap” 
and those who “move back to procyclicality”. 
We have systematically linked the evidence of “fear of free floating” with the cyclicality of 
monetary policy. After an exhaustive battery of tests by utilising cross-country and panel 
data estimation methods for 100 countries’ (29 advanced, 46 emerging and 25 low-income 
developing countries) over the period 1960-2014, we document that “fear of free floating” 
is negatively associated with the degree of monetary policy countercyclicality. Our results 
reveal countercyclical monetary policy for low levels of “fear of free floating” and 
procyclical policies as “fear of free floating” increases.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section briefly discusses the 
existing evidence on monetary policy cyclicality and its sources. Section 3.3 discusses our 
methodology for estimating monetary policy cyclicality and fear of free floating. 




Descriptive statistics are presented in section 3.4. Section 3.5 relates and discusses the 
systematic outcomes of fear free floating to the derived cyclicality measures. Robustness 
and extension of the analysis are presented in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 provides 
concluding remarks.  
3.2 Evidence on monetary policy cyclicality and the causes of 
monetary policy procyclicality 
Kaminsky et al., (2004) were the first to examine the cyclical properties of monetary policy 
of broad set of countries covering both advanced and emerging economies by relying 
primarily on short-term interest rates. Using 104 countries’ annual data over 1960-2003, 
they estimate Taylor rule for individual countries and propose that most industrial 
countries follow countercyclical policy, while monetary policy is overwhelmingly 
procyclical across the developing countries. These results were later confirmed by 
Calderón et al., (2004a&b) and Yakhin (2008). The later work utilised higher frequency 
data and limited the sample to countries with managed floating and flexible exchange 
rate regimes only. Yakhin (2008) investigates 30 countries’ quarterly data for the period 
1974-2004 and estimates the cyclical properties of monetary policy by looking at the 
correlation between a measure of the business cycle and short-term policy rate. The 
author finds that the average correlation is negative (-0.18) in developing countries and 
positive (0.26) is developed countries and confirms the evidence to support the notion that 
monetary policy in developing countries is procyclical.  
In the same vein, the recent evidence by Vegh and Vuletin (2012) utilises a correlation 
based approach for a sample of 68 countries for the period 1960-2009, pointing to 
widespread procyclical monetary policy in the developing world, in contrast to that in 
industrial countries. Duncan (2014) use higher frequency data for 56 countries ranging 
from 1984Q1 to 2008Q4 restricts the sample period based on the lack of independent 
monetary policy (i.e., periods in which monetary regimes were freely floated or managed 
float). After carefully selecting the sample period and using the correlation based 
approach, it is concluded that procyclical monetary policy is a fact in emerging countries 
and not fiction. Recent work by McGettigan et al., (2013) used short-term real interest 
rate rather than nominal rates to estimate the cyclicality properties, and they argue that 
the correlation between real output and nominal interest rates could be problematic, 
especially for emerging countries with a large swing with inflation.  




Recent work presents empirical evidence on emerging and developing countries’ recent 
shift from procyclical monetary policy to countercyclical policy, similar to developments 
in their fiscal policy cyclicality. Using annual data from 68 countries, Vegh and Vuletin 
(2012) argue that over the last few decades (1960-99 vs. 2000-09) several emerging and 
developing economies have been able to overcome the problem of conducting the 
procyclical monetary policy and became countercyclical. They refer to this group of 
countries as “recent graduates”. A recent paper by McGettigan et al., (2013) support the 
evidence of “recent graduate” hypothesis, and they show that emerging and developing 
economies increasingly adopting countercyclical monetary policy during the post-1999s. 
Nevertheless, Vegh and Vuletin (2012) and McGettigan et al., (2013) propose that a 
substantial number of emerging and developing countries continued to exhibit 
procyclicality over the last 55 years and even several countries’ policy stance recently 
reversed to procyclicality that had been countercyclical.  
Why would emerging and developing countries conduct a procyclical monetary policy that 
might aggravate the business cycle?  Put it differently, what are the underlining forces 
behind this destabilising behaviour? Several explanations have been proposed to explain 
this puzzling behaviour of procyclical monetary policy. The literature essentially reveals 
four types of explanations: (a) restrictions on access to international credit markets that 
preclude them from borrowing during recessions combined with rapid capital outflows; (b) 
reputation and credibility explanations typically based on the hypothesis that recession 
forces an increase in the interest rate to prevent the exchange rate devaluation; (c) 
institutional weaknesses hampering the ability of policymakers to conduct countercyclical 
policy; (d) absence of inflation targeting regime and lack of central bank independence 
hindering the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
The most common explanations are widely based on incomplete international credit 
markets or credit constraints during the economic crisis. The Asian crisis and other 
emerging market crises triggered a strand of literature on the optimal response of 
monetary policy to large external shocks. An increasingly common view blames fixed 
exchange rates, precisely “soft pegs” for these financial meltdowns (see, for example, 
Goldstein et al., 1999). Calvo and Reinhart (2002, p.2) and Kaminsky et al., (2004) argue 
that emerging countries do not adopt countercyclical stabilisation policies because when 
the economy contracts, it experiences capital outflows. Rapid capital outflows trigger 
currency depreciation, intensifying the “sudden stops” (see, for example, Calvo, 1999). 
Monetary authorities are forced to raise interest rates to compensate for the effect on the 




exchange rate. Otherwise, defaults and general debt servicing difficulties mount if the 
exchange rate is allowed to float freely. The need to raise interest rates to defend domestic 
currency would prevent emerging economies to conduct countercyclical policy. 
There is also a large body of research that studies monetary policy under financial 
constraints. It has been argued that optimal stabilization policy in emerging countries is 
hindered by external borrowing constraints (see, for example, Perotti, 1999; Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2000), fragile domestic financial systems (Riascos and Vegh, 2003; Lane, 2003); 
and the interaction between domestic and external financial imperfections (Caballero, 
2002). In a New-Keynesian small open economy model, Yakhin (2008) proposes that under 
full financial integration (i.e., when the economy can borrow and lend freely in the 
international capital markets), the optimal policy is countercyclical, while under financial 
autarky (i.e., when economy denied access in the international capital markets), the 
optimum policy is procyclical. He also proposes that financial autarky induces excess 
volatility of the exchange rate and central banks’ attempt to moderate its movement 
results procyclical policy. However, Céspedes et al., (2003) proposed that procyclical policy 
might be required if the economy is characterised by balanced-sheet effects and financial 
vulnerabilities (i.e., high indebtedness in foreign currency)55.  
It is clear that in the presence of financial constraints and high indebtedness in foreign 
currency, monetary authorities will want to maintain the credibility of their currency 
regime. Under such conditions, even a short-term monetary relaxation may have a 
negative effect on confidence, raising risk premium in external borrowing (see, for 
example, Lane, 2003). A study by Calderón et al., (2003) of the cyclicality monetary policy 
in emerging economies, finds that credibility of the policy is a key factor. As emphasised 
by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Caballero (2002), and Mendoza (2002), exchange rate 
devaluation further loses its effectiveness if the monetary authorities lack credibility. 
Under the proposed hypothesis, during crises, when the currency depreciates rapidly 
balance sheet effect (i.e., fear of bankruptcy of private and public sectors indebted in 
foreign currency) plunges the economy into deeper crisis by encouraging further capital 
outflows, forcing a rise in the interest rate to prevent the currency devaluation, resulting 
in procyclical policy. Devereux and Lane (2003) confirms that countries with a greater 
dependence on foreign currency debt are more likely tailor the monetary policy to 
minimise the exchange rate volatility. They also propose that monetary policy 
                                                          
55 The authors, however, acknowledge that implausible values for the model parameters would be necessary for an economy to be in that 
situation. 




significantly depends on external debt maturities and debt with shorter maturities has 
affected the perceived solvency of emerging economies during the crisis.  
Another factor that is found to impact on the ability of policymakers to conduct 
countercyclical policy is the strength of institutional quality. Calderón et al., (2004a&b) 
and Vegh and Vuletin (2012) find systematic evidence of the link between cyclicality of 
monetary policy and the quality of institutions. In a similar vein, Duncan (2014) in his 
theoretical work argues that when there are positive external demand shocks, the 
reduction in the value of foreign debt caused by the real exchange rate is smaller. Given 
this low wealth effect, the real appreciation leads to lower consumption, wages drop, and 
inflation declines. The central bank reacts by cutting its policy rate to stabilise inflation, 
thus adopting a procyclical policy stance. Duncan (2014) also presents supporting 
empirical evidence. 
In addition to institutional quality and credibility issues, researchers also pointed to the 
importance of the link between inflation targeting regimes and the cyclicality of monetary 
policy. A low inflation environment facilitates the loosening of monetary policy, consistent 
with the Taylor rule’s prescription. Inflation could also capture the independence of the 
central bank and, hence credibility of monetary policy. Several studies document that 
monetary authorities in lower inflation countries are more independent (see, for example, 
Alesina and Summers, 1993) and central bank independence improves the efficiency of 
monetary policy (see, for example, Mishkin, 2011). Coulibaly (2012) and McGettigan et 
al., (2013) empirically show that inflation targeting appears to have been most successful 
in implementing countercyclical monetary policy. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Identifying monetary policy cyclicality 
Our main focus in this chapter is on the consequences of fear of floating for the cyclicality 
of monetary policy. The first essential step in any such study is to detect the cyclical 
properties of monetary policy. The simplest measure of monetary policy cyclicality is the 
correlation between the cyclical components of short-term nominal interest rate and real 
output that are filtered by Hodrick-Prescott method to focus only on the detrending 
cyclical components. Previous empirical work on monetary cyclicality uses this method to 
identify the cyclicality of monetary policy56. However, the correlation coefficient can be 
                                                          
56 See, for example, Kaminsky et al., (2004); Yakhin (2008); Vegh and Vuletin (2012); Duncan (2014); McGettigan et al., (2013). 




ambiguous if countries have a different level of volatility for both nominal interest rate 
and real output, requiring a more formal estimation procedure. A clear alternative is to 
resort to estimating Taylor rules, where a measure of short-term nominal interest rate 
cyclicality components is regressed on a measure of real output cyclicality and other 
control variables57. The estimated coefficient can then be taken to indicate the cyclicality 
of monetary policy.  
Monetary policy cyclicality is generally measured by monetary policy instruments (e.g. 
nominal short-term interest rate) rather than other monetary variables (e.g. real interest 
rate and real money balance M1 and M2)58. Kaminsky et al., (2004) suggest that the 
expected correlations between monetary instruments (e.g. real interest rate and real 
money balance M1 and M2) and output are more complex. They point out that the 
cyclicality behaviour measured by real interest rate estimate ambiguous cyclicality 
posture of monetary policy cyclicality59, although the instrument (i.e., real interest rate) 
has been used in the literature. In contrast McGettigan et al., (2013) argue that the 
correlation between real output and nominal interest rates could be problematic, 
especially for emerging and developing countries with a large swing with inflation. 
Notwithstanding this concern, the majority of the previous studies have used nominal 
short-term interest rates, rather than the real rates (see, for example, Kaminsky et al., 
2004; Yakhin, 2008; Vegh and Vuletin, 2012; and Duncan, 2014).  
In this Chapter, we also use the short-term nominal interest rate as the monetary policy 
instrument. This is based on the fact that short-term interest rate is a common policy 
instrument under flexible and managed floating exchange rate regimes (see, for example, 
Kaminsky et al., 2004 and Vegh and Vuletin, 2012). More specifically, we use central 
bank’s short-term discount rate or money market rate or interbank rate depending on 
data availability as a proxy for monetary policy instruments. For countries where the 
discount rate is not available, we use lending rate or Treasury bill rate. Table A3.3-A3.5 
                                                          
57 See, for example, Clarida et al., (1998); Kaminsky et al., (2004); Yakhin (2008); Duncan (2014); and McGettigan et al., (2013). 
58 Theoretically, any standard open economy macro-model with imperfect asset substitution would allow central banks to use the interest rate 
as a policy instruments (see, for example, Calvo and Vegh, 1995; Flood and Jeanne, 2005). 
59 According to Kaminsky et al., (2004), “…..in the absence of an active monetary policy, real money balances (i.e., interms of monetry 
aggregate) are high in good times and low in bad times (i.e., positive correlation with the business cycle) and real interest rate is low in good 
times and high in bad times (i.e., negatively correlated with cycle). However, a negative correlation between output and real interest mainly 
arises from a standard endowment economy model (i.e., a model with exogenous output) in which high real interest rates today may signal 
today’s scarcity of goods relative to tomorrow. In a production economy driven by technology shocks, however, this relationship could have 
the opposite sign. In addition, demand shocks, in and of themselves, would lead to higher real interest rates in good times and vice versa. 
Given these different possibilities, any inferences drawn on the cylicality stance of monetary policy from the behaviour of real interest rates 
should be treated with extreme caution.” 




provide more details on the country-specific policy rates that we have utilised in this 
chapter. 
We estimate monetary policy cyclicality for 100 countries covering the period 1960-2014. 
Our empirical strategy is mainly motivated by Kaminsky et al., (2004), where we attempt 
to refine their results. Our first refinement is linked to incorporating the role of exchange 
rate regimes; it is common practice for monetary authorities to raise some short-term 
interest rate to defend a fixed (or more rigid) exchange rate. Accordingly, our sample 
includes periods of dirty floating and floating exchange rate regimes with at least 15 
observations, following Ilzetzki et al., (2011) for exchange rate de facto classification60. 
Second, we exclude observations of very large nominal interest rates during 
hyperinflation episodes above the 99th percentile to handle the potential outlier problem. 
The hyperinflation episodes were observed in Latin America in the 1980s and many 
emerging and low-income developing economies in the 1990s. Table A3.3-A3.5 provide 
more details on the country-specific sample periods, exchange rate regimes and 
hyperinflation episodes. 
Two underlying reasons for such precaution that are related to our analysis by focusing 
on the cyclical components of interest rate. First cyclical components of interest rates may 
be wrongly identified from Hodrick-Prescott trend if we incorporate both peg and flexible 
exchange regimes in the time series properties of the data. Conceptually, under hard peg 
regime monetary authorities day to day actions are more committed towards open market 
operations (i.e., buy and sell its currency) or using interest rates to defend currency61. 
Second, the cyclicality components of interest rates may be wrongly estimated from 
Hodrick-Prescott trend if we incorporate hyperinflation periods, when the nominal short-
term interest are very large compared to normal period. 
In what follows, we first present correlation between cyclical components of the short-
term interest rate (𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and the natural logarithm of real output gap (𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) for each 
country. The cyclical components are measured by removing Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend 
from the time series62. Clearly, a positive correlation between short-term interest rate 
(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and real output gap (𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) would indicate countercyclical monetary policy (i.e., 
                                                          
60 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) propose that in many countries, there is a discrepancy between de jure and de 
facto exchange rate regimes and countries appear to actively limit fluctuations in the external value of their national monies. That is, many 
countries that announce they float the exchange rate, in fact intervene heavily in the foreign exchange market. Similarly, many countries that 
say they are in fixed regime, in fact devalue when trouble arises. To avoid this problem, we use de facto classification rather de jure one. 
61 Adopting such hard peg regimes indicates the complete surrender of the central banks’ independent control over domestic monetary policy 
(see, for example, IMF, 2017). 
62 We use HP filter with a frequency 𝜆 = 100 for annual data. These values are referred to as the “de facto industry standards” (see, for 
example, Giorno et al., 1995). 




the policy rate increases in good times and reduced in bad times, thus 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) >
0). A negative correlation between between short-term interest rate (𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and real 
output gap (𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) would indicate procyclical monetary policy (i.e., the policy rate is 
reduced in good times and increased in bad times, thus 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) < 0).  
We then estimate monetary policy cyclicality by estimating the Taylor rule for each 
country for which data are available. Following Clarida et al., (1999) and Kaminsky et al., 
(2004), our specification takes the following form: 
𝑖𝑖𝑡




𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                (3.1) 
where, 𝑖𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
 is the deviation of policy rate from its trend, 𝜋𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
 captures deviations of 
inflation from its trend and 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
 is the logarithm of real output gap, measured as the 
cyclical components of from its trend. We estimate specification (3.1) by using ordinary 
least square method (OLS). We correct for the first-order autocorrelation in the residuals 
by using a standard two steps Prais-Winsten procedure based on country specific 
estimation63. The following transformation takes place during autocorrelation correction 
procedure for individual country 𝑖. 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                              (3.2) 
𝑖𝑖𝑡







𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) + 𝜗𝑖𝑡           (3.3) 
Model (3.3), estimated ?̂?𝑖
𝑌 measures cyclicality of monetary policy stance over a business 
cycle for each country 𝑖. A positive (negative) value of ?̂?𝑖
𝑌 specifies that monetary 
authorities take countercyclical (procyclical) monetary policy over the business cycle – 
over and above the monetary authorities concern about the inflation which are measured 
by the estimated coefficient 𝛾𝑖
𝑌. In our estimation process of monetary policy cyclicality 
indicator 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌, the data are collected from different sources; please 
refer Table A3.1 for their sources and data description. 
Several observations are in order regarding the specification (3.1) for annual data. First, 
we are assuming that historical inflation is a good predictor of future inflation. Second, 
we maintain that the trend inflation (i.e., mean rate estimated by HP filter) is a good 
prediction of some implicit/explicit inflation target on the basis that monetary authorities 
                                                          
63 However, during the estimation process for the specification (3.1), we find that some countries’ error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is not only correlated in first-
order; it can be correlated with second, third order and so forth. To identify the correct order of autocorrelation among the error term, we first 
estimate the specification (3.1) and investigate correlogram Ljung-Box Q-statistics of the partial autocorrelation function (PAC) to detect the 
correct order 𝑧. After that, we estimate AR (𝑧) model to correct autocorrelation problem among the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 for the specification (3.1). 




choose to deliver based on the trend of an inflation rate that they desire. Third, given the 
potential endogeneity problem, the estimated coefficient of monetary policy cyclicality 
stance in the specification (3.1) is viewed as the best interpretation of a long-run 
cointegrating relationship. Fourth, by estimating the ?̂?𝑖
𝑌 and 𝛾𝑖
𝑌, the specification (3.1) 
does not mean to imply that the sample country has followed some type of Taylor rule 
throughout our sample. Rather, we are using the specification (3.1) in a potential useful 
way to characterize the relation between the output gap and a short-term interest rate, 
where we control for monetary authorities explicit/implicit inflation target.  
3.3.2 Identifying fear of free floating 
To explore the relationship between the fear of floating and procyclical monetary policy, 
our second step is to compose an index of fear of floating (hereafter 𝐹𝑂𝐹) for each country. 
The simplest measure of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 is the correlation between the cyclical components of the 
exchange rate and the short-term interest rate that are filtered by Hodrick-Prescott (see, 
for example, Vegh and Vuletin, 2012). Calvo and Reinhart (2002) argue that under the 
managed or free floating regimes, monetary policy can certainly be thought of in terms of 
some short-term interest rate, since changes in the money supply will directly influence 
interest rates, thus the exchange rate. In this case, under managed floating or free 
floating regimes, the only assumption needed to construct the 𝐹𝑂𝐹 indicator is that short-
term interest rates can represent common monetary policy instruments and there is some 
imperfect substitution between foreign and domestic assets. It is common practice for 
monetary authorities to raise short-term interest rate to defend domestic currency under 
managed floating exchange rate (see, for example, Kaminsky et al., 2004). 
To measure 𝐹𝑂𝐹, we fist compute the cyclical components of rate of change in the nominal 
exchange rate (𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) from its trend for each country64. Where, a positive (negative) 
value of 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 denotes currency depreciation (appreciation). Second, we compute the 
cyclical components of the short-term interest rate 𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 from its trend65. As standard, the 
cyclical components are measured by removing Hodrik-Prescott (HP) trend from the time 
series. We then measure the 𝐹𝑂𝐹 indicator by constructing the correlation between the 
cyclical component of exchange rate (𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and the short-term nominal interest rate 
                                                          
64 We use nominal exchange rate of domestic currency against the US dollar. For European countries, we use the nominal effective exchange 
rate. Please refer Table A3.1 for the data description. Table A3.3-A3.5 provide more details on the country-specific sample period and 
exchange rate regime. 
65 Kaminsky et al., 2004 propose that short-term interest rate is a common policy instrument under flexible and managed floating exchange 
rate regimes. More specifically, we use central bank’s short-term discount rate or money market rate or interbank rate depending on data 
availability as a proxy for monetary policy instruments. For countries where the discount rate is not available, we use lending rate or Treasury 
bill rate. Table A3.3-A3.5 provide more details on the country-specific policy rates that we have utilised in this paper. 




(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒). A positive correlation specifies that monetary authorities increase the short-term 
policy rate (𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) when the domestic currency is depreciating, indicating the presence of 
𝐹𝑂𝐹 [𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) > 0]. Similarly, a zero or negative correlation 
[𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) ≤ 0] indicates that central bank does not systematically react to 
exchange rate movements66. In other words, our measure of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 reflects the likelihood of 
relative movements in interest rates in response to the exchange rates movement over a 
business cycle, representing monetary authorities’ willingness to use interest rate as a 
means of stabilizing the exchange rate67.  
3.4 Descriptive statistics 
3.4.1 The prevalence of monetary policy procyclicality    
Table 3.1 shows the average monetary policy cyclicality indicators [𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and 
?̂?𝑖
𝑌] based on data from all available years for each country; these statistics have then been 
aggregated across the country group classification. Results presented in Table 3.1 helps 
us to make two clear points. First, on average monetary policy procyclicality are observed 
in emerging economies (i.e., all the cyclicality indicators values are negative). Low-income 
developing countries tend to follow acyclical monetary policy, or slightly procyclical policy. 
On the contrary, advanced economies’ monetary policies are heavily countercyclical (i.e., 
all the cyclicality measures are positive). Second, there is a strong degree of pair-wise 
correlation between the cyclicality indicators, indicating consistency of measurement 
across the computed cyclicality indicators, with a correlation between 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) 
and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌 (around 0.81). 
The above-presented results establish that on average emerging and developing countries 
follow procyclical monetary policy. However, these findings are coming from average 
values of cyclicality indicators and thus may not necessarily be representative, 
particularly if there is substantial cross-country variation in the making of monetary 
policy. Hence it is important to examine monetary policy cyclicality for individual 
countries, as is presented in Figure 3.1 and 3.268. As can be seen in Figure 3.1 and 3.2, the
                                                          
66 In an open economy, a negative correlation between exchange rate and the short-term interest rate may indicate that monetary authorities 
decreases short-term policy rate, when the domestic currency appreciating. The negative interest rate response is mainly arise from the currency 
appreciations’ contractionary effect on aggregate demand; the appreciation makes foreign goods cheaper and domestic goods more expensive, 
thereby reduce the net export. The cut of interest rate mitigates this condition (see, for example, Ball, 1999; Svensson, 2000; Taylor, 2001). 
67 If interest parity condition hold in practice, our measure of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 would be questionable because 𝐹𝑂𝐹 would always be positive by using 
simple correlation (considering variability in international interest rates are not significant). But, empirically, it is acclaimed that interest parity 
condition does not hold, more specifically in the short-run (see, for example, Vegh and Vuletin, 2012; Mishkin, 1984; Frankel, 1991; Chinn 
and Meredith, 2004; Akram, et al., 2008; and Burnside et al., 2011). 
68 Table A3.3-A3.5 provide estimated cyclicality statistics of 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌 for individual country over the period 1960-2014.  




TABLE 3.1: CYCLICALITY OF MONETARY POLICY 1960-2014 
Country Group 
Cyclicality of Monetary Policy 
𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) 
Mean [St.Dev] 
?̂?𝒀 
Mean [St.Dev]  
Observations 
All Country Group 0.08 [0.33] 0.11 [0.59] 100 
Advanced Economies 0.37 [0.20] 0.52 [0.40] 29 
Emerging Market -0.04 [0.35] -0.10 [0.65] 46 
Low Income Developing Economies -0.01 [0.26] 0.02 [0.37] 25 
CORRELATION MATRIX OF MONETARY POLICY CYCLICALITY  
 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) ?̂?𝒀 
𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) 1  
?̂?𝒀 0.81 1 
Note: We estimate the cyclicality of monetary policy [𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and ?̂?𝒀] for individual country on a sample of 100 countries’ annual data 
(29 advanced economies, 46 emerging and 25 low-income developing economies) over 55 years for the time 1960-2014. We take average of monetary 
policy cyclicality statistics for each country group to present the above summery statistics. A simple correlation statistics is calculated by utilizing the 









tendency to run procyclical monetary policy is widespread among the emerging and low-
income developing countries, as opposed to advanced economies (red vs blue bars). The 
findings indicate that there is an inverse relation between procyclicality with the 
countries’ development. In Figure 3.1, cyclicality indicators of 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) reveals 
that more than 96% of the advanced economies (28 out of 29) show countercyclical 
monetary policy (blue bars). On the contrary, around 60% of emerging market (28 out of 
46) and 52% of developing countries (12 out of 25) show procyclical policy (red bars). 
Cyclicality indicators of ?̂?𝑖
𝑌 show similar results (Figure 3.2).  
3.4.2 The graduation hypothesis and inflation targeting 
In this section, we re-visit the “graduation hypothesis”, this time for monetary policy 
procyclicality69. McGettigan et al., (2013) propose that inflation targeting (𝐼𝑇) in emerging 
market appear to have been most successful in implementing the countercyclical 
monetary policy. We investigate this proposition by examining how the cyclicality 
behaviour of monetary policy has changed over the last decades and its relation to the 
presence of 𝐼𝑇 regime70. To this end, Figure 3.3 presents a scatter plot with pre-1990s’ 
cyclicality on the horizontal axis and post-1999s’ cyclicality on the vertical axis similar to 
our analysis with fiscal policy in Chapter 271. In Figure 3.3, these are four categories of 
countries72.  
a) Recent graduates (top-left): These are the countries that were procyclical during the 
pre-1999s and became countercyclical over the last decade (post-1999s). Our findings 
indicate that in total 29 out of 97 sample countries have recently graduated. The 
majority of them are emerging (17) and developing countries (9). Most of the “recent 
graduate” countries have adopted some version of targeting (𝐼𝑇) regimes in the post-
1999s period (Panel B, Green Dots). By and large, a greater proportion of inflation 
targeting countries (5 out of 17 emerging and 1 out of 9 developing countries) moved 
from procyclical to countercyclical monetary policy compare to non-IT countries (Panel 
B, non-Green Dots).  
b) Established graduates (top-right): These are countries that have always been 
countercyclical in both sub-time period. We have observed that 41 out of 97 sample 
                                                          
69 To propose the “graduation hypothesis”, Vegh and Vuletin (2012) investigate 68 countries data for the period 1960-2009; McGettigan et 
al., (2013) analyse 84 countries data over the period 1960-2011.  
70 Table A3.3-A3.5 for Inflation Targeting (𝐼𝑇) regime adoption date for the sample countries. The adoption date of inflation targeting from 
Hammond (2012) and Ebeke and Fouejieu (2015). 
71 We calculate the monetary policy cyclicality [𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒)] by establishing the correlation between cyclical components of nominal 
short-term interest rate and real GDP for both sub-period using annual data (1960-99 vs. 2000-09). The two sub-period cyclicality results are 
presented in Table A3.3-A3.5. 
72 We borrow the expression of the coordinate’s name from Frankel et al., (2013). 




countries have always been countercyclical or “established graduate” over the time 
1960-2014. Not surprisingly, the majority of the advanced countries (24) belongs to 
this category and 10 of them have already adopted some version of 𝐼𝑇 regimes. A small 
set of emerging (12) and developing countries (6) also fall in this category. Among 
them, 4 emerging and 1 developing countries have already adopted 𝐼𝑇 regimes (Panel 
B, Green Dots). 
c) Back to school (bottom-right): These are the countries that were countercyclical during 
pre-1999s and turned to procyclical over the last decade (post-1999s). We have 
observed that a small group of countries (8) fall into these categories. They are 
emerging (3) and low-income developing countries (5). Remarkably, only one emerging 
country has adopted 𝐼𝑇 regimes (Panel B, Green Dots). 
d) Procyclicality trap (bottom-left): These are the countries that have continued to exhibit 
procyclicality over the last decade. As expected, these are all emerging (13) and low-
income developing (5) countries. Among these only one emerging country has adopted 
𝐼𝑇 regimes (Panel B, Green Dots). 
Figure 3.3 scatter plot classify that in total 26 emerging and developing countries are 
classified as “procyclicality trap” and “back to school”. We find that on average “procyclicality 
trap” and “back to school” countries used to be less procyclical during pre-1999s, and 
became more procyclical during post-1999s (see, Table 3.2).  
3.4.3 The prevalence of fear of floating 
We represent the calculated 𝐹𝑂𝐹 indicator [𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒)] in Figure 3.4, where blue 
bars indicate no evidence of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 (𝐹𝑂𝐹 ≤ 0) and red bars indicate the presence of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 
(𝐹𝑂𝐹 > 0). Specifically a positive correlation indicates [𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) > 0 or 𝐹𝑂𝐹 >
0]  that the short term policy rate increases when the currency is depreciating. Figure 3.4 
shows that the 𝐹𝑂𝐹 is prevalent in both emerging and developing country; precisely, more 
than 82% of emerging market (38 out of 46) and 84% of low-income developing countries 
(21 out of 25) show the evidence of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 (red bars). On average, we detect that 𝐹𝑂𝐹 value 
is above zero for both emerging (𝐹𝑂𝐹 = 0.27) and low-income developing countries (𝐹𝑂𝐹 =
0.18). On the contrary, we have observed a minor evidence of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 for advanced economies, 
on average, it is nearly zero (𝐹𝑂𝐹 = 0.07). We also notice that on average 𝐹𝑂𝐹 in 
“procyclicality trap” and “back to school countries” used to be less prominent during the 
pre-1999s and it has increased in the post-1999s period (Table 3.3).










TABLE 3.2: CHANGE OF MONETARY CYCLICALITY OVER THE TIME 1970-2014 (PRE 1999s vs. POST 1999s) 
Country Group 
Cyclicality of Monetary Policy [𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆)] 
Pre-1999s Post-1999s ∆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) Sample 
All Country Group 0.03 0.26 +0.23↑ 96 
Advanced Economies 0.30 0.61 +0.31↑↑ 26 
Emerging Market -0.08 0.16 +0.24↑ 45 
Low Income Developing Country -0.04 0.09 +0.13↑ 25 
Procyclicality Trap  and Back to School -0.14 -0.32 -0.18↓↓ 26 
Note: We estimate yearly 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) for two sub-time period 1960-1999 (pre-1999s, 40 years) and 2000-2014 (post-1999s, 15 years) for each country. We take 
average of monetary policy cyclicality statistics for each country group to present the above summery statistics.  Change ∆ calculated from 2000-2014 (post-1999s) average 
value minus 1960-99 (pre-1999s) average value of 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆). The +ve (or -ve) value of ∆ indicates that country groups are moving from procyclical monetary 
policy to less (more) procyclical policy. The country group classification is from Nielsen (2011). 
 












TABLE 3.3: CHANGE OF FEAR OF FLOATING (𝑭𝑶𝑭) OVER THE TIME 1960-2014 
Country Group 1960-99 2000-14 
∆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝑬𝑿𝑬𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) 
or ∆𝑭𝑶𝑭 
Sample 
All Country Group 0.14 0.11 -0.04↓ 96 
Advanced Economies 0.07 -0.04 -0.11↓↓ 26 
Emerging Market 0.18 0.20 +0.02↑ 45 
Low Income Developing Country 0.16 0.10 -0.06↓ 25 
Procyclicality Trap  and From Countercyclical to Procyclical 0.15 0.25 +0.10↑↑ 26 
Note: We measure the 𝑭𝑶𝑭 indicators [𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝑬𝑿𝑬𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆)] by using annual data for two sub-time period 1960-1999 (40 years) and 2000-2014 (15 years) for each country.  
We take average of fear of free floating statistics for each country group to present the above summery statistics.  Change ∆ calculated from 2000-2014 average value minus 
1960-99 average value of 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝑬𝑿𝑬𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆). The -ve (or +ve) value of ∆ indicates that country groups are moving from more fear of free floating to less (more) fear free 
floating. 
  




3.5 Empirical results 
3.5.1 Bivariate analysis 
Figure 3.5 presents the co-movement between monetary policy cyclicality and 𝐹𝑂𝐹 over 
the period 1980-2014. First it is clear that during the period of the Great Moderation 
starting in 1984, advanced economies’ monetary policy steadily moved towards more 
countercyclical nature (blue lines, Figure 3.5, Panel A). This is likely to demonstrate the 
importance of more flexible exchange rate regimes in facilitating greater monetary policy 
independence. However, we have not observed any noticeable improvement for emerging 
and developing economies during the same period. Rather, these countries shift towards 
more procyclical monetary policy from the 1990s onward (blue line, Figure 3.5, Panel B). 
𝐹𝑂𝐹 has also increased during the period of emerging market crises 1990-2002 (red line, 
Figure 3.5, Panel B). The need to defend the domestic currency in the crisis time is best 
exemplified by the procyclical policy73. However, we observed that emerging and 
developing economies have gradually shifted from procyclical policy to countercyclical 
during 2000, but they always show the evidence of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 (red line, Figure 3.5, Panel B). 
We have also observed that during the global financial crisis (2008-09), monetary policy 
has become less countercyclical across countries. A key factor in this has been the nominal 
rates hitting the zero lower bound, resulting in a shift towards less countercyclical policy 
during the global crisis 2008-09 episode (blue line, Figure 3.5, Panel A). On the contrary, 
emerging and developing economies have experienced substantial losses in the value of 
their currencies combined with rapid capital flight. Global commodity and food price 
shocks played a role given their weight in many emerging and developing economies’ CPI 
baskets, with important implications for exchange rate pass-through. Once the crisis hit 
in 2008-09, central banks in the emerging and developing countries had less capacity to 
conduct countercyclical policy but they were required to tighter monetary policy to stop 
capital flight. We also detected that 𝐹𝑂𝐹 has increased during the global financial crisis 
compared to the pre-crisis period for these groups of countries (see, red line, Figure 3.5, 
Panel B). 
                                                          
73 For example, the Tequila crisis in Latin America during 1994-1995, as well as the more recent experiences of Russia, Brazil, Turkey and 
Hong Kong, exhibit important examples of strong defiance domestic currency during the crisis. All the listed countries have experienced 
massive devaluations of their currencies and central banks force to increase interest rates along with other supporting policy measures. Similar 
condition were observed, during the 1997 Asian crisis, the reserves of Korea and Thailand fell significantly to defend domestic currency, and 
the Indonesian currency depreciated sharply. Thus, during that time IMF advice was to regain confidence in the currency (see, for example, 
Fischer, 1998). To accomplish this, countries have to make it more attractive to hold the domestic currency (i.e., to defend capital flight and 
to regain foreign investors’ confidence), which, in turn, create a pressure on monetary authorities to raise interest rates temporarily. 




It is clear that from the start of the Great Moderation till the onset of the global financial 
crisis, on average advanced economies were always countercyclical (blue lines, Panel A) 
with a clear swing towards greater countercyclicality (blue lines, Panel A). The co-
movement between cyclicality and 𝐹𝑂𝐹 is negative (-0.68). The emerging and developing 
countries exhibited 𝐹𝑂𝐹 (red line, Panel B) throughout the sample period with a 
noticeable co-movement between between 𝐹𝑂𝐹 and monetary policy over the sample 
period (i.e. red vs blue, the correlation is -0.36).  
We further check these results by constructing a scatter plot between 𝐹𝑂𝐹 and monetary 
policy cyclicality indicators [𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒), ?̂?𝑖
𝑌] at the individual country levels, as in 
plotted in Figure 3.6. It can be seen that monetary policy is countercyclical for low levels 
of 𝐹𝑂𝐹, becoming more procyclical as 𝐹𝑂𝐹 increases. Figure 3.6 also suggests that majority 
of the advanced economies (blue dots) exhibit a clear evidence of low 𝐹𝑂𝐹 with 
countercyclical policy. On the contrary, majority of emerging (orange dots) and developing 
countries (red dots) are characterized by relatively high degree of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 with procyclical 
monetary policy. However, there may be a large variation exists within the sample 












3.5.2 Fear of free floating as a determinants of procyclical 
monetary policy 
In this section, we attempt to address the issue of cross-country variability by utilising 
panel regressions to establish the relation between 𝐹𝑂𝐹 and monetary policy cyclicality. 
We maintain that one can characterise monetary policymaking by an expanded version of 
Taylor rule and included a multiplicative term of output cycle with fear of floating [𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 ×
𝐹𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡]. In doing so, we try to capture the interaction between the measure of monetary 
policy cyclicality and 𝐹𝑂𝐹.  
Following Corbo (2000); Morón and Winkelried (2005); Calderón et al., (2004a&b); Duncan 





𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝛿𝐹𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑌𝐹[𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 × 𝐹𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡] + 𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑌𝑋[𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 × 𝑋𝑖𝑡]
+ 𝛿0  + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                      (3.4) 
where, 𝑖𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
 is the deviation of policy-controlled nominal short-term interest rate from its 
trend, 𝜋𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
 captures the deviations of CPI inflation from its trend and 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
 is the 
logarithm of real output gap, measured as the cyclical components from its trend. The 




trend and cyclical components of these variables are measured by using Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 account for a vector of appropriate control variables, which we will discuss 
later, and 𝛿0, 𝜂𝑡, 𝜉𝑖𝑡 are the unobserved error terms. Following Vegh and Vuletin (2012), 
the 𝐹𝑂𝐹 indicator is constructed by using 10 years rolling correlation between the cyclical 
components of the short-term nominal interest rate and the rate of the exchange rate. We 
select each countries time frame based on two restrictions: exchange rate regime and 
hyperinflation episode, which we have discussed earlier. Table A3.3 to A3.5 provide more 
details on the country-specific sample period and selection criteria. The data for 
dependent, explanatory and control variables are collected from different sources; please 
refer Table A3.1 and A3.2 for their sources and data description.  
The interaction term in specification (3.4) between the fear of floating (𝐹𝑂𝐹) with output 
cycle (𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐) will determine whether the 𝐹𝑂𝐹 plays a role on the way monetary authorities 
respond to business cycle fluctuations. More precisely, under specification (3.4), the 




𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 = 𝛿𝑌 + 𝛿𝑌𝐹𝐹𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑌𝑋 𝑋𝑖𝑡                                                                                                             (3.5) 
where 𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝜕𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒⁄  measures the cyclicality of monetary policy. Specification (3.5) 
indicates that at the presence of 𝐹𝑂𝐹, we expect the interaction term coefficient 𝛿𝑌𝐹 to be 
negative. This would confirm that monetary policy is more procyclical as 𝐹𝑂𝐹 increases.  
We estimate specification (3.4) by using yearly panel data, pulling all countries together 
to gain efficiency for the period 1960-2014, including country fixed effects but they are not 
reported for brevity. We also use cross-sectional weighting matrix assuming the presence 
of cross-section heteroscedasticity. Please note, we estimate specification (3.4) by utilising 
least square method, although there is the probability of potential endogeneity problem. 
The underlying reason is the lack of appropriate time variant instruments for 𝐹𝑂𝐹 to 
perform GMM estimation.  
Our estimation results are presented in Table 3.4. Col 1 indicates that during good (bad) 
times interest rates increases (decreases), specifying that monetary policy is 
countercyclical (procyclical), more precisely interest rate cycle (𝑖𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
) and output cycle 
(𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
) are positively correlated.  Col 1 also support the notion that interest rate cycle is 
positively correlated with inflation cycle (𝜋𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
) and the estimated coefficients are 
statically significant at 1% level.  




As can also be seen, and, in line with our earlier analysis, monetary policy is seen to be 
overwhelmingly countercyclical in advanced economies and the estimated coefficients of 
output cycle (𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
) are statistically significant at 1% level with correct positive sign 
(Table 3.4, Col 4). In contrast, emerging and developing countries’ monetary policy is 
procyclical and the estimated coefficients of the output cycle (𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
) enter with negative 
sign and they are statistically significant at 1% level (Table 3.4, Col 7). It can be seen that 
the “procyclicality trap and back to school” countries follow procyclical monetary policy 
and the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1% level with correct negative 
sign (Table 3.4, Col 10). 
We now incorporate 𝐹𝑂𝐹 and the interaction term between the fear of floating (𝐹𝑂𝐹) with 
output cycle (𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
) in the specification (3.4) to capture the 𝐹𝑂𝐹’s role on monetary policy 
is responses to business cycle fluctuations. The estimated coefficients of the interaction 
term [𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 × 𝐹𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡] for all sample countries enter with correct negative sign as expected 
and they are statistically significant at 1% level (Table 3.4, Col 2). The LS estimate in 
Table 3.4 Col 2 imply that 1% increase in 𝐹𝑂𝐹 increase the monetary policy procyclicality 
by 0.17%. 
We also notice that emerging and developing countries’ estimated coefficients of the 
interaction term [𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 × 𝐹𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡] are statistically significant and relatively high (in 
absolute term) compared to those for advanced countries (Table 3.4, Col 5 vs. Col 8). The 
higher 𝐹𝑂𝐹 coefficient values imply that monetary policy in emerging and developing 
countries is relatively more sensitive to 𝐹𝑂𝐹 compared to the advanced economies.  
We also investigate “procyclicality trap and back to school” economies separately. The 
coefficient values of the interaction term [𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 × 𝐹𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡] for these countries are 
statistically significant and enter with correct negative sign. The coefficient values are 
relatively high compared to other sample countries, supporting the evidence of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 as a 
critical determinant for monetary policy cyclicality for this group of countries (Table 3.4, 
Col 11).  
Next, we include exchange rate cycle (∆𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
) as a control variable in specification (3.4) 
as an extension of Taylor rule74. It has been argued that the monetary authorities in open 
economies should react to exchange rate movements in addition to inflation and output 
                                                          
74 A positive (negative) value of ∆𝑒𝑖
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
 denotes currency depreciation (appreciation). Please refer to Table A3.1 for more detailed description 
of the data.  




(Ball, 1999; Corbo, 2000; Benigno and Benigno, 2001; and Morón and Winkelried, 2005). 
For example, Taylor (2001) argues that monetary policy rule performs worse, if nominal 
exchange rate fluctuations are excluded. In Table 3.4, all the estimated coefficients of 
∆𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
 enter with correct positive sign. However, they are not statistically significant for 
advanced economies (Table 3.4, Col 6). In sharp contrast, exchange rate cycle (∆𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
) 
appears to be critical determinants for interest rate cycle (𝑖𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
) for other group of 
countries, pointing to monetary authorities’ deliberate response to exchange rate 
movements. The estimated coefficients of the interaction term [𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 × 𝐹𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡] continues 
to appear with correct negative sign and are statistically significance level even when we 
control for exchange rate cycle (∆𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
).  
We have also repeated the above exercise with quarterly data, as presented in Table 3.5, 
confirming results from annual data in Table 3.4. In sum, we find that, when 𝐹𝑂𝐹 is 
negligible, monetary policy is countercyclical because the traditional monetary policy 
reaction dominates, hence policy rate responds to inflation and output movements. This 
largely exemplifies policy making in advanced economies. In sharp contrast, 𝐹𝑂𝐹 greatly 
matters for “procyclicality trap and back to school” countries resulting in higher interest 
rates in downturns and hence procyclical monetary policy.  
3.5.3 Other determinants of procyclical monetary policy 
While it seems natural to think that 𝐹𝑂𝐹 affect the way in which monetary policy is 
conducted, our findings so far could reflect the effect of omitted variables that are related 
to 𝐹𝑂𝐹. To address this issue, we include a set of control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡, following Vegh and 
Vuletin (2012), McGettigan et al., (2013) and Duncan (2014). The estimated results are 
presented in Table 3.6. 
First, we consider the degree of fiscal policy cyclicality (𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑌𝐶)75. It is well known that 
less developed countries often face restricted access to international credit markets during 
downturns, resulting in, government’s dependence on central bank’s credit, either to 
finance state-owned entities or to support the budget deficit76. This makes it challenging 
for the central bank to retain control over on monetary policy77. Government budget 
                                                          
75 𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑌𝐶 indicator is constructed by using 10 years rolling correlation between the cyclical components of real government consumption 
and the real GDP. A positive (negative) value of 𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑌𝐶 specifies that government take procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy.  
76 See, for example, Gavin and Perotti (1997); Riascos and Végh (2003); Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000); Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) 
and Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008). 
77 The legal provision of monetary authorities debt financing of the government deficit is inversely related to the level of development. The 
underlying bases are seen as shallow tax bases and underdeveloped financial systems (see, for example, Alagidede (2016) and Jácome et al., 
(2012). 




constraint links budget deficits directly to monetary policy; a change in budget deficit 
inevitably changes the size of high-power money or interest bearing government bonds 
required to finance the deficit. Of course, as long as the government has access to the 
domestic or international credit markets, a budget deficit does not necessarily raise the 
growth of money. Put differently, access to international credit markets weakens the link 
between the fiscal deficit and money creation because changes of fiscal deficit can be 
directly financed through issuing government bonds (see, for example, Taylor, 1995).  
In contrast, government borrowing from the central bank tends to generate an upward 
pressure on inflation and weaken the exchange rate (see, for, example, Laurens, 2005). 
This in turn, forces monetary authorities to conduct procyclical policies to stabilise the 
inflation and support budget deficit at the same time. If so, we are expecting countries 
that pursue procyclical fiscal policy to also follow procyclical monetary policy. Results 
presented in Table 3.6, Col 1 show that interaction term coefficients of 𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐶𝑌𝐶 enter 
with correct negative sign and they are statistically significant at 1% to 5% level. The LS 
estimate in Table 3.6 Col 1 imply that 1% increase in 𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑌𝐶 (i.e. fiscal procyclicality) is 
associated with an increase in the monetary policy procyclicality of 0.17%.  
Next, we incorporate CBI (central bank independence) de facto index and monetary 
freedom (𝑀𝐹) index in specification (3.4). In the absence of central bank independence and 
monetary freedom, the fiscal authorities have the incentives to indirectly influence central 
banks to conduct an expansionary monetary policy by increasing the debt accumulation 
(see, for example, Dimakou, 2006). The delegation of monetary policy to an independent 
monetary authority in democracies permits central banks to respond in a conservative 
manner that is reflected directly in the lower rate of money supply growth. That is, 
monetary authorities can target money supply or exchange rate and manage the interest 
rates to ensure, most prominently, price stability, regardless of political pressure. If so, 
𝐶𝐵𝐼 and 𝑀𝐹 in the sphere of the monetary policy as means of preventing high inflation, 
achieving the price and output stability (see, for example, Alesina, 1988; Cukierman et 
al., 1992; Berger et al., 2001)78. Thus, we can argue that higher 𝐶𝐵𝐼 and 𝑀𝐹 may lead to 
sound monetary policy in response to output fluctuations. The interaction term 
coefficients of 𝐶𝐵𝐼 and 𝑀𝐹 enter with correct positive sign and they are statistically 
                                                          
78 However, a growing number of literature also argue that there is no systematic relationship available between central bank independence 
(𝐶𝐵𝐼) and inflation (see, for example, Posen, 1993; Fuhrer, 1997; Campillo and Miron, 1997; and Hayo and Hefeker, 2002). One possible 
reason why these studies do not find a negative relation between CBI and inflation is the accurate measure of 𝐶𝐵𝐼. Brumm (2002) argue that 
accurate measure of CBI and the discrepancy mainly arise from de jure and de facto independence, which can lead to anomalous results. He 
also argue that de jure measure of independence may significantly differ from de facto independence, particularly in emerging and developing 
economies, where institutions are weak and the rule of law is relatively low. Keeping these factors into consideration, in this paper, we have 
used de facto independence rather de jure independence.  




significant for 𝑀𝐹 at 1% level (Table 3.6, Col 2 and 3). The estimated result in Table 3.6 
Col 3 suggest that 1 point increase in 𝑀𝐹 reduces the monetary policy procyclicality by 
0.013%. The positive coefficients of 𝐶𝐵𝐼 and 𝑀𝐹 address that central bank independence 
and monetary freedom acting as a constraints on fiscal policy, which in turn affect the 
ability of the monetary authority to conduct countercyclical policy.  
Next, we incorporate institutional quality in the baseline regression. Countries with 
strong institutions tended to follow countercyclical monetary policy (see, for example, 
Duncan, 2014). In the absence of appropriate checks and balance, there may be a danger 
that monetary authorities are being transformed into multipurpose institutions (see, for 
example, Taylor, 2016). A delegation of monetary policymaking to a non-elected 
institution should be accompanied by transparency and accountability. Central bank 
transparency and accountability are seen as ways of facilitating domestic and 
international financial markets response to its policy decisions. Policy changes are less 
likely to cause a sharp movement in asset prices, reducing output fluctuation (see, for 
example, Dincer and Eichengreen, 2012). To examine this argument, we construct the 
institutional quality (𝐼𝑄) index, measured by a composite index, which is proxied by 
measures of corruption and transparency. The estimated coefficients interaction term 
enter with correct positive sign and they are statistically significant at 1% (Table 3.6, Col 
4). The LS estimates in Table 3.6 Col 4 imply that 0.10 unit increase in 𝐼𝑄 reduces 
monetary procyclicality by 0.47%, suggesting that higher 𝐼𝑄 are associated with sound 
monetary policy responses to output fluctuations.  
Next, we control for the role inflation targeting (IT) regimes on price and output stability. 
The appointment of an independent and sufficiently conservative central bank (i.e., 𝐶𝐵𝐼 
and 𝑀𝐹), combined with better institutional quality (i.e., 𝐼𝑄) are seen as one type of anchor 
to stabilize price and output. Another anchor is commitment to a unilateral exchange rate 
management (see, for example, Cukierman, 2008). According to “hollowing-out 
hypothesis”, the choices are either to follow a flexible exchange rate combined with 
inflation targeting (IT) regime or a fully dollarized economy (see, for example, Frankel et 
al., 2000; Masson, 2001; Williamson, 2000 and Velasco, 2000). Over the last twenty five 
years many advanced and emerging economies have gradually shifted from an exchange 
rate anchor to effective 𝐶𝐵𝐼 and 𝑀𝐹 augmented by implicit or explicit inflation target (IT) 
regimes79 (see, for, example, Hammond, 2012).  
                                                          
79 Other countries like European countries (EU) are raised their commitment to permanently fixed exchange rates by eliminating separate 
currencies by the creation of European Monetary Union (EMU). In many emerging market, such as, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, 




The argument of replacing exchange rate anchors with implicit and explicit 𝐼𝑇 regimes is 
that 𝐼𝑇 regimes allow for monetary tools to be used for domestic stabilization purposes. 
To the extent that this is true, 𝐼𝑇 regimes may help to conduct the monetary policy in a 
countercyclical manner. To examine this argument, we construct 𝐼𝑇 dummies with a value 
of 1 for countries that have adopted 𝐼𝑇 regime and 0 otherwise. The interaction term 
coefficient of 𝐼𝑇 enter with correct positive sign and they are statistically significant at 1% 
level in Table 3.6, Col 5. Specifically, Table 3.6 Col 5 LS estimation imply that countries 
with 𝐼𝑇 regime run 0.28% more countercyclical monetary policy compared to countries 
with non 𝐼𝑇 regime.  
Lastly, we control for the degree of financial depth and integration in specification (3.4). 
It has been argued that a country’s ability to adopt optimal stabilisation policies is 
hampered by external borrowing constraints (see, for, example, Perotti, 1999; Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2000) and the interaction between domestic and external financial 
imperfections (see, for example, Caballero, 2002). Greater financial depth and integration 
stabilise the exchange rate, which, in turn, improves its effectiveness as an endogenous 
shock absorber and therefore allow the central bank to conduct countercyclical monetary 
policy. Thus, countries’ access to international capital markets can be closely related to 
the way its monetary policy is conducted. We proxy financial integration by using the 
Chinn-Ito financial openness index (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁). Countries with greater values of the index 
have better access to the international capital markets.  
We also incorporate financial depth (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻) in specification (3.4). We measure 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻 by liquid liabilities over GDP, which may result from free access to 
international capital markets or greater integration with foreign capital markets. It can 
be argued that countries with a high level of 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻 have the appropriate financial 
cushion to conduct countercyclical monetary policy to smooth out the business cycle. 
Countries with better financial integration (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) and financial depth (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻) 
are better placed to conduct countercyclical policy in an environment where financial 
markets are deep and better integrated. Table 3.6 (Col 6 and 7) present results; both 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 and 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻 interaction term coefficients enter with correct positive sign and 
they are statistically significant at 1% level. The LS estimates in Table 3.6, Col 6 and 7 
imply that 1 unit increase in 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 and 1% increase in 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻 reduces monetary 
policy procyclicality by 0.11%, and 0.10%, suggesting that higher financial openness and 
                                                          
Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey have recently adopted flexible regimes but with 
managed floating (see, for example, Hammond, 2012). We have presented the inflation targeting adoption date in Table A3.3-A3.5. 




better financial integration are positively associated with countercyclical monetary policy 
responses to output fluctuations. 
Results presented in Table 3.6 (Col 1-8) show that interaction term 𝐹𝑂𝐹 coefficients 
remain a strong determinant of monetary policy cyclicality in terms of sign, size and 
statistical significance, even after accounting for other potential determinants. 
Additionally, we find larger quantitative effect of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 compared to 𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑌𝐶, 𝐶𝐵𝐼, 𝑀𝐹, 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 and 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻. However, the quantitative effect of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 is small but 
statistically significant, while we control for 𝐼𝑄 and 𝐼𝑇. Our findings clearly point to 𝐹𝑂𝐹 
as key determinant of monetary policy cyclicality. 
3.5.4 Sensitivity analysis: cross-country evidence 
Estimating the cyclical response of monetary policy in a large panel of heterogeneous 
countries, as done in the panel estimates. To access the robustness of the results, here we 
estimate cross-country data to exploit the cross-country variability as oppose to within-
country variability. To explore whether there is a statistically significant link between the 
compiled cyclicality indicators [𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌] and 𝐹𝑂𝐹, we estimate the 
following cross country regression for the period 1960-2014. 
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑡̂ 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡                                                                                       (3.5) 
Where 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑡̂ 𝑖𝑡 denotes the relevant estimated monetary policy cyclicality 
indicators measured by 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌 from the section 3.4.1. Our core variable 
of interest is the 𝐹𝑂𝐹, measured by correlation between the cyclical components of the 
short-term nominal interest rate cycle (𝑖𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and the rate of exchange rate cycle 
(𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒), that we have discussed in section 3.4.3. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 accounts for a set of the appropriate 
control variable, which we have discussed in the previous panel regression tables. The 
estimated results are presented in Table 3.7.  
Our key indicator 𝐹𝑂𝐹 show consistent results as hypothesised earlier. The coefficients of 
(𝐹𝑂𝐹) enter with correct negative signs that are all statistically significant at the 1% level 
(Table 3.7, Col 1-16). These results are in-line with our panel data analysis, however the 
quantitative effect becomes much larger with higher values of coefficient values being 
recorded. We also include a set of control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 measured by 𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑌𝐶, 𝐼𝑄, 𝐶𝐵𝐼, 𝑀𝐹, 
𝐼𝑇, 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 and 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻 in the specification (3.5). The coefficients of control variables 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 enter with correct signs in line with our earlier panel evidences (Table 3.7). The 
statistical significance and the size of the coefficients of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 remain much the same, even 




after incorporating 𝑋𝑖𝑡. The empirical findings form cross-country estimation supports to 
the arguments laid out in our earlier panel evidences; 𝐹𝑂𝐹 is an important determinants 
for procyclical monetary policy. 
3.5.5 Addressing the potential endogeneity of fear of floating 
In this section, we try to address the potential endogeneity of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 and the monetary policy 
stance by using an instrumental variable (IV) approach, by estimating specification (5). 
We have not found any time-varying instruments for 𝐹𝑂𝐹, hence we rely on cross-country 
estimation method as opposed to panel estimations. We adopt the two-step feasible GMM 
estimation method results are presented in Table 3.8.  
To the extent that procyclical policies harm macroeconomic outcomes, they will also 
worsen the 𝐹𝑂𝐹. Additionally, 𝐹𝑂𝐹 and monetary policy cyclicality indicators are both 
measured during the same period 1960-2014, hence it is important to consider the 
potential endogeneity problem in estimating the link between 𝐹𝑂𝐹 and monetary policy 
cyclicality. This is done by estimating specification (3.5). 
Our first set of instruments are 𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐷 and 𝐼𝑀𝐹, where 𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐷 is the number of episodes a 
country has gone through of sovereign external default from 1800 to 1960 and 𝐼𝑀𝐹 is the 
number of episodes of International Monetary Fund programmes80. We collect the data 
from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). During 1952-2008, there were in total 85 default 
episodes and 538 IMF programme (see, for example, Qian et al., (2011). The availability 
of IMF’s loans to support member countries has certainly increased during eve of “sudden 
stop”. Countries seeking help from IMF programmes are still forced to undergo through 
economic adjustments in an effort to regain sound macroeconomic policy and regain access 
to international capital markets (see, for example, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). 
How is our constructed 𝐹𝑂𝐹 is associated with 𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐷 and 𝐼𝑀𝐹? We argue that crisis 
episodes may amplify the 𝐹𝑂𝐹 particularly in emerging and developing countries, where 
monetary authorities want to maintain their credibility to avoid debt crisis. The fear of 
the depreciation of domestic currency (typically characterised by significant capital 
outflows) would force monetary authorities to raise interest rates to defend the domestic 
                                                          
80 Qian et al., (2011) propose that the world has experienced the sovereign default episodes during the Napoleonic wars in the early nineteenth 
century (i.e., 1814 end of Napoleonic era) and the Latin American countries once they became independent. They also argue that the biggest 
default were largely observed during the era of Great Depression (1929-1939) and World War II (1939-1945), when at the peak more than 
40% of the world was in default in external debt. They propose that from 1800 to present, the average external default crisis probability of the 
advanced economies is less than half of that of developing countries and almost one-fifth of that of Latin American emerging market countries. 
On average the probability of default crisis in advanced economics is 7%, in emerging and developing countries is 19% and in Latin American 
countries is 34%. 




currency. During crisis periods, this fear becomes severe, when the currency depreciates 
rapidly and balance sheet effect plunges the economy into recession by encouraging 
further capital outflows. The IV regression results in Table 3.8 support these arguments. 
The first-stage regression results show that sovereign external default (𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐷) and IMF 
programme (𝐼𝑀𝐹) coefficients are statistically significant at 1% level with a correct 
positive sign (Table 3.8, Col 1 and 3). The findings indeed suggest, countries that 
experience sovereign external defaults (𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐷) and those with IMF programmes (𝐼𝑀𝐹) are 
more likely to exhibit 𝐹𝑂𝐹. 
The second set of instruments are combines of currency crisis (𝐶𝐶) and other crisis (𝑂𝐶), 
where 𝐶𝐶 is the number of episodes a country have gone through currency crisis81 and 𝑂𝐶 
is the combined number of episodes a country have gone through inflation crisis82, stock 
market crashes, domestic debt crisis, external debt crisis and banking crisis83 from 1800 
to 1960. Similar to the above, we argue that countries that experience currency crises and 
other crises in the past, may have inflated 𝐹𝑂𝐹. The IV regression results in Table 3.8 
suggest that countries that previously experienced currency crises (𝐶𝐶) and other crises 
(𝑂𝐶) exhibit to greater 𝐹𝑂𝐹. 
After using the above instruments, the first stage regression results in Table 3.8, Col 1-4 
suggest that higher 𝐹𝑂𝐹 leads to a higher tendency to conduct procyclical monetary policy 
rather than the other way round and the estimated coefficients are statistically significant 
at 1% level with correct negative sign. The IV results in Table 3.8 are largely consistent 
with the OLS baseline regression results presented in Table 3.7.  
Our instrumental variables satisfy two major requirements of GMM estimations: they 
must be orthogonal to the error term and correlated with the incorporated endogenous 
variables. Table 3.8 shows that F-test statistics indicate a test of the joint significance of 
the (excluded) instruments, which are presented in the first-stage regressions. The 
overidentification test presented in Hansen J-test statistics is employed to test whether 
the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term. The results are consistent with the 
                                                          
81 Some famous historic example of currency crisis, French franc crisis of 19923-26, the sterling crisis of 1931, the dollar crisis of 1933, and 
gold bloc crisis 1935-36. With regard to post–World War II period, we can distinguish between those that occurred during the Bretton Woods 
era and those that occurred after 1973. Some notable crises in the Bretton Woods era were those of the pound sterling in 1947-49 and again in 
1967, the French franc in 1968-69, and the U.S. dollar in 1960 (see, for example, Brown, 1940 and Eichengreen and Hsieh, 1996).  
82 There was huge rise in inflation crisis starting after the World War II and it had continued in the 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, inflation 
crisis was partially acting as a vehicle for partial other default as many advanced countries experienced in the 1970s and recent hyperinflation 
era in Latin America during 1980s and in many emerging economies in the 1990s (see, for example, Qian et al., 2011). 
83 Some famous historic example of banking crisis, by the time of the Great Depression of the 1930s, banking crisis were the world wide 
phenomenon. More specifically, there were small number of banking crisis during the years of financial repression that began during World 
War II and sustained in many countries well into the 1970s. Emerging markets were certainly affected by advanced country banking crises 
but did not have so many of their own, if only because their financial systems were dominated by foreign banks (see, for, example, Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2009). 




presence of a general form of heteroscedasticity. The Hansen J-statistics shows that our 
selected instruments satisfy the orthogonality conditions, indicate they are valid 
instruments for 𝐹𝑂𝐹. 
3.5.6 Robustness checks 
We check the robustness of our findings by utilising four alternative measures of 
monetary cyclicality from the previous literature. In this approach, we use our baseline 
specification (3.5) but the dependent variable of monetary policy cyclicality indicators 
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑡̂ 𝑖𝑡 are replaced by alternative measures of monetary policy cyclicality index 
as used in the existing literature. One issue with the availability of the monetary policy 
cyclicality index from previous literature that reduces the number of observations 
compared to our cyclicality measurement. Nonetheless, the estimation results are 
conclusive, and they are presented in Table 3.9. 
First, we use Vegh and Vuletin (2012) cyclicality index (𝑉𝑉2012) which is based on country 
correlations between the cyclical components of real GDP and nominal short-term interest 
rate where the cyclical components are estimated by using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter. Results presented Table 3.9, Col 1 confirm our earlier findings. The estimated 
coefficient of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 is statistically significant at 1% level with negative sign.  
Second, we consider Yakhin (2008) cyclicality index (𝑌𝑌𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟2008 and 𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆2008). To 
determine the cyclical behaviour of monetary policy, he measures the correlation 
(𝑌𝑌𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟2008) between cyclical movements between real GDP (i.e., measured by GDP 
deflator) and nominal interest rate (i.e., measured by interbank market rate). In addition, 
he also estimates Taylor rule by utilising TSLS approach and evaluate the sign of the 
coefficients on output as a measure of cyclicality stance (𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆2008). According to his 
index, a positive (negative) relation indicates countercyclical (procyclical) monetary 
policy. The two cyclicality indices confirm our earlier evidences, we find that 𝐹𝑂𝐹 
coefficients are estimated with the expected negative sign and they are statistically 
significant at 10% level (Table 3.9, Col 2 and 3).  
Third, we use McGettigan et al., (2013) index, which is developed for 84 sample countries 
annual data for 1960 to 2011. Their cyclicality index is different from the others discussed 
in this section. They emphasise the real interest rate, rather than the nominal interest 
rate. To determine the cyclical behaviour of monetary policy, they measure the correlation 
(𝑀𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟2013) between cyclical movements between output and real interest rate (i.e., 
proxied by discount rate or money market rate). In addition, they also estimate Taylor 




rule and evaluate the sign of the coefficients on output as a measure of cyclicality stance 
(𝑀𝑐𝑇𝑅2013). The two cyclicality indices confirm our earlier results, the estimated 
coefficients of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 are statistically significant at 1% to 5% with negative sign (Table 3.9, 
Col 4 and 5).  
Finally, we utilise Duncan (2014) index, which is similar to others discussed in this section 
(𝑅𝐷2014). He measures the cyclicality of monetary policy by utilising a simple correlation 
between cyclical components of real GDP and central banks’ nominal discount rate. 
According to the index, a positive (negative) correlation indicates countercyclical 
(procyclical) monetary policy. The estimated coefficient of 𝐹𝑂𝐹 is not statistically 
significant, yet it enters with correct negative sign (Table 3.9, Col 6).  
Results presented in Table 3.9 (Col 1-6) show that 𝐹𝑂𝐹 remains a strong determinant of 
monetary policy cyclicality, even after accounting for the alternative measures of fiscal 
cyclicality index.  
3.6 Conclusions 
We document that procyclical monetary policy has been widely observed in emerging and 
low-income developing countries. This contrasts sharply with advanced economies, where 
the policies have tended to be countercyclical. We have also shown that, similar to fiscal 
policies in the previous Chapter, a substantial number of emerging and developing 
countries have been trapped in a procyclical monetary policy stance, being unable to move 
to countercyclical monetary policy. Further, we have shown that “fear of free floating” is 
a critical determinant of the way monetary policy is conducted. We found “fear of free 
floating” is strongly and negatively associated with the degrees of monetary policy 
cyclicality; monetary policy is more procyclical as fear of free floating increases.  
Given the role of fear of floating in monetary procyclicality, overcoming the “fear of 
floating” appears as a critical factor to shift from procyclical to countercyclical policies. 
We document that a lion share of our sample countries are still practising intermediate 
exchange rate regimes and not letting their currencies to float freely, hence showing “fear 
of floating” (see, Figure 3.4). We also show that a number of countries in our sample have 
moved away from the “procyclicality trap” and recently graduated to countercyclical policy 
by adopting of inflation targeting regime. Several emerging economies have gradually 
shifted from an exchange rate anchor to effective inflation targeting regimes, which are 
seen as key factors in such a move towards countercyclical policy (see, for example, 
Coulibaly, 2013 and McGettigan et al., 2013).  




The cost of procyclical monetary policies can be substantial. McGettigan et al., (2013) 
demonstrate that procyclical monetary policy is positively associated with output 
volatility. In Chapter 4, we will also provide empirical evidence that procyclical monetary 
policy is costly for the macroeconomic outcomes in terms of lower rates of economic 
growth, higher rates of output volatility and inflation volatility. Our findings point to the 
importance of shifting from procyclical to countercyclical monetary policy. 
Two policy implications can be drawn from our study to overcome the problem of 
procyclicality. First, emerging and developing countries’ countercyclical policy severely 
hampered by weak exchange rate (i.e. fear of free floating). Dollarization is unlikely to 
be the paramount solution in pursuit of this problem. In general, this policy is only 
applicable for very small open economies or if the domestic institutional infrastructure is 
deemed beyond repair (see, Lane, 2003). For the vast majority of the developing and 
emerging countries, the preferred approach to monetary stability is to maintain some 
degree of central bank independence (i.e., monetary freedom with less fiscal dominance) 
and to develop robust, accountable and transparent framework to formulate interest rate 
decisions. When monetary authorities are accountable and transparent about its economic 
outlook, monetary policy choices are less likely to act as a surprise, most prominently, 
price stability, regardless of political pressure. Policy changes are more likely to prevent 
high inflation, sharp movement in asset prices, achieving the price and output stability. 
It therefore follows that countries with these characteristics are less likely to face credit 
constraints in international capital markets and regain investor’s confidence, thus better 
financial integration. Greater financial integration stabilises the exchange rate, which in 
turn, reduces the exchange rate volatility and therefore calls for a countercyclical 
monetary policy to step in. 
Second, in line with the recent developments of the advanced economies, the most obvious 
policy is to adopt inflation targeting regime in conducting monetary policy. The argument 
of replacing exchange rate anchors by implicit and explicit inflation targets is that the 
regime makes allows monetary tools to be used for domestic stabilisation purposes. The 
inflation targeting regime provides a policy rule on which domestic sector can anchor its 
expectations about the future inflation. Within this framework, monetary authorities 
have the discretion in responding to shocks to stabilise the economy, ensuring greater 
policy credibility. Of course, credible pursuit of inflation targeting requires a capable, 
independent monetary authority and better institutional quality that is demonstrably 
committed to price stability (see, for example, Hammond, 2012 and Lane, 2003). In this 




case, inflation targeting regime may be helpful to overcome the problem of procyclicality 
for better macroeconomic outcomes.  
In summary, escaping monetary policy procyclicality does require clear transparent policy 
making process, better macroeconomic fundamentals, lower exchange rate 
vulnerabilities, international capital flows and adoption of inflation targeting regimes. It 
is also notable that many monetary authorities appear to have escaped fiscal dominance, 
as many emerging countries have recently shifted to countercyclical fiscal policy for better 
institutional quality (see, for example, Frankel et al., 2013). A key factor has been the 
financial reforms achieved over the past decades and adoption of inflation targeting, 
which has enhanced the transparency and flexibility of monetary policy. Although the 
process of founding a credible inflation targeting may involve a persistent period of high 
real interest rates, the payoff will be the enhanced monetary climate. Central to developed 
stabilization performance is an inflation targeting that anchors the price expectations in 
the medium-term that would allow the monetary authority to stabilise the business cycle 
fluctuations, without persuading countervailing shifts in long-term interest rates (see, for 






TABLE 3.4: PANEL REGRESSION OF MONETARY POLICY CYCLICALITY WITH FEAR OF FREE FLOATING (𝑭𝑶𝑭), 1960-2014 (ANNUAL DATA) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CYCLICAL COMPONENTS OF SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE [𝒊𝒊
𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆
]. ESTIMATION METHOD: LEAST SQUARE1 
 ALL COUNTRIES AD SAMPLE EM & DE SAMPLE PT & CP SAMPLE 













































































EXCHANGE RATE DEPRECIATION CYCLE [∆𝒆𝒊
𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆












STATISTICS             
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 52.64% 52.76% 50.82% 71.93% 70.14% 69.94% 8.64% 9.32% 13.33% 8.25% 9.26% 11.45% 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 2383 2383 2383 798 798 798 1585 1585 1585 581 581 581 
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES 99 99 99 28 28 28 71 71 71 26 26 26 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. All data regression include intercept term. See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
AD=Advanced Economies, EM=Emerging Market Economics, DE=Low-Income Developing Countries.  
PT=Procyclical trap countries, who conduct procyclical monetary policy in both sub-period 1960-1999 and 2000-2014.  
CP=Back to school countries that were countercyclical during 1960-1999 and became procyclical during 2000-2014. 
Fear of free floating 𝑭𝑶𝑭 is constructed using the 10-year rolling window correlation between the cyclical components of the short-term interest rate and the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate.  
For brevity constant and 𝑭𝑶𝑭 terms are not reported. 






TABLE 3.5: PANEL REGRESSION OF MONETARY POLICY CYCLICALITY WITH FEAR OF FREE FLOATING (𝑭𝑶𝑭), 1960Q1-2014Q4 (QUARTERLY DATA) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CYCLICAL COMPONENTS OF SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE [𝒊𝒊
𝑸𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆
]. ESTIMATION METHOD: LEAST SQUARE1 
 ALL COUNTRIES AD SAMPLE EM & DE SAMPLE PT & CP SAMPLE 













































































EXCHANGE RATE DEPRECIATION CYCLE [∆𝒆𝒊
𝑸𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆












STATISTICS             
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 18.98% 18.88% 18.15% 23.37% 24.39% 24.40% 14.29% 13.87% 13.85% 10.59% 13.73% 17.97% 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 5104 5104 5104 3143 3143 3143 1961 1961 1961 540 540 540 
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES 61 61 61 29 29 29 32 32 32 11 11 11 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. All data regression include intercept term. See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
AD=Advanced Economies, EM=Emerging Market Economics, DE=Low-Income Developing Countries.  
PT=Procyclical trap countries, who conduct procyclical monetary policy in both sub-period 1960-1999 and 2000-2014.  
CP= Back to school countries that were countercyclical during 1960-1999 and became procyclical during 2000-2014. 
Fear of free floating 𝑭𝑶𝑭𝑸 is constructed using the 20-quater rolling window correlation between the cyclical components of the short-term interest rate and the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate.  
For brevity constant and 𝑭𝑶𝑭𝑸 terms are not reported. 




TABLE 3.6: PANEL REGRESSION OF MONETARY POLICY CYCLICALITY WITH FEAR OF FREE FLOATING (FOF) 
AND OTHER DETERMINANTS OF MONETARY POLICY CYCLICALITY, 1960-2014 (ANNUAL DATA) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CYCLICAL COMPONENTS OF SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE [𝒊𝒊
𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆
]. ESTIMATION METHOD: PANEL LS1 
 ALL COUNTRIES 















































































] × 𝑭𝑰𝑺𝑪𝒀𝑪 
-0.17*** 
(0.034) 





] × 𝑪𝑩𝑰  
0.032 
(0.09) 





] × 𝑴𝑭   
0.013*** 
(0.002) 





] × 𝑰𝑸    
0.47*** 
(0.10) 



























ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 53.02% 43.64% 58.17% 62.94% 50.82% 56.98% 54.64% 50.75% 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 2171 2033 1558 1922 2380 2350 2290 1081 
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES 85 96 97 93 99 98 99 90 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. All data regression include intercept term.  
Fear of free floating 𝑭𝑶𝑭 is constructed using the 10-year rolling window correlation between the cyclical components of the short-term interest rate and the rate of depreciation of the 
exchange rate.  
1 Least square estimation are performed using cross sectional country fixed effect and cross sectional weighting matrix assuming the presence of cross-section heteroscedasticity.  





TABLE 3.7: CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION OF MONETARY POLICY CYCLICALITY WITH FEAR OF FREE FLOATING (FOF), 1960-2014 





𝒀 BY UTILIZING ANNUAL DATA) 
ESTIMATION METHOD: OLS1 




)]. Dependent Variable: Monetary policy Cyclicality [?̂?𝒊
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0.799 
(0.597) 
CBI   
0.256 
(0.172) 






    
0.597 
(0.375) 
MF    
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
   
0.010 
(0.004) 
   
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
   
0.010 
(0.008) 


































STATISTICS                 
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 46.63% 43.44% 34.21% 45.40% 34.93% 38.57% 40.62% 53.48% 33.27% 29.08% 24.94% 31.74% 30.68% 22.49% 26.70% 45.16% 
OBSERVATIONS 78 94 97 98 100 99 100 72 78 94 97 98 100 99 100 72 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
All data regression include intercept term 
1All the estimation is based on white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. 
See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
 







TABLE 3.8: IV REGRESSION OF MONETARY POLICY CYCLICALITY WITH FEAR OF FREE FLOATING (FOF), 1960-2014 





𝒀 BY UTILIZING ANNUAL DATA) 
PANEL A: GMM ESTIMATION (SECOND STAGE REGRESSION)  
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PANEL B: FIRST STAGE REGRESSION 





























CENTRED 𝑹𝟐 70.75% 55.79% 61,38% 43.91% 










WEAK IDENTIFICATION F-TEST ON JOINT 
SIGNIFICANCE OF EXCLUDED INSTRUMENTS2 
F= 15.529 F= 10.600 F= 15.529 F= 10.600 
OVERIDENTIFICATION TEST (J-STATISTICS)3 
Null: The Instruments are Valid Instruments 
Sargan Statistics = 1.682 
(P= 0.194) 
Accept Null 
Sargan Statistics = 0.031  
(P= 0.861) 
Accept Null 
Sargan Statistics = 3.724 
(P= 0.101) 
Accept Null 
Sargan Statistics = 0.044 
(P= 0.834) 
Accept Null 
OBSERVATIONS 40 42 40 42 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10% 
All data regression include intercept term. Only the estimated variables of interest are presented in second stage regression. For brevity constant IQ, CBI, MF, IT, FINOPEN and FINDEPTH 
terms are not reported in second stage regression. See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
 
1 The test is essentially the test of the rank of a matrix:  under the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. A rejection of the null indicates that the matrix is full column rank, i.e., 
the model is identified. 
 
2 Weak identification arises when the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, but only weakly.  Estimators can perform poorly when instruments are weak, and 
different estimators are more robust to weak instruments (e.g., LIML) than others  (e.g., IV); see, e.g., Stock and Yogo (2002) for further discussion. Under the null, the excluded instruments 
are correlated with the endogenous regression, but only strongly. A rejection of null indicates that the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, but only weakly. 
 
3 The Sargan-Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions.  The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the 
excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. A rejection of null indicates that the instruments are not valid instruments. 








TABLE 3.9: ROBUSTNESS CHECK: ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF MONETARY CYCLICALITY 
FROM Vegh and Vuletin (2012), Yakhin (2008), McGettigan et al. (2013) and Duncan (2013) 
ESTIMATION METHOD: OLS VV20121 YYCorr20082 YYTSLS20083 McCorr20134 McTR20135 RD20146 




























































































STATISTICS       
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 30.38% 44.36% 59.04% 24.85% 31.982% 33.89% 
OBSERVATIONS 34 23 21 31 31 44 
 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.   
All data regression include intercept term. All the estimation is based on white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. See data appendix for variable 
definitions and sources. 
 
1 Country correlation between the cyclical component of nominal short-term interest rate and real GDP for the time period 1960-2009 (annual data). The cyclical component 
have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. A positive (negative) correlation indicates countercyclical (procyclical) monetary policy. The index is from Vegh and 
Vuletin (2012). 
 
2 Country correlation between the cyclical component of nominal short-term interest rate and real GDP for the time period for the time period 1974-2004 (quarterly data). The 
cyclical component have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. A positive (negative) correlation indicates countercyclical (procyclical) monetary policy. The index 
is from Yakhin (2008). 
 
3 Estimated time series relation between nominal short-term interest rate and real GDP using Tylor Rule for the time period 1974-2004 (quarterly data). The interest rule model 
is estimated using instrument variable approach to avoid potential endogeneity problem. A positive (negative) coefficient value implies that a cyclical upturn is associated with 
an increase (decrease) output gap, meaning that the behaviour of monetary policy is countercyclical (procyclical). The index is from Yakhin (2008). 
 
4 Country correlation between the cyclical component of real short-term interest rate and real GDP for the time period for the time period 1960-2011 (annual data). The cyclical 
component have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. A positive (negative) correlation indicates countercyclical (procyclical) monetary policy. The index is from 
McGettigan et al. (2013). 
 
5 Estimated time series relation between real short-term interest rate and real GDP using Tylor Rule for the time period 1960-2011 (annual data). A positive (negative) coefficient 
value implies that a cyclical boom is associated with an increase (decrease) output gap, meaning that the behaviour of monetary policy is countercyclical (procyclical). The index 
is from McGettigan et al. (2013). 
 
6 Country correlation between the cyclical component of nominal short-term interest rate and real GDP for the time period for the time period 1974-2004 (quarterly data). The 
cyclical component have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. A positive (negative) correlation indicates countercyclical (procyclical) monetary policy. The index 









On the consequences of macroeconomic policy: 
procyclicality, volatility and growth 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Conventional wisdom suggests that macroeconomic policies should be aimed at 
minimizing business cycle fluctuations. Standard Keynesian theory prescribes increases 
in public expenditure and reductions in taxes in bad times to increase the aggregate 
demand. Similarly, monetary policy is expected to follow the Taylor-type rules, whereby 
short-term interest rates would be reduced in downturns to boost the aggregate demand 
and investment (see, for example, Clarida et al., 1999). Yet in both Chapter 2 and 3, we 
found that many emerging and developing countries routinely pursue procyclical fiscal 
and monetary policies. In particular, fiscal authorities appear to reduce (increase) 
government expenditures in bad (good) times. Similarly, monetary authorities appear to 
increase (reduce) interest rates in downturns (upturns). However, lack of such effective 
stabilisation tools by pursuing procyclical policy may reinforce the cyclical fluctuations, 
aggravating the busts and exacerbating the booms, or, as Kaminsky et al., (2004) put it, 
“turning rainy days into torrential downpours and sunny days into scorching infernos”, 
with potentially serious implications. The purpose of this Chapter is to examine the 
macroeconomic consequences of pursuing procyclical fiscal and monetary policy. 
It is argued that procyclical fiscal and monetary policy deprived emerging and developing 
countries of important macroeconomic stabilisation tools and might partially explain the 
higher volatility of inflation and output in these group of countries (see, for example, 
Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). A lack of stabilisation policy is likely to exert detrimental 
impacts on the economy not only through greater fluctuation in output and price level but 
also through increased output and price level uncertainty. High volatility of output and 
inflation over time raises uncertainty that may increase country perceived risk. In a world 
with nominal contracts, the country perceived risk may induce risk premia for both short 
and long-term agreements/borrowing from external sources, increases costs for hedging 
against output and inflation risks and may lead to an unanticipated reallocation of wealth 
and investments (see, for example, Rother, 2004). Thus, both inflation and output 
volatility that may arise from procyclical policy may impede economic growth.  
Chapter 4. Consequences of Procyclical Macroeconomic Policy  
101 
 
A key question of whether the cyclical properties of macroeconomic policies could affect 
economic growth is also not purely an academic issue, as argued by Aghion and Marinescu 
(2007)84. Before we try to answer the above question, it is worthwhile to ask, how the 
short-term macroeconomic stabilisation policies can impact on the long-run economic 
performance. A brief review of the literature on volatility and growth can be useful. 
Aghion et al., (2005) show that macroeconomic volatility likely to be influenced by the 
cyclicality of macroeconomic policy, with important implication on the long-run average 
growth. They argue that at the presence of macroeconomic volatility, the probability of 
liquidating firm investment increases. As a result, firms are more reluctant to invest in 
risky technologies in the presence of uncertainties. Credit constrained firms have a 
borrowing constraint that is typically constrained by their current earnings. In a 
recession, current earnings are reduced, so are firm’s capacity to borrow to maintain the 
long run growth-enhancing investments (e.g., capital, R&D). Under tight credit 
constraints, long-term investment turns procyclical, and business cycle amplified thus it 
amplify volatility. To the extent that higher short-term macroeconomic volatility 
transforms into deeper recessions, it has an influence on firms’ incentives to engage in 
growth-enhancing investments, resulting in lower average growth. Hence, short-run 
macroeconomic stabilisation policy that can help to reduce the output volatility can 
contribute to enhancing long-run growth.  
Existing empirical and theoretical work distinguishes the cyclical properties of 
macroeconomic policies between advanced economies and developing countries. Several 
accounts have been put forward to explain the cyclical pattern of fiscal and monetary 
policy. However, it is surprising that, in contrast to the wealth of literature on 
determinants of procyclical macroeconomic policy, potential costs of pursuing such sub-
optimal macroeconomic policies have largely been ignored in the existing literature. A 
small number of exceptions include, McManus and Ozkan (2015) who document that 
procyclical fiscal policy is positively associated with output volatility and inflation 
volatility that are harmful to economic growth85. However, to the best of our knowledge, 
there is no systematic study of procyclical monetary policies and their macroeconomic 
                                                          
84 Aghion and Marinescu (2007) argue that standard textbooks present macroeconomics in two separate bodies: in the long term economic 
performance is fundamentally determined by structural features (e.g., education, openness to trade, R&D, financial development and others). 
However, in the short term, the economy is influenced by macroeconomic-both fiscal and monetary stabilisation policies. These two 
approaches have been considered as distinct and separate bodies of research, in a sense that no long-term evaluation (i.e., economic 
performance) is considered to have any impact on the short-term stabilisation policy. 
85 Aghion and Marinescu (2007) and Woo (2009) find a negative relation between fiscal procyclicality and economic growth. However, for 
both of the studies, this is not the main focus of their analysis. Aghion and Marinescu (2007) analyse 19 industrialized OECD countries, Woo 
(2009) analysis is based on 104 countries sample average and McManus and Ozkan (2015) investigate 114 countries panel data over the period 
1950-2010. 
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consequences. In this Chapter we examine, how the cyclical stance of fiscal and monetary 
policy influence macroeconomic stability and long-term growth.  
In what follows, using data from a large number of countries, we link cyclical stances of 
fiscal and monetary policy with macroeconomic stability (i.e., proxied by output volatility 
and inflation volatility) and economic growth. Our earlier findings from Chapter 2 and 3 
suggest that many emerging and low-income developing countries run procyclical policies. 
The evidence provided in this Chapter suggests that procyclical policies – both fiscal and 
monetary policies exert a significant role on macroeconomic instability; they increase 
output volatility and inflation volatility. Our empirical analysis also reveals that 
procyclical macroeconomic policy is positively associated with lower economic growth. By 
identifying a specific source of macroeconomic instability (i.e., output and inflation 
volatility that emerges from procyclical policy), we are able to better isolate the link 
between procyclical policy and growth. Our results are robust to controlling for the 
endogeneity and wide range of robustness checks.  
The rest of the Chapter is organised as follows. The next section briefly discusses the 
underlying evidence from the previous literature on the link between macro policy 
cyclicality, macroeconomic stability and growth. Section 4.3 discusses the methodology. 
Section 4.4 presents descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis. Section 4.5 and 4.6 
relates and discusses the macroeconomic outcomes in the form of output volatility, 
inflation volatility and growth to the derived cyclicality measurements from Chapter 2 
and 3. Robustness checks and extension of the analysis are also presented in Section 4.5 
and 4.6. Finally, Section 4.7 provides concluding remarks. 
4.2 Consequences of macroeconomic policy cyclicality  
Existing empirical studies on the link between macroeconomic policy and its outcomes 
can be broadly classified into two stands; those on the consequences of volatility and those 
on the consequences of procyclicality. Regarding the former, Fatás and Mihov (2010) find 
that countries with excessive fiscal volatility experience a high level of output volatility. 
In a similar vein, Rother (2004) emphasise adverse consequences of inflation volatility on 
the GDP growth. The second strand comprises of recent contributions on the impact of 
procyclical fiscal policies on inflation and output volatility. For example, McManus and 
Ozkan (2015) find that procyclical fiscal policy is positively associated with output 
volatility and inflation volatility. Similarly, Lane (2003) shows that developing economies 
have been fundamentally more exposed to volatile business cycles than the advanced 
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economies. It is suggested that this was because developing countries have done less well 
in smoothing the business cycle fluctuations and output volatility due to procyclical fiscal 
policy.  
Yet, there has been little attention on the macroeconomic costs of pursuing procyclical 
monetary policy. Recent work by McGettigan et al., (2013) estimated Taylor rule for 84 
countries over 1960-2011. Their empirical investigation suggests that that countercyclical 
monetary policy is closely associated with the less volatile output. Aguiar and Gopinath 
(2007) documents that procyclical monetary policy deprived the developing countries of 
important macroeconomic stabilisation tools and might partially explain higher output 
volatility for these group of countries.  
How large are the costs of procyclical fiscal and monetary policy? Several studies highlight 
the relationship between growth and volatility from an empirical viewpoint. For example, 
Ramey and Ramey (1994) and Martin and Rogers (2000) document evidence of a negative 
relationship between output volatility and growth. In a similar vein, Judson and 
Orphanides (1999) and Al-Marhubi (1998) find evidence that inflation volatility has a 
significant negative relation with economic growth. Similarly, Froyen and Waud (1987), 
reveals that high inflation encourages uncertainties with adverse impact on growth. The 
second strand of empirical work explores specific channels of uncertainty and how this 
has affected growth. For example, Alesina and Tabellini (2005) emphasise political 
instability as a source of macroeconomic uncertainty and show that this impacts economic 
growth unfavourably. Fatás (2002) also finds that the association between growth and 
volatility is negative and significant for low-income developing countries. Most of these 
studies present evidence in support of the hypothesis that political instability, uncertainty 
and volatility hurt economic growth.  
From a theoretical viewpoint, Angeletos et al., (2005) develop a formal framework to 
explain why macroeconomic volatility may be negatively related to productivity growth. 
They argue that domestic firms face credit constraints that are typically conditioned by 
their current earnings. In a recession, firms’ current earnings decrease, so is their ability 
to borrow, hence investment. Under tight credit constraints, long-term investment turns 
procyclical, amplifying volatility. As a result, short-term macroeconomic volatility 
transforms into deeper recessions and thus lower mean growth. This prediction received 
empirical support from Aghion and Marinescu (2007). These results are later confirmed 
by looking at the firm level evidence (see, for example, Aghion et al., 2012).  
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The above two lines of literature indeed suggest that countercyclical macroeconomic 
policies, with higher government spending and lower nominal interest rates during 
recessions, may allow credit constrained firms’ to preserve their growth-enhancing 
investments, in turn inducing a long positive effect on economic growth. This argument 
has received empirical support, where the literature has attempted to relate the cyclical 
properties of fiscal policy to economic growth. For example, Aghion et al., (2009) utilising 
industry-level data form OECD countries, find that countries with tight credit constraints 
would benefit from countercyclical fiscal policy to enhance long-term economic growth. 
Woo (2009), on the other hand, proposes an alternative channel through which 
macroeconomic cyclicality may impact output growth. He proposes that greater 
heterogeneous preferences (or polarisation) of social groups is responsible for fiscal policy 
to be more procyclical. By utilising a cross-section data of 96 countries, the author shows 
that social polarisation (i.e., income and education inequality) has a negative impact on 
growth through procyclical fiscal policy. These results are consistent with McManus and 
Ozkan (2015), who find that procyclical countries have lower rates of economic growth.  
4.3 Methodology on the consequences of procyclical 
macroeconomic policy 
To explore the link between the cyclicality of macroeconomic policy and macroeconomic 
outcomes (i.e., growth, output volatility and inflation volatility), we estimate the following 
cross-country dimension of data for the period 1960-2014. Our methodology is comparable 
to the ones used by Fatás and Mihov (2003), Lane (2003) and Woo (2009). The baseline 
regression model is as follows:  
𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑 + 𝜃𝐹𝑀?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ℰ𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                 (4.1) 
where 𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 denotes a macroeconomic outcomes (𝐺𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶, 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑂𝐿 and 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿) for 
country 𝑖 during a time interval 𝑡; 𝐺𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶 is the GDP growth, measured by the average 
of growth rate of real GDP per-capita for the period 1960-2014 for each country 𝑖; 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑂𝐿 represents real GDP volatility by the standard deviation of annual 
percentage change of real GDP per-capita for the period 1960-2014 for each country 𝑖. 
Similarly, we calculate inflation volatility (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿) by taking the standard deviation of 
the annual percentage change of GDP deflator for the same time interval for each 
country 𝑖. 𝐹𝑀?̂?𝑖𝑡 denotes the relevant estimated cyclicality macroeconomic policy 
measured by cyclical properties of fiscal and monetary policy for country 𝑖 during a time 
interval 𝑡. We estimate the cyclical behaviours of fiscal policy (?̂? and ?̂̅?) from our sample 
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of 137 countries of over 45 years 1970-2014, by following specification (2.1) and (2.2) from 
Chapter 2. To estimate the cyclical properties of monetary policy (𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and 
?̂?𝑖
𝑌), we use a sample of 100 countries over 55 years 1960-2014 by applying the correlation 
approach and specification (3.1) from Chapter 386. Each of the policy cyclicality indicators 
enter the regression specification separately, and their results are tested and presented 
in isolation.  
In specification (4.1), 𝑋𝑖𝑡 accounts for a set of the appropriate control variable, which we 
will discuss later. The data for dependent, explanatory variables and other control 
variables are collected from a wide range of sources, as is presented in Table A4.1. 
According to specification (4.1), the impact of macroeconomic cyclicality will be tested 
along three dimensions: volatility of output (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑂𝐿), volatility of inflation (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿) 
and average growth (𝐺𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶).  
4.4 Descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis 
Table 4.1 presents average cyclicality measures for fiscal and monetary policy and 
macroeconomic outcomes (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑂𝐿, 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿 and 𝐺𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶) and their pairwise 
correlations. Results presented in Table 4.1 (Panel A) helps us to make two observations. 
First and as stated in Chapter 2 and 3, on average procyclical fiscal and monetary policy 
is widely observed in emerging and developing countries (i.e., fiscal policy cyclicality 
indicators ?̂? and ?̂̅? show positive values and monetary policy cyclicality indicators 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑖𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and ?̂?𝑌show negative values). On the contrary, on average advanced 
economies tend to follow slightly procyclical fiscal policy (i.e., the cyclicality indicators of 
?̂? and ?̂̅? are slightly positive). However, advanced economies’ monetary policies are 
profoundly countercyclical (i.e., monetary policy cyclicality indicators 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑖𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) 
and ?̂?𝑌show high positive values). Second, on average, advanced countries have lower 
level of output volatility (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑂𝐿) and inflation volatility (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿) with higher level 
of growth (𝐺𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶) compare to emerging and developing economies.  
A simple bivariate analysis, as is presented in Table 4.1 (Panel B) depicts a clear positive 
relation between fiscal policy cyclicality, and output and inflation volatility. Similarly, we 
find a clear negative relation between monetary policy cyclicality, and output and 
inflation volatility. These findings imply that output and inflation volatility are higher for 
                                                          
86 Please note, the sample size reduced to 100 country due to exchange rate classification and hyperinflation episodes, while we estimate the 
monetary policy cyclicality. On the other hand, we estimate 137 countries’ fiscal policy cyclicality at the absence of such restrictions. 
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countries conducting procyclical fiscal and monetary policy. We also find a clear negative 
relation between fiscal policy cyclicality and economic growth. In a similar vein, we find 
that countries with procyclical monetary policy have low level of economic growth. The 
results in bivariate analysis are statistically significant at 1% level. In sum, the bivariate 
analysis indicates that procyclical countries have higher rates of output volatility, 
inflation volatility and lower rates of economic growth. 
TABLE 4.1 
 
PANEL A: CYCLICAL PROPERTIES OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY, OUTPUT VOLATILITY, INFLATION 
VOLATILITY AND GROWTH 
Country group 
Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy Cyclicality of Monetary Policy  Volatility of Output Volatility of Inflation Growth 
Avg. ?̂?  Avg. ?̂̅? 
Avg. 
𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) 
Avg. ?̂?𝒀 Avg. 𝑹𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑪𝑯𝑽𝑶𝑳 Avg. 𝑰𝑵𝑭𝑽𝑶𝑳 Avg. 𝑮𝑹𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑪 
All country group 0.68 0.66 0.08 0.11 5.56% 9.11% 2.33% 
Advanced economies 0.17 0.07 0.37 0.52 3.31% 4.52% 3.92% 
Emerging market and low 
income developing 
economies 
0.83 0.82 -0.03 -0.04 6.19% 10.47% 2.19% 
PANEL B: CORRELATION MATRIX OF CYCLICALITY, OUTPUT VOLATILITY, INFLATION VOLATILITY AND 
GROWTH 
 ?̂? ?̂̅? 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) ?̂?𝒀 𝑹𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑪𝑯𝑽𝑶𝑳 𝑰𝑵𝑭𝑽𝑶𝑳 𝑮𝑹𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑪 





























We estimate ?̂?𝑰 and ?̅?𝒊
̂ for 45 year annual (1970-2014) for each country to measure the cyclicality of fiscal policy by utilizing the stated methodology in Chapter 2. We use 137 countries’ 
(30 developed, 59 emerging and 48 low-income developing country) data during the estimation process. A positive (negative) values of ?̂?𝑰 and ?̅?𝒊
̂ imply procyclical (countercyclical) 
policy. The estimated results are presented in Table A4.2. 
  
We estimate 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and ?̂?𝒀 for 55 years annual data (1960-2014) to measure the cyclicality of monetary policy by applying the stated methodology in Chapter 3. We utilize 
100 countries’ (29 advanced economies, 46 emerging and 25 low-income developing economies) data during the estimation process. A negative (positive) values of 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) 
and ?̂?𝒀 imply procyclical (countercyclical) policy. The estimated results are presented in Table A4.2. 
 
We take average of volatility of output, volatility of inflation, growth and the estimated cyclical properties of fiscal and monetary policy values for each country group to present the 
above summery statistics. The country group classification is from Nielsen (2011). Please refer to page 20 in his paper for the list of classification. 
  
In Panel B, a simple correlation statistics is calculated for full set of countries by utilizing the cyclicality indicators of ?̂?, ?̂̅?, 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and ?̂?𝒀. A simple bivariate OLS regression 
is conducted to establish the relation between cyclicality of macroeconomic policy (?̂?, ?̂̅?, 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and ?̂?𝒀) and macroeconomic outcomes (𝑹𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑪𝑯𝑽𝑶𝑳, 𝑰𝑵𝑭𝑽𝑶𝑳, 
𝑮𝑹𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑪). We use the standard star convention for statistical significance; ***1%, **5% and *10% significance, where white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
are reported in the parenthesis.  
 
4.5 Role of procyclical macroeconomic policy on output and 
inflation volatility 
4.5.1 Output volatility 
In this section, we formally test the relation between the cyclical properties of 
macroeconomic policy and output volatility. A natural hypothesis is that a higher level of 
macroeconomic procyclicality would lead to higher levels of output volatility. A 
countercyclical policy action against the cycle would be expected to act as stabilisation 
tool and reduce output fluctuation, keeping the growth on a non-fluctuating path over the 
business cycle. On the contrary, procyclical policy may aggravate the busts and intensify 
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the booms. Such policy may amplify the oscillation of business cycle movements that may 
lead to higher level of output volatility. In this section we empirically examine this 
hypothesis by exploring whether there is a statistically significant link between the 
cyclicality of macroeconomic policy (i.e., both fiscal and monetary) and output volatility. 
Our estimation results from specification (4.1) are presented in Table 4.2, where output 
volatility (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑂𝐿) is regressed on the cyclicality of macroeconomic policy and a set 
of control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡. In the baseline regression specification (4.1), we include the initial 
real GDP per-capita in 1960 (𝐿𝑁𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻) to control for the potential impact of the level 
of economic development on output volatility. It is also widely known that output volatility 
is inversely correlated with the level of development (see, for example, Lane, 2003; Kraay 
and Ventura, 2000). The estimated coefficients of  𝐿𝑁𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻 enter with correct negative 
sign and they are statistically significant at 1% to 5% level (Table 4.2).  
It may also be that smaller countries face higher volatility since the scope for regional and 
sectoral diversification is more limited (see, for example, Lane, 2003). We include country 
size measured by population (POP) in the specification (4.1). The coefficient of POP is 
estimated with a correct negative sign, and is significant at 1% level (Table 4.2).  
Similarly, more open economies – those with high trade volumes may be more vulnerable 
to external shocks, such as volatile terms of trade shocks (see, for example, Blanchard and 
Wolfers, 2000). To capture such an impact, we include trade openness (𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸). The 
estimated coefficient of 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 enter with correct positive sign, however they are not 
statistically significant (Table 4.2). We also consider the government size (𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃) 
measured by government expenditures as a percentage of GDP. 𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃 is introduced to 
capture the stabilisation impact of government size on output gap (see, for example, Fatás 
and Mihov, 2003; Gali, 1994). That is, countries with larger governments are more likely 
to exhibit countercyclical fiscal policy to reduce macroeconomic stability, thus output 
volatility (see, for example, Gali, 1994 and Debrun et al., 2008). The estimated coefficient 
of 𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃 enter with correct negative sign (Table 4.2).  
After incorporating the above-discussed control variables in the specification (4.1), our 
key indicator macroeconomic policy-both fiscal and monetary cyclicality show expected 
results as hypothesised earlier. The coefficients of fiscal policy cyclicality (?̂? and ?̂̅?) enter 
with correct positive sign that are all statistically significant at 1% level (Table 4.2, Col 1-
6). The findings confirm that procyclical fiscal policy is harmful for economic stability, 
that is to say procyclicality intensify the output volatility. Table 4.2 OLS estimates in Col 
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1 for ?̂? imply that 0.01% increase in fiscal policy procyclicality increase the output 
volatility (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑂𝐿) by 0.017%.  
We find similar evidence for monetary policy cyclicality in relation to output volatility. 
The coefficients of monetary policy cyclicality (𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌) enter with correct 
negative sign that are all statistically significant at 1%  level (Table 4.2, Col 7-12). The 
findings confirms that countercyclical monetary policy is required to reduce output 
volatility. Table 4.2 OLS estimate in Col 7 for 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) imply that 0.01% increase 
in countercyclical monetary policy reduce the output volatility (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑂𝐿) by 0.031%. 
The results propose a clear note, countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy is required for 
output stability. It is also noticeable that the coefficient values are changing for different 
cyclicality of macroeconomic policy indicators [i.e., ?̂?, ?̂̅?, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌], 
nonetheless,  they are all statistically significant with correct sign. These variations of 
result arise due to a different kind of macroeconomic policy cyclicality measurements 
method.  
We add three additional control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in the specification (4.1): exchange rate 
volatility (𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿), terms of trade volatility (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿) and financial development 
measured by financial depth (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻) and results are presented in Table 4.2. We 
include the above listed variables to check the robustness of the relation between 
cyclicality of macroeconomic policy and output volatility. In earlier literature, these three 
variables received a significant attention in relation to output volatility (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑂𝐿).  
First, we consider 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿 as a measure of risk, and it is calculated by taking the standard 
deviation of the annual nominal exchange rates between the sample country and the 
USA87. High 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿 indicates the uncertainties for an open economy in international 
agreements for financial assets and goods. 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿 has a negative impact on domestic and 
foreign investment decisions. It may cause the reallocation of resources among the 
domestic sectors and countries, between imports and exports and creates an uncertain 
environment for investment, thus output volatility (see, for example, Ghosh, et al. 1997; 
Bleaney and Fielding, 2002). Additionally, it has been argued that exchange rate volatility 
leads to a reduction in the level of international trade, as firms are exposed to asymmetric 
exchange risk. Higher exchange rate risk lowers the risk-adjusted expected revenue from 
exports, and therefore incentives to trade (see, for example, Broli. 1994; Wolf, 1995). Thus, 
exchange rate volatility may lead to volatile macroeconomic environment through export 
                                                          
87 Please note for European countries, we use the nominal effective exchange rate.  
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and investment channel. The results in Table 4.2 confirm a strong positive relation 
between 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑂𝐿 and 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿, and the estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant at 1% to 5% level. 
Similarly, terms of trade shocks are likely to have a larger impact on macroeconomic 
volatility in countries more open to international trade, as it will have their most direct 
impacts on the tradable sector of an economy (see, for example, Beck et al., 2006). 
However, economies with more flexible exchange rates are more likely to absorb the terms 
of trade shocks through currency depreciation with favourable impact on economic 
activity. This is consistent with the notion that, given the adverse shock, a country with 
flexible exchange rate will adjust through a currency depreciation, which tends to offset 
the shock’s negative effects on output via a boost in external competitiveness.  On the 
contrary, countries with fixed exchange rate regimes or managed exchange rate regime 
may experience substantial swings in output (see, for example, Mendoza, 1995; Kose, 
2002; Broda, 2004; Edwards and Yeyati, 2005). If so, countries that have high trade 
volumes combined with the rigid exchange rate regime are vulnerable to terms of trade 
shocks. We measure terms of trade shock (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿) by taking the standard deviation of 
annual percentage change of terms of trade. The results in Table 4.2 confirm a positive 
relation between 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑂𝐿 and 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿. 
We also consider the role of financial development, proxied by financial depth 
(𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻). Countries with a high level of liquid liability have the appropriate financial 
cushion to conduct countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy to reduce volatile 
macroeconomic outcomes. However, we have observed a weak relation between 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻 and 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑂𝐿. The estimated coefficients of 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻 sometimes enter 
with wrong positive sign and the estimated effects are relatively small (Table 4.2).  
After incorporating the three important determinants (𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿, 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿 and 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻) 
of macroeconomic volatility (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑂𝐿), our key results remain intact, in particular, 
the coefficient of macroeconomic policy cyclicality indicators [i.e., ?̂?, ?̂̅?, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) 
and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌] remain significant at 1% level with the expected signs (Table 4.2); procyclical 
macroeconomic policies have a significantly unfavourable effect on output volatility.  
OLS estimation results presented in Table 4.2 may be sensitive to outliers – influential 
observations with unusual values of explanatory variables. We use weighted and 
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reweighted OLS regression (WLS and RWLS method) to control for outliers88. This 
estimation process is an alternative to OLS regression when data is contaminated with 
outliers. The robust results for Table 4.2 are presented in RCol. Interestingly the 
statistical significance and the size of the coefficients of macroeconomic policy cyclicality 
indicators remain much the same even after controlling for outliers and even if we include 
all the major control variables, that we have already discussed in this section (All RCol). 
4.5.2 Inflation volatility 
We now turn to the relation between the cyclical properties of macroeconomic policy and 
inflation volatility. Given that macroeconomic policy impacts aggregate demand and 
hence price level and output, greater procyclicality would lead to higher level of inflation 
volatility. It is straightforward to establish that procyclical policy is likely lead to 
inflationary pressures in the good times and prolong recession in the bad times.  
In Table 4.3, inflation volatility (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿) is regressed on the cyclicality of macroeconomic 
policy and a set of control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡. In the baseline regression, we include the initial 
real GDP per-capita in 1960 (𝐿𝑁𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻) to control for the potential impact of the level 
of economic development on inflation volatility. According to Balassa–Samuelson effect if 
poor countries grow and catch up, productivity is likely to increase in the tradable sector, 
thereby increasing wages and prices of non-traded goods, raising inflation (see, for 
example, Samuelson, 1994). Additionally, initial real GDP per-capita needs to be included 
because it is possible that poor countries may have weak institutions and pursue poor 
macroeconomic policies, leading to greater macroeconomic volatility (see, for example, 
Acemoglu et al., 2003 and Easterly 2008). The estimated coefficients of 𝐿𝑁𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻 enter 
with correct negative sign, but they are not statistically significant (Table 4.3). 
Next, we include trade openness (𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸) in the specification (4.1). It is well known that 
trade integration is associated with inflation stability (see, for example, Brahmbhatt and 
Dadush, 1996; Granato et al., 2006). The costs of inflation volatility may be larger in open 
economies, if the domestic firms fail to maintain a stable price path, they run the risk of 
losing international competitiveness. In relatively open economies such cost of inflation 
volatility plays a key role in policy formulation, and this may cause them to conduct more 
disciplined macroeconomic policies, delivering inflation stability (see, for example, Romer, 
                                                          
88 Two types of weights are used in the estimation process.  In Huber weighting, observations with small residuals get a weight of 1, the larger 
the residual, the smaller the weight. With biweighting, all cases with a non-zero residual get down-weighted at least a little.  The two different 
kinds of weight are used because Huber weights can have difficulties with severe outliers, and biweights can have difficulties converging or 
may yield multiple solutions.  Using the Huber weights first, helps to minimise problems with the biweights. 
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1993). More precisely, trade openness matter due to exchange rate pass through and 
policymakers should adjust the interest rate based on the inflationary pressures that are 
originated from degree of trade openness (see, for example, Clarida et al., 2001). Table 4.3 
presented results support the evidence of an inverse relation between 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 and 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿, 
however without sufficient statistical significance. 
We find that the coefficients of fiscal policy cyclicality (?̂? and ?̂̅?) enter with the expected 
positive sign and are all statistically significant at 1% to 5% level (Table 4.3, Col 1-6). The 
findings confirm that procyclical fiscal policy intensify inflation volatility. Table 4.3 Col 1 
suggests that 0.01% increase in fiscal policy procyclicality increases inflation volatility 
(𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿) by 0.036%. We find similar evidence for the role of monetary policy cyclicality 
on inflation volatility (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿). The coefficients of monetary policy cyclicality 
(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌) enter with correct negative sign that are all statistically 
significant at 1% to 5% level (Table 4.3, Col 7-12). As is seen in Table 4.3 coefficient values 
are different for different cyclicality indicators [i.e., ?̂?, ?̂̅?, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌], 
however they are all statistically significant at required level with correct signs. 
To check whether the link between cyclicality and inflation volatility is sensitive to the 
inclusion of other control variables we incorporate; exchange rate volatility (𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿), 
terms of trade volatility (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿) and central bank independence (proxied by monetary 
freedom 𝑀𝐹), where all these are expected to impact inflation volatility unambiguously.  
First, we consider 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿 as a measure of risk, in a sense countries that have high level 
of trade volumes or open to trade may be more vulnerable to exchange rate volatility 
(𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿), resulting in inflation volatility. The volatility mainly arises from monetary 
authorities’ direct intervention in foreign exchange market due to procyclical policy. If 
this adjustment happens, then one can notice a similar degree of volatility in commodity 
prices, thus on inflation. On the other hand, if the exchange rate is allowed to move freely 
to accommodate commodity price shocks in a countercyclical fashion, then the commodity 
prices in the local currency should be relatively stable in the presence of flexible exchange 
rate regime (see, for example, Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). Table 4.3 presents evidence of 
a positive relation between 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿 and 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿, and the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1% level. 
It is also well known that countries that are more open to trade are more vulnerable to 
external shocks due to volatile terms of trade. Using a real business cycle model for a 
small open economy, Mendoza (1995) and Kose (2002) argue that terms of trade shocks 
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can explain the majority of the variance in output. Changes in terms of trade impact on 
output variability by altering the volume of imports that can be obtained for a given 
amount of exports, hence the economy’s real domestic income. Terms of trade shocks also 
impact on inflation, directly through the shock’s effect on domestic price and wages, and 
indirectly through its effects on output (see, for example, Beck et al., 2006). We include 
terms of trade volatility (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿) as a measure of terms of trade shock in specification 
(4.1). This is with the correct positive sign, but is not statistically significant (Table 4.3). 
We also consider the role of central bank independence on inflation stability. There is 
mounting evidence on the importance of central bank independence in the sphere of 
monetary policy as means of avoiding high inflation and achieving price stability (see, for 
example, Cukierman, 2008; Taylor, 2016). At the absence of central bank independence, 
there is a tendency to fiscal dominance resulting in greater debt accumulation (see, for 
example, Dimakou, 2006). Delegation of monetary policy to an independent monetary 
authority permits the central banks to respond in a conservative manner that is reflected 
directly in a lower rate of money supply growth, ensuring price stability (see, for example, 
Berger et al., 2001; Posso and Tawadros, 2013). We therefore include a measure of central 
bank independence (measured by monetary freedom 𝑀𝐹) that may lead to better 
macroeconomic outcome by stabilizing the inflation volatility (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿). The estimated 
coefficients of 𝑀𝐹 appear with the expected negative sign and they are statistically 
significant at 1% to 5% (Table 4.3). 
After incorporating the three important determinants (𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿, 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿 and 𝑀𝐹) of 
macroeconomic volatility (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿), the coefficient of the cyclicality indicators [i.e., ?̂?, ?̂̅?, 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌] remain significant at 1% to 5% level with correct sign (Table 
4.3). In Table 4.3 we also present estimation results from WLS and RWLS method 
controlling for outliers, where size of the coefficients of cyclicality indicators remain much 
the same (All RCol). Overall, we observe a clear negative link between countercyclical 
macroeconomic policy and inflation volatility. 
4.5.3 Addressing endogeneity in the output and inflation 
volatility regression 
It can be argued that the relation between macroeconomic outcomes (i.e., 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑂𝐿 
and 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿) and macroeconomic cyclicality indicators [i.e., ?̂?, ?̂̅?, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and 
?̂?𝑖
𝑌] may reveal the fact that better (poorer) macroeconomic outcomes help to stabilise 
(weaken) the economy that might improve (deteriorate) the macroeconomic policy 
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management. For example, external shock facing countries that are more open to trade 
that may be reflected in their output and inflation volatility through terms of trade 
volatility (see, for example Beck et al., 2006). That is, an indirect causality may run from 
output and inflation volatility to macroeconomic cyclicality indicators and not the other 
way around. Also given that macroeconomic outcomes and cyclicality indicators are both 
measured during the period 1960-2014, there may a potential endogeneity problem in 
estimating the relation between cyclicality of macroeconomic policy and the 
macroeconomic outcomes by using the specification (4.1). We re-estimate our main 
relationships using the two-step feasible GMM as an IV regression and results are 
presented in Table 4.4.  
We instrumented cyclical properties of macroeconomic indicators by using two different 
variables. First, cyclical properties of macroeconomic policies [i.e., ?̂?, ?̂̅?, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) 
and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌] are instrumented by using the initial level institutional quality. We measure the 
initial institutional quality proxied by executive corruption in 1946 (𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅)89. We 
have established in Chapters 2 and 3 a strong correlation between better (weak) 
institutional qualities and countercyclical (procyclical) fiscal and monetary policy as is 
also shown by Calderón and Hebbel (2008), Frankel et al., (2013), Calderón et al. 
(2004a&b) and Duncan (2014). The first stage regression in Table 4.4 (Col 1-2 and 5-6) 
show that 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅 and fiscal policy cyclicality (?̂? and ?̂̅?) coefficients are statistically 
significant at 1% level with the expected positive sign. Similarly, the first stage regression 
in Table 4.4 (3-4 and 7-8) show that 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅 and monetary policy cyclicality 
(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌) coefficients are estimated with the expected negative sing and 
are statistically significant at 1%.  
Second, cyclical properties of macroeconomic indicators [i.e., ?̂?, ?̂̅?, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and 
?̂?𝑖
𝑌] instrumented by using the initial level of borrowing constraint proxied by institutional 
investor credit ratings in 1979 (𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑅) for a country90. It has been widely argued that the 
ability of emerging and developing countries to adopt optimal (countercyclical) 
stabilization policies is hindered by external borrowing constraints (see, for example, for 
fiscal policy Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Calderón and Hebbel, 2008, and for monetary policy 
Calvo and Reinhart, 2000 and Calderón et al., 2004a&b). The literature proposes that 
                                                          
89 Please note that, we set the year 1946 for executive corruption based on the earliest time data availability for the sample countries. That is 
to say, executive corruption 1946 is exogenous. The executive corruption 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅 is a normalized index and it ranges from 0 (lower 
executive corruption) to 1 (highest executive corruption). 
90 Please note that, we set the year 1979 for institutional investor credit ratings based on the earliest time data availability for the sample 
countries. That is to say, institutional investor credit ratings 1979 is exogenous.  One issue with this instrument is the restricted availability of 
data that reduces the number of sample size. The credit rating 𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑅 ranges from 0 (lower credit ratings) to 100 (highest credit ratings). 
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there is strong a correlation between better (weak) access to international capital markets 
and countercyclical (procyclical) fiscal and monetary policy. The first stage regression in 
Table 4.4 (Col 1-2 and 5-6) show that 𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑅 and fiscal policy cyclicality (?̂? and ?̂̅?) 
coefficients are statistically significant at 1% to 10% level with the expected negative  sign. 
Similarly, the first stage regression in Table 4.4 (Col 3-4 and 7-8) show that 𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑅 and 
monetary policy cyclicality (𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌) coefficients are statistically 
significant at 1% to 10% level with the positive sign.  
The IV results presented in Table 4.4 are largely consistent with the OLS baseline 
regression results presented in Table 4.2 and 4.3. However, higher coefficients values are 
reported for cyclical properties of macroeconomic policies.  
Our instrumental variables (𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅 and 𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑅) satisfy two major requirements of 
GMM estimations: they must be orthogonal to the error term and correlated with the 
incorporated endogenous variables. Table 4.4 show that F-test statistics indicate a test of 
the joint significance of the (excluded) instruments, which are presented in the first-stage 
regressions. The overidentification test presented in Hansen J-test statistics is employed 
to test whether the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term. The results are 
consistent with the presence of a general form of heteroscedasticity. The Hansen J-
statistics shows that our selected instruments satisfy the orthogonality conditions, 
indicate 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅 and 𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑅 are valid instruments for cyclical properties of 
macroeconomic indicators [i.e., ?̂?, ?̂̅?, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌].  
4.6 Role of procyclical macroeconomic policy on economic 
growth  
4.6.1 Economic growth  
We now turn to our key outcome, economic growth, which we will relate to the cyclical 
properties of macroeconomic policies. A natural hypothesis is that greater procyclicality 
would lead to lower level of economic growth. Several studies investigate the relationship 
between growth and volatility from an empirical standpoint. The first group of studies 
propose that output volatility is harmful to growth (see, for example, Ramey and Ramey, 
1994; Martin and Rogers, 2000). Other establish that inflation volatility is detrimental to 
growth (see, for example, Judson and Orphanides, 1999; Al-Marhubi, 1998). While there 
is broad agreement that high volatility is harmful to growth, little attention has been 
devoted to disentangling the procyclical policy channels through which such effects take 
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place. In the earlier sections, we find that procyclical countries have a higher level of 
output and inflation volatility. As a result, in this section, we empirically investigate 
whether the effects of procyclical policy has an impact on economic growth. To explore 
whether there is a statistically significant link between the cyclicality of macroeconomic 
policy (i.e., both fiscal and monetary) and growth (𝐺𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶), we estimate specification 
(4.1) and present the results in Table 4.5. 
In our baseline specification, we include a small set of core growth determinants in line 
with Barro (1996) and Woo (2009) 91; initial income per-capita (𝐿𝑁𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻) in 1960 to 
control for convergence hypothesis; initial human capital (educational attainment) as 
measured by log of average years the the of secondary schooling of the population over 
age 15 in 1960 (𝐿𝑆𝑌𝑅). It is widely known that GDP growth (𝐺𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶) is inversely 
correlated with the level of development (see, for example, Woo, 2009 and McManus and 
Ozkan, 2015). Estimated results presented in Table 4.5 are consistent these hypotheses.   
In Table 4.5 our key cyclicality indicators appear with negative (positive) estimated 
coefficients for fiscal (monetary) policy. The coefficients of fiscal policy cyclicality (?̂? and 
?̂̅?) are all statistically significant at the 1% to 5% level (Table 4.5, Col 1-6), indicating that 
procyclical fiscal policy is harmful for economic growth, while estimated effects of 
monetary cyclicality are not statistically significantly different from zero. Table 4.5 OLS 
estimates in Col 1 for ?̂? imply that 0.01% increase in fiscal policy procyclicality reduces 
the economic growth by 0.007%.  
We also incorporate a set of control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡; government size (𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃), trade (𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸), 
demographic factors proxied by level of fertility (𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑇) and life expectancy at birth 
(𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑃). First, we consider government size (𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃). A large public sector may have 
negative spillover on the economy due to greater taxes, borrowing printing money. On the 
other hand, if the government size relatively small or even zero, the growth is very limited 
due to limited provision of public goods. The empirical literature shows that government 
spending and growth are negatively associated (see, for example, Dar and Amirkhalkhali, 
2002; Guseh and Oritsejafor, 2007). The results in Table 4.5 confirm the negative relation 
between 𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃 and 𝐺𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶, although not at conventional significance levels.  
                                                          
91 There is growing number of empirical growth literature and they do have some shortcoming of growth regressions (see, for example, Durlauf 
et al., 2005 for a critical survey). One of the major concern about the robustness. Many growth literature have regressed real GDP growth on 
a vast array of potential determinants. But this selection of determinants have been called into question, largely because the estimated 
parameters are often sensitive to other control variables. To avoid this problem, we focus on the a core set of explanatory variables that have 
been shown to consistently related to growth and estimate the importance of other control variables conditional on presence of the core set. 
The other major problem is the endogeneity problem. This is why, in our baseline specification, we give emphasis on a small set of growth 
determinants which are in initial condition. 
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To also examine the role of trade, we include trade (𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸) in specification (4.1). 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 
is measured by taking the average value of trade shares, exports plus imports divided by 
GDP. Existing empirical work suggests that trade openness has a positive and significant 
effect on economic growth (see, for example, Harrison, 1996; Frankel and Romer, 1999; 
and Irwin and Tervio, 2002). To capture the concept, we include trade openness (𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸) 
in relation to growth (𝐺𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶) in the baseline regression. The estimated coefficient in 
Table 4.5 confirm earlier findings on the positive association between openness and 
economic growth. 
Next, we incorporate fertility rate (𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑇) and life expectancy rate at birth (𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑃). 
Level of fertility (𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑇) is closely associated with population growth, and hence with 
economic growth. High population growth through high level of fertility are shown impede 
to economic growth (see, for example, Weintraub, 1962 and Barro, 2001). The argument 
is that the choice to have more children per adult (and, hence, in the long run, to have a 
higher rate of population growth) comes at the expense of per person output growth rate. 
The results in Table 4.5 confirm this negative relation between 𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑇 and 𝐺𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶. 
Similarly, life expectancy rate at birth (𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑃) may reflect public health condition thus 
human capital development. Low life expectancy may reflect low health that is harmful 
for economic growth and development (see, for example, Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007; 
Lorentzen et al., 2008). The results in Table 4.5 are also consistent with these hypothesis. 
After incorporating 𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑇, and 𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑃, the coefficient of fiscal cyclicality  
indicators ((?̂? and ?̂̅?) remain significant at 1% to 5% level with the expected negative sign 
and the size of coefficients does not change noticeably (Table 4.5, Col 1-6). Overall, the 
estimated results clearly point to the important role of countercyclical fiscal policy.  
4.6.2 Addressing endogeneity in the growth regression 
It can be argued that the possible relation between cyclical properties of macroeconomic 
policy and growth may reveal the fact that countries with less economic development may 
have a weak institutional quality. Lack of better institutional quality may prevent 
countercyclical policy, and hence better economic outcomes. A strong negative association 
between institutional quality and economic growth is well-established (see, for example, 
Mauro, 1995 and Knack and Keefer, 1995). Additionally, Calderón and Hebbel (2008) and 
Frankel et al., (2013) propose that countries with better institutional quality exhibit less 
procyclical policy stance. Linking the above two arguments suggests that less developed 
countries with poor institutional quality may exhibit procyclical characteristics and not 
Chapter 4. Consequences of Procyclical Macroeconomic Policy  
117 
 
the other way round. We attempt to address this potential endogeneity of growth and 
cyclical properties of macroeconomic policy through the instrumental variable (IV) 
regression. The estimation results from the two-step feasible GMM estimation are 
presented in Table 4.6. 
We instrumented cyclical properties of macroeconomic policy [i.e., ?̂?, ?̂̅?, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 , 𝑌𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) 
and ?̂?𝑖
𝑌] by using the same set of instrument variables (𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅 and 𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑅) that are 
discussed in section 4.5.3. The first stage regression in Table 4.6 show that countries with 
initial level of weak institutional quality (𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅) and high borrowing constraint 
(𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑅) pursue procyclical fiscal and monetary policy. The second stage regression in 
Table 4.6 reveal that greater procyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy leads to lower 
growth and these results are statistically significant. Moreover, the estimated effect of the 
cyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy becomes much larger with higher values of 
estimated coefficients being recorded compare to the OLS results presented in Table 4.5.  
4.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have examined the extent to which cyclical pattern of macroeconomic 
policy can affect the macroeconomic stability and economic growth, focusing on both fiscal 
and monetary policy. Our empirical analysis can be summarised as follows: first, 
procyclical fiscal and monetary policies destabilise macroeconomic outcomes, by 
intensifying output and inflation volatility. Second, procyclical policies are harmful to 
growth. These findings have been shown to be robust to a set of alternative measures of 
fiscal and monetary policy cyclicality. The results are further tested using GMM 
estimating method to handle potential endogeneity and heteroscedasticity issue, and the 
results remain unaltered and provide a clear narrative: both procyclical fiscal and 
monetary policies are detrimental to economic growth and intensify output and inflation 
volatility. 
What are the major channels through which these links operate? One possible explanation 
is that the effect of fiscal and monetary policies are asymmetric over the course of the 
business cycle. Recent research documents that fiscal and monetary policy are 
considerably more effective in recessions compared to expansions (see, for example, 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012 and Coulibaly, 2012). Under the proposed hypothesis 
fiscal and monetary authorities should be conducting countercyclical policy when it has 
its largest impact on the aggregate economy: when the multiplier is relatively high (in 
downtime) expansionary impacts are amplified. In this case, the countercyclical policy is 
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more effective to take the economy out of the recession. Under the procyclical policy, the 
main impact of expansionary policy will be first reflected in prices as the economy is close 
to the capacity and also on the output. Intuitively, such policy management may 
accelerate output and inflation volatility, which supports our empirical findings.  
Another interpretation of our results is that countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy 
management is a good proxy for good general macroeconomic management. Our empirical 
analysis proposes that procyclical – both fiscal and monetary policies have a detrimental 
impact on output and inflation volatility. Therefore, fiscal and monetary authorities who 
conduct countercyclical policy is sending a signal that they are good at policy 
management, which in effect reduces macroeconomic uncertainty (e.g., output and 
inflation volatility). By doing so, countercyclical authorities can demonstrate a credible 
fiscal and monetary management. The fiscal and monetary authority that ensures the 
reputation of countercyclical policy would in time find that their credible policy execution 
did the work for them; in a sense, rational agents would anticipate the economy not to 
fluctuate as much, and the uncertainty would be relatively low. At the presence of less 
uncertainty, the rational agents have more incentives to invest growth enhancing long-
term investments. An economy in such a condition would feasibly have a higher level of 
growth.  
Having empirically linked the macroeconomic outcomes in the form of higher output 
volatility, inflation volatility and lower level of growth with procyclical fiscal and 
monetary policy, our findings point to the importance of shifting from procyclical to 
countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy. Earlier research has proposed that 
institutional reforms and credible policy responses in the conduct of fiscal and monetary 
policy can do much to improve the capacity to stabilize the cyclical fluctuations (see, for 
example, Lane, 2003; Calderón et al., 2004a&b; Frankel et al., 2013; Vegh and Vuletin, 
2012; Duncan, 2014). It is also argued that procyclical countries face greater restrictions 
to accessing to international capital markets and have shallow domestic credit markets 
(see, for example, Riascos and Vegh, 2003; Lane, 2003; Caballero, 2002; Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy, 2004). In line with the Chapter 2 and 3 policy recommendation, better 
institutional/government quality (i.e., strengthening checks and balances, transparency 
and fiscal rules), credible policy response (i.e., the appropriate exchange rate regime and 
inflation targeting) and better financial integration with international capital markets 






TABLE 4.2: OUTPUT VOLATILITY AND CYCLICALITY OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY, 1960-2014  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTPUT VOLATILITY (RGDPCHVOL) 
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STATISTICS             
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 37.20% 47.61% 46.57% 36.53% 46.88% 47.23% 49.60% 56.37% 54.38% 44.05% 54.85% 54.63% 
OBSERVATIONS 131 113 113 131 113 113 92 91 91 92 91 91 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
All data regression include intercept term. 
Col estimations are performed based on OLS, where white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance are reported in the parenthesis. 
RCol estimation are performed based on weighted and reweighted OLS regression to control for outliers. 






TABLE 4.3: INFLATION VOLATILITY AND CYCLICALITY OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY, 1960-2014  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INFLATION VOLATILITY (INFVOL) 
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STATISTICS             
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 27.08% 35.95% 53.71% 27.85% 37.37% 52.91% 39.78% 51.63% 57.61% 35.59% 50.59% 57.61% 
OBSERVATIONS 105 105 105 105 105 105 90 88 88 90 88 88 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
All data regression include intercept term 
Col estimations are performed based on OLS, where white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance are reported in the parenthesis  
RCol estimation are performed based on weighted and reweighted OLS regression to control for outliers. 




TABLE 4.4: IV REGRESSION OF OUTPUT VOLATILITY, INFLATION VOLATILITY AND CYCLICALITY OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY 
PANEL A: GMM ESTIMATION  
 
Dependent Variable  
Output Volatility (RGDPCHVOL) 
Dependent Variable  
Inflation Volatility (INFVOL) 


















CYCLICALITY OF FISCAL POLICY ?̂?𝒊 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
   
0.112*** 
(0.031) 
   





















CYCLICALITY OF MONETARY POLICY ?̂?𝒊
𝒀    
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
   
-0.077*** 
(0.021) 
PANEL B: FIRST STAGE REGRESSION 































































STATISTICS         
CENTRED 𝑹𝟐 29.74% 17.55% 29.51% 17.65% 33.49% 10.41% 32.80% 28.95% 


















WEAK IDENTIFICATION F-TEST ON JOINT 
SIGNIFICANCE OF EXCLUDED INSTRUMENTS2 
F= 13.900 F= 11.744 F= 20.066 F= 12.066 F= 16.575 F= 14.188 F= 23.061 F= 14.763 
OVERIDENTIFICATION TEST (J-STATISTICS)3 
Null: The Instruments are Valid Instruments 
































OBSERVATIONS 50 50 55 55 51 51 54 54 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
All data regression include intercept term. See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
 
1 The test is essentially the test of the rank of a matrix:  under the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. Under the null, the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(L1-K1+1).  A rejection of the null indicates that the matrix is full column 
rank, i.e., the model is identified. 
2 Weak identification arises when the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, but only weakly.  Estimators can perform poorly when instruments are weak, and different estimators are more robust to weak instruments (e.g., LIML) than others  
(e.g., IV); see, e.g., Stock and Yogo (2002) for further discussion. Under the null, the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regression, but only strongly. A rejection of null indicates that the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
regressors, but only weakly. 
3 The Sargan-Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions.  The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. A rejection of 





TABLE 4.5: GROWTH  AND CYCLICALITY OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY, 1960-2014  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROWTH RATE OF REAL GDP PER CAPITA (GRGDPC) 
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STATISTICS             
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 23.56% 42.34% 57.01% 23.05% 42.94% 56.83% 21.73% 55.72% 62.67% 21.57% 55.72% 62.91% 
OBSERVATIONS 115 115 115 115 115 115 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
All data regression include intercept term. See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
Col estimations are performed based on OLS, where white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance are reported in the parenthesis  
RCol estimation are performed based on weighted and reweighted OLS regression to control for outliers. 
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TABLE 4.6: IV REGRESSION OF GROWTH  AND CYCLICALITY OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY  
PANEL A: GMM ESTIMATION  
 
Dependent Variable  
Growth Rate of Real GDP Per Capita (GRGDPC) 



















CYCLICALITY OF FISCAL POLICY ?̂?𝒊 
-0.019*** 
(0.004) 
   













CYCLICALITY OF MONETARY POLICY ?̂?𝒊
𝒀    
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
PANEL B: FIRST STAGE REGRESSION 

































STATISTICS   
CENTRED 𝑹𝟐 14.11% 14.74% 19.18% 17.83% 










WEAK IDENTIFICATION F-TEST ON JOINT SIGNIFICANCE OF EXCLUDED INSTRUMENTS2 F= 13.970 F= 13.404 F= 21.171 F= 12.995 
OVERIDENTIFICATION TEST (J-STATISTICS)3 
Null: The Instruments are Valid Instruments 
















OBSERVATIONS 50 50 55 55 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
All data regression include intercept term. See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
1 The test is essentially the test of the rank of a matrix:  under the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. A rejection of the null indicates that the matrix is full column rank, i.e., the model is identified. 
2 Weak identification arises when the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, but only weakly.  Estimators can perform poorly when instruments are weak, and different estimators are more 
robust to weak instruments (e.g., LIML) than others  (e.g., IV); see, e.g., Stock and Yogo (2002) for further discussion. Under the null, the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regression, but only 
strongly. A rejection of null indicates that the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, but only weakly. 
3 The Sargan-Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions.  The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. A rejection of null indicates that the instruments are not valid instruments. 





The role of macroeconomic policy, trade and 
external debt in the global financial crisis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Financial crisis is not a new phenomenon for either the emerging or the developing 
countries. Indeed, since the early 1990s, many emerging economies have been hit by 
either financial, or currency crises, or both. For example, Mexico’s 1994 Tequila crisis was 
characterised by a sharp correction of the exchange rate and the current account, together 
with a collapse of output and economic activity. Broadly similar outcomes were observed 
in the 1997 East Asian currency and financial crisis, Russia’s currency devaluation and 
debt default in 1998, Brazil’s abandonment of its peg in 1999, Turkey’s banking cum 
currency crisis in 2001, and Argentina’s debt crisis in 2002. Although the source of 
difficulty may have been different in each episode, the profile of the crises and their 
consequences have been broadly similar. A “sudden stop” of capital inflows is almost 
always followed by a sharp contraction in real economic activity. Moreover, many 
countries experienced substantial losses in the value of their currencies, which 
significantly helped them to recover from the crisis. These countries were mostly able to 
expand their net exports to counter the contractionary effects of foreign currency 
denominated debt (see, for example, Ozkan and Unsal, 2017). 
The 2008-09 global financial crisis has been widely considered to be the worst economic 
downturn, since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It has originated in the financial 
system of the United States and quickly spread through multiple channels to the other 
parts of the world. The standard explanation of the transmission of the global crisis 
highlights the role played by the global financial linkages and the trade collapse. The 
financial shock originating in the United States disrupted the financial system of several 
advanced and other emerging countries. In turn, the turmoil in the global financial system 
was steadily transferred to the real economy resulting in a contraction in economic 
activity in late 2008 and early 2009. However, not all emerging countries suffered to the 
same degree or in the same way. Some were impacted predominantly through rapid 
financial spillovers effect and other countries through a subsequent collapse in trade.  
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Based on the previous experiences of emerging countries, the recent global financial crisis 
has been different in two significant ways (see, for example, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). 
First, during the years 2008-09, the financial markets in the developed world faced a 
liquidity crisis, which led to a sharp reduction of capital inflows into the emerging 
countries. Second, the emerging economies also suffered significant falls in their trading 
partner’s export demand, as the financial crisis hit the consumers spending across the 
globe. Hence these countries were unable to export, due to the sharp downturn in the 
global economy, although a large number of emerging economies experienced a 
substantial devaluation of their currency. Figure 5.1 documents the severe decline of net 
flows of debt finance and merchandise export, from large and positive before the pre-crisis 
(2007), to large and negative during the crisis (2008-09). Figure 5.1 shows that the net 
flow of gross external debt and merchandise export fell by -23.15% (Panel A) and -22.53% 
(Panel B) respectively (year on year weighted average growth rate) during the crisis (2008-
09), from the previous period (2007). 
The above discussion suggests that the global synchronisation of trade and finance has 
been crucial in the transmission mechanism during the global financial crisis, with a clear 
adverse impact on GDP growth. The advanced and emerging countries’ GDP growth 
moved much more lockstep during the crisis. Figure 5.2 (Panel A) shows that the quarterly 
GDP growth rate for the two country groups has moved together, from the first quarter of 
2008 to the fourth quarter of 2009. In the acute phase of the crisis92, the GDP growth rate 
in the advanced world was -4.48% and -3.53% respectively (quarter on quarter weighted 
average growth rate). Over the same period, GDP growth of the emerging countries was -
1.89% and -3.03%. The parallel business cycle performance of the two groups during the 
crisis (Figure 5.2, Panel A) indicates an active global synchronisation of trade and 
finance93 (Figure 5.1, Panel A and B). 
Figure 5.2 (Panel B) depicts, the “GDP Gap” during the crisis, for a sample of 40 emerging 
countries94. Here, “GDP Gap” denotes the deviation of GDP growth from its ten years 
growth trend and it helps us measure the intensity of the crisis impact on the output 
growth for each country. Higher negative value of “GDP Gap” indicates greater growth 
losses during the crisis from previous growth trend. Figure 5.2 (Panel B) reveals that a
                                                          
92 Blanchard et al., (2010) defined fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 as acute phase of the crisis. 
93 However, there could be other substantial heterogeneous macroeconomic factors involved between the two groups with a parallel business 
cycle performance during the crisis. For instance, a deterioration of country’s financial conditions will affect the economy through a negative 
wealth effect on consumption and investment decisions. The effect on the economy depends not only on the agent’s behaviours, but also on 
the institutional framework they operate in, both of which vary across the countries, and over time (see for example, Ciccarelli et al., 2015). 
94 Following Al-Saffar et al., (2013), we define the term “GDP Gap” as the crisis time average real GDP growth (2008-09) net of the pre-crisis 
real GDP growth trend (1997-2007). 
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large number of the countries in the sample experienced negative “GDP Gap” during 2008-
09, except Morocco, Indonesia, and Uruguay. Figure 5.2 (Panel B) also suggest that Baltic 
countries (i.e., Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) faced larger “GDP Gap” compared to other 
emerging countries, precisely Baltic countries growth was lower than ten years growth 
trend by more than 12%. On average, the emerging economies faced -4.42% GDP growth 
losses from their previous ten years growth trend, but there exists a considerable 
variation across the sample95. 
Figure 5.2 (Panel B) provides a clear motivation for examining the potential factors 
underlying such diverse patterns in the losses across the emerging countries during the 
crisis. Motivated by this, our main purpose in this Chapter is to explore the nature and 
the role of trade and financial channels in the transmission of financial crises. We follow 
the theoretical framework of Blanchard et al., (2010) to establish our empirical hypothesis. 
The conceptual framework proposes that emerging countries’ growth was primarily 
affected by trading partners’ weak export demand during the crisis and foreign currency 
dominated external debt before the crisis.  
To that end, we empirically investigate whether the incidents and the severity of the 2008-
09 global financial crisis (measured by GDP growth 2008-09) are systematically related 
to the trade collapse and pre-crisis financial variables. Earlier empirical studies 
investigate cross-sectional data for a group of advanced and emerging countries, and 
suggest that the pre-crisis current account imbalances, trade openness and gross external 
debt can explain the severity and intensity of the crisis (see, for example, Blanchard et al., 
2010, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011 and Al-Saffar et al., 2013). Their current findings on 
trade and financial channels transmission mechanism on growth collapse motivate us to 
extend the existing analysis to the emerging countries. More specifically, we complement 
and extend some of the findings of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) and Berkmen et al., 
(2009) in the following dimensions. First, we examine 38 emerging countries’ external 
balance sheets (i.e., liability side) based on the maturity structure (i.e., long and short 
term) during pre-crisis periods. Second, we incorporate the role of gross external debt by 
sectors (i.e., government, central bank, bank and non-bank private sector). Third, we also 
investigate the role of external leverage position and foreign rollover risk before the crisis. 
                                                          
95 For a sample of 40 emerging countries, on average the GDP growth during 1997 to 2007 was 6.91% (pre-crisis time growth trend) and on 
average GDP growth during 2008 and 2009 was 2.49% (crisis period). GDP Gap on average from pre-crisis time to crisis time was -4.42% 
(2.49%-6.91%).  
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Fourth, we develop trading partners’ export demand index to account for the trade 
collapse proposition.  
We examine the emerging countries’ external balance sheets (liability side) measured by 
gross external debt to identify the impact of the financial channel. This hypothesis implies 
that the financially open countries have accumulated large portions of their debt 
externally during the pre-crisis period. In particular, flexible credit market regulations 
and a moderate level of country credit ratings encourage domestic financial systems to 
acquire a significant portion of their debt externally before the crisis (see, for example, 
Giannone et al., 2011). Pre-crisis foreign currency denominated external debt increases 
the currency and maturity mismatches, which enhances the probability of strong “balance 
sheet effect” and a scale of “liquidity crisis”. Balance sheet effect arises when high levels 
of foreign currency denominated debt force financial sectors to collectively focus on paying 
down their debt rather than spending on investment, slowing down or reducing economic 
growth as a result. The financial shock intensifies the impact if financial sector holds a 
high level of short-term debt before the crisis and currency devaluation takes place during 
the crisis (see, for example, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009 and Abiad et al., 2009). This 
situation can lead to a liquidity crisis, arising from the inability to pay due debt or meet 
other debt related obligations. As a result, a country’s high level of gross external debt is 
expected to increase its perceived risk (see, for example, Kannan and Köhler-Geib, 2009). 
Higher perceived risk in turn, imposes a higher risk premium for external borrowing, 
which reduces the net capital inflow or enhances the probability of “sudden stop” on the 
eve of the crisis, eventually reducing investment and growth collapses.  
We argue that the financial sector’s (bank and non-bank) pre-crisis gross external debt – 
specifically short-term debt is also likely to played an important role in its severity. This 
observation, is based on the notion that the financial sector was the key source of fragility 
during the crisis. Moreover, emerging countries are characterised by highly leveraged 
financial sectors with a considerable amount of foreign currency denominated debts (see, 
for example, Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012). This implies severe currency mismatches in 
the face of the devaluation of the currency. This situation led to rapid capital outflows 
during the crisis, due to, for example, the need to repay the short-term debt, which further 
weakened the balance sheets, and reduced the net worth. Additionally, the liquidity crisis 
in the advanced economies, led to a sharp reduction of capital inflows into the emerging 
countries.  
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In relation to this, we argue that external leverage is likely to be a good crisis predictor 
as a source of financial sectors’ vulnerability. Emerging economies were characterised by 
highly leveraged domestic financial systems, which had experienced more rapid domestic 
credit growth, before the crisis (see, for example, Haldane and Madouros, 2012). 
Leveraged financial systems, combined with greater risk-taking, through rapid domestic 
credit expansion experienced both an increase in asset price inflation and in the real 
economic activity. Both distant past and more recent crisis episodes typically witnessed a 
period of significant growth in credit (and external financing), followed by busts in the 
financial markets, along with sharp corrections in the asset prices, making it difficult to 
attract short-term financing (see, for example, Claessens and Kose, 2013). Such “sudden 
stops” can lead to a cascade of forced sales and liquidations of assets, and a further decline 
in the prices, with consequences for the real economy. To investigate the proposition, we 
develop an external leverage index to account for the financial channel. 
Additionally, foreign rollover risk is another source of vulnerability for financial sectors. 
High gross external interbank debt combined with a set of maturity mismatches, can lead 
to a foreign rollover risk. This problem arises from the emerging countries’ financial 
system, with typically short-term external debt to finance long-term domestic 
investments. Again, the lack of systematic information about the balance sheets of 
financial sectors represents a difficulty in analysing debt maturity mismatches in 
emerging economies. Foreign rollover risk is associated with the refinancing of debt. 
Rollover risk is commonly faced by the countries when their debt is about to mature and 
needs to be rolled over into new debt. This relationship plays a pivotal role in destabilising 
direct cross-border credit in turbulent times (see, for example, Kashyap et al., 2008). That 
is, the maturity mismatch and the asymmetric information gives rise to rollover risks, 
that is closely associated with growth collapses. We construct a foreign rollover index to 
investigate this propositions. 
During the global financial crisis 2008-09, many emerging countries pursued 
countercyclical policy to cushion against the global financial shock and to boost economic 
recovery. The fiscal and monetary authorities reacted in different ways during the crisis. 
Some emerging countries took countercyclical fiscal policy to shorten the length of crisis 
episode by stimulating short-run aggregate demand (see, for example, Blanchard et al., 
2010). Other emerging countries loosened monetary policy (see, for example, Coulibaly, 
2012). Some others decumulated foreign reserves to stabilise currency values to limit the 
adverse effects of trade and financial channels on real activity during the crisis (see, for 
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example, Bussière et al., 2013). In our analysis, we use exchange rate regime, fiscal space, 
interest rate gap and reserve to account for fiscal and monetary policy’s role to stabilise 
the economy during the global financial crisis.  
Overall, our empirical analysis yields four important findings. We document that trading 
partner’s weak export demand has a positive impact on growth collapse during the crisis 
(2008-09) and countries which were more open to trade before the crisis (2007) faced more 
adverse impact. We examine external balance sheets (liability side) and find that pre-
crisis gross external debt, specifically short-term gross external debt just before the crisis, 
were closely associated with the growth collapse. To extend our analysis, we examine the 
role of initial level of gross external debt by sectors (i.e. government, the central bank, 
bank and non-bank private sector). We find that the sharp growth declines that are 
observed in the emerging countries were well explained by the pre-crisis level of the 
banking sector’s gross external debt, specifically those of short-term in nature. Our 
analysis also suggests that countries with highly leveraged domestic financial systems 
experienced a larger subsequent contraction in real output. Furthermore, we demonstrate 
that foreign rollover risk played a key role in the transmission of the financial crisis, 
creating an impact on the real economic activity. Lastly, we find little evidence for a 
central role of countercyclical policy to cushion against the global financial shock. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 reviews the empirical work. 
Section 5.3 presents an empirical framework. Section 5.4 discusses empirical results for 
trade and financial channel’s impact on output. Extensions to the benchmark estimations 
and robustness checks are also presented in section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the 
concluding remarks. 
5.2 Review of the existing literature 
Financial integration has improved intensely over the past decade, in particular among 
the advanced economies (including many emerging countries), that were at the hearth of 
the global imbalances. Capital account openness and the financial market reforms have 
led to large increase in cross-border interaction. Increasing the interconnectedness of 
financial institutions led to highly correlated financial risks. For example, Claessens et 
al., (2010) propose that the increased level of cross-border financial integration and the 
dependence on wholesale funding during the pre-crisis time were the primary indicators 
of current account imbalances and can quantify the severity of the crisis.  
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Imbalances often resulted from badly sequenced regulatory reforms. Poorly designed 
financial reforms and inadequate supervision often led to currency and maturity 
mismatches. Berkmen et al., (2009) and Giannone et al., (2010) suggest that the policies 
in favour of the liberal credit market regulations, before the crisis, stimulated the foreign 
fund inflows with a high level of external leverage. They also argue that the countries 
with a high level of external leverage had experienced the worst performance during the 
crisis. This vulnerability mainly arises from the rapid increases in credit, funded by 
external sources. For, example, Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), and Hahm et al., (2013) 
proposed that a high level of external leverage indicate that a country was financing a 
significant part of its assets through foreign debt issuance, which subsequently increased 
the domestic credit growth. The close association between the net capital inflows, external 
leverage and the incidence of domestic credit growth is well-documented (see, for example, 
Ostry et al., 2010 and Furceri et al., 2011). The leverage build up and the greater risk-
taking, through rapid domestic credit expansion, together with the increases in asset price 
inflation and real economic activity, often preceed crises (see, for example, Borio and 
Lowe, 2002). Periods of significant growth in external financing (i.e., credit) or typically 
followed by crashes in credit markets, along with sharp corrections in asset prices (see, 
for example, Claessens and Kose, 2013). 
External balance sheets are seen as a key source financial fragility preparing the ground 
for the crisis. Ahrend and Goujard (2014) argue that a significant amount of foreign 
capital that came in prior to the crisis brought the link between countries’ external 
balance sheets and financial stability to the forefront of the policy debate. Excessive 
dependence on short-term liabilities, combined with the currency and maturity 
mismatches, have been seen as a crucial risk factor. Hence, the external debt maturity 
structure is often considered to be an important determinant of the scale of financial 
crises. One reason is that debt with a shorter maturity structure might increase the risks 
of refinancing. A large share of short‐term external debt may also be associated with the 
financial sectors’ (bank and non-bank) vulnerability to the wholesale funding runs (see, 
for example, Morris and Sing, 2008)  
Additionally, foreign currency denominated debt is seen as a major determinant of the 
capital gains and losses that result from the exchange rate movements (see, for example, 
Lane and Shambaugh, 2010). As domestic financial sectors (bank and non-bank) are 
typically not (fully) insured, exchange rate fluctuations have destabilising consequences, 
with a cumulative impact on real economic activity (see, for example, Eichengreen et al., 
Chapter 5. Macroeconomic Policy, Trade and External Debt in the Global Financial Crisis 
132 
 
2007). Similarly, Blanchard et al., (2010) focus on debt maturity structure for the 
emerging countries and demonstrate that high levels of pre-crisis short-term external 
debt are negatively associated with GDP growth losses. They also propose high levels of 
short-term external debt stock, with maturity and currency mismatches, aggravate a 
country’s perceived risk. Higher perceived risk imposes increased risk premium for 
external borrowing reducing capital flows and hence investment and growth. 
Trade is another channel through which countries get affected by crises elsewhere. GDP 
growth decline more significantly in more open economies, and this has been the case in 
particular for the countries that have faced the trading partner’s weak export demand. 
Blanchard et al., (2010) explains the role of trade for the emerging economies during the 
crisis, and they propose that the trading partner’s reduced export demand has a direct 
impact on the downfall of GDP growth. Additionally, Berg et al., (2011) propose that low-
income countries are significantly affected by the crisis, due to the sharp declines in terms 
of trade. Berg and Ostry (2013) suggest that the high oil prices in the pre-crisis period hit 
the commodity exporters’ revenue hardest, due to the weak export demand and low offered 
price.  
The relationship between trade finance and the export collapse has also been widely 
examined. Early research by Auboin (2009) confirms that the decline in the world trade, 
between the second quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009 was mainly caused by 
the weak demand for exports. He confirms that the world supply of trade credit declined 
by 15 percent during mid-2008 to mid-2009, which had an adverse impact on small and 
medium-sized companies across the globe. Amiti and Weinstein (2011) find similar results 
and confirms that the exports dropped by 28 percent during the crisis (first quarter of 
2008 to the first quarter of 2009). They argue that trade finance is closely associated with 
the health of financial institutions and it is an essential determinant of firm-level exports 
during the crises. Sauvant et al., (2010) find similar results and they propose that the low 
commodity prices, the cost of trade finance and the decline in trade credit create an 
adverse impact on GDP growth.  
5.3 Empirical specification 
We utilize data from 38 emerging countries to explore the role of the trade collapse in 
2008-09 and the pre-crisis (2007) financial variables on the output collapse during 2008-
09. The emerging country classification is based on International Monetary Fund (2014)96. 
                                                          
96 Table A5.2 presents the full country list. 
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Our sample base is geographically diverse and covers Emerging Europe, Commonwealth 
and Independent State (CIS), The Caribbean and Latin America, Emerging Asia, Sub-
Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa. Following Lane and Milesi‐Ferretti (2011), 
our cross-country regression analysis considers two-time phases, namely the pre-crisis 
period (2007) and the crisis period (2008-09). The empirical specification for cross-country 
regression analysis is as follows:  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖0809 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖0507 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖0809 + 𝛽4𝑖𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖07 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖0709
+ 𝛽6𝑖𝑋𝑖0709 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                                    (5.1) 
where 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖0809 is the average real GDP growth in 2008-09, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖0507 is the average real 
GDP growth over 2005-07 and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑  is the real GDP growth trend measured by 
average growth rate over 1997-200797. The growth trend is included to take account of the 
persistent differences in growth across the sample countries – particularly important in 
a diverse sample. The GDP growth rate over 2005-07 is alternatively a control for above 
– trend growth during the pre-crisis time.  
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖0809 is the trading partners’ export demand in 2008-09 to capture the concept of 
trade collapse and its potential impact on the growth loss. We develop an index for trading 
partner export demand, which is measured by countries’ trading partner’s crisis time 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑗0809 multiplied by countries’ weighted merchandise export 𝑊𝑖07 in 200798. A 
simplified equation (5.2) has been used for each country (𝑖) to calculate its trading 
partner’s (𝑗) export demand.  
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖0809 = ∑ 𝑊𝑖07[𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑗0809]
𝐽
𝐽=1                                          (5.2)    
In equation (5.2) trading partner’s 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑗0809  is measured by  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑗0809 −
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑗9707, which indicates average real GDP growth (2008-09) minus the pre-crisis 
real GDP growth trend from 1997 to 2007. Weight 𝑊𝑖2007 is constructed as follows;  
𝑊𝑖07 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗07 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑𝑖⁄                                                                                            (5.3)  
where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗07 denotes country’s (𝑖) merchandise export to its trading partner country 
(𝑗) and 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑𝑖 is defined as each emerging country’s (𝑖) total merchandise 
export to rest of the world. 
                                                          
97 Here real GDP growth is based on gross domestic product constructed by purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP (current 
international dollar). Here "real" GDP is considered to be the PPP GDP in current prices (Definition from World Development Indicator, 
World Bank, 2014). 
98 We follow Fayad and Perrelli (2014) to develop the index. We collect the trade data from Direction of Trade Statistics (2014) and GDP data 
from World Economic Outlook (2014). 
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Emerging countries that are more open to trade is likely to experience an amplified 
impact, due to the sudden downfall of export demand. Therefore, the estimated 
coefficients of the trading partner’s export demand ?̂?3𝑖  should enter with a positive sign. 
The positive coefficient indicates that the lower the trading partner’s export demand the 
greater the GDP growth collapse during the crisis.  
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖07 broadly measured by gross external debt to GDP during the pre-crisis time (2007). 
Country’s gross external debt is the total debt of a country owed to foreign creditors. Gross 
external debt is composed of public debt (government and central bank) and 
private/financial sectors debt (bank and non-bank private institution99), which includes 
both short-term and long-term debt100. We also investigate the contribution of different 
institutions government, central bank, bank and non-bank in the accumulation of the 
external debt prior to the crisis. We have used Quarterly External Debt Statistics (QEDS) 
Template to segregate the gross external debt statistics by economic sectors and by their 
maturity structure (short and long term) 101. 
High levels of foreign currency denominated external debt increase the currency and 
maturity mismatch risk, enhancing the probability of strong “balance sheet effect” and 
scale of “liquidity crisis”, as well as country’s perceived risk. Higher perceived risk, in 
turn, imposes a higher risk premium for foreign borrowing, reducing capital inflows. This 
situation increases the probability of a “sudden stop” of foreign capital inflow and leads to 
liquidity constraint, which is closely associated with investment and growth collapses 
during the crisis. This particular fragility mainly arises from the high share of short-term 
debt. The pre-crisis (2007) short-term debt is those that mature during the crisis (2008-
09). Naturally, countries with a high level of foreign currency denominated pre-crisis 
short-term debt face stronger balance sheets effects during the crisis, due to maturity and 
currency mismatch risk. Therefore, the estimated coefficient ?̂?4𝑖 should enter with a 
negative sign, indicating that higher gross external debt, especially those of shorter 
maturity creates adverse impacts on GDP growth during the crisis. 
We measure financial fragility through external leverage index, domestic credit growth 
and foreign rollover risk. Emerging countries’ high pre-crisis gross external debt indicates 
                                                          
99 Bank is defined as deposit-taking corporations’ gross external debt except the central bank, which composed of short-term and long-term 
external debt. Non-Bank sector defined as non-deposit taking corporations’ (e.g. finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance 
corporations, pension funds, and foreign exchange company) external debt. 
100 Long-term debt is debt that has an original or extended maturity of more than one year and short-term external debt is defined as debt that 
has an original maturity of one year or less (Definition from World Bank, International Debt Statistics, 2014). We collect the accumulated 
data of the country’s gross external debt by their maturity structure for end of the year 2007 from World Bank, International Debt Statistics 
(2014). 
101 In October 2014, the World Bank launched the new Quarterly External Debt Statistics (QEDS) SDDS database. The template is publicly 
available at //databank.worldbank.org/data/.../debt/SDDS_QEDS_template_v2.1.xlsx.// 
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that the financial sectors are levered through borrowing from abroad (see, for example, 
Claessens and Kose, 2013). Pre-crisis “external leverage” is a good crisis predictor for 
subsequent financial sectors vulnerability through rapid domestic credit expansion. The 
external leverage index is constructed by the ratio of the country’s total assets (domestic 
and foreign) to its gross equity debt (domestic and foreign)102. The high value of external 
leverage indicates a significant reliance on external debt issuance. Therefore, the 
estimated coefficient ?̂?4𝑖  is expected to enter with a negative sign.  
As argued above, another factor underlying the financial fragility is related to the “foreign 
rollover risk” 103. Following Cerutti et al., (2012), we construct the foreign rollover risk 
index, by the ratio of external loans to foreign deposits (i.e., external deposit) ratio104. The 
high value of the index indicates insufficient liquidity, likely prepare the ground for 
“liquidity crisis”, with clear consequences for real activity.  Therefore, the estimated 
coefficient ?̂?4𝑖  is expected to be estimated with negative sign.  
In specification (5.1) 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖0709 denoted a set of policy variables. We incorporate the pre-
crisis level (2007) of total foreign reserves to measure the role of the foreign reserves’ 
decumulation during crisis episodes105. Blanchard et al., (2010) argue that foreign reserve 
decumulation can come into play to adjust the exchange rate to minimize the balance 
sheets adverse impact on GDP growth during the crisis. Countries with a higher level of 
foreign reserves relative to short-term, suffer less from the crisis. We also introduce the 
exchange rate regime dummy as a control variable. We collect exchange rate regime data 
from Ilzetzki et al., (2011) and construct a dummy variable for exchange rate; 1=country 
have fixed exchange rate during crisis time (2008-09) and zero otherwise106. Theoretically, 
for a given shock, the flexible exchange rate regime helps to adjust the exchange rate and 
minimize the balance sheets adverse impact on GDP growth during the crisis (see, for 
example, Blanchard et al., 2010). Therefore high level of foreign exchange reserves in 2007 
and flexible exchange rate regimes help to counter against the crises, hence estimated 
coefficient ?̂?5𝑖 is expected to enter with a positive sign. 
We also include monetary and fiscal policy instruments to account countercyclical policy 
response in order to support the domestic economy. Coulibaly (2012) argue that central 
                                                          
102 We measure an external leverage index, based on the proposed definition by Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012). We collect the data from 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
103 Foreign rollover risk is associated with the refinancing of debt. Rollover risk is commonly faced by countries, when their debt is about to 
mature and needs to be rolled over into new debt. 
104 We collect the data from Bank of International Settlement (BIS) (2014). 
105 Total foreign reserves comprise special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members held by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under 
the control of monetary authorities. Gold holdings are excluded. (Definition from World Development Indicator, World Bank, 2014) 
106 Exchange rate regime classification based on 1 to 6 scaling rating, where 1=fixed exchange rate regime, 6=fully flexible exchange rate 
regime. (Definition from Ilzetzki et al., 2011).  
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banks in emerging countries were able to loosen the monetary policy considerably to foster 
economic recovery. To capture the concept we include interest rate gap during 2008-09; 
defined as the average interest rate (2008-09) net of the interest rate trend from 1997-
2007, where a negative value of indicates that country has loose monetary policy. We also 
incorporate the pre-crisis level of fiscal space; calculated as general government revenue 
net of total expenditure as a percent of GDP107. Countries with a greater pre-crisis fiscal 
space would have room for countercyclical fiscal policy in the face of the crisis. The 
estimated coefficients ?̂?5𝑖 are expected to enter with positive signs. 
In equation (5.1), 𝑋𝑖0709 denotes as set of control variables. We follow Lane and Milesi‐
Ferretti (2011) to include the level of GDP per-capita in 2007 in specification (5.1). They 
argue that overall level of economic development (proxied by GDP per-capita) is correlated 
with the financial development indicators in 2007 and to the possible extent they want to 
distinguish between financial factors and factors linked to the general level of 
development. The estimated coefficient ?̂?6𝑖 are expected to enter with negative sign for 
GDP per-capita. We also include population size in 2008-09 to account for size of a country. 
It is possible that smaller countries may larger GDP losses during crises, since the scope 
of regional and sectoral diversification is more limited. In a similar fashion, smaller 
countries that have large trade volumes may be more vulnerable to external shocks during 
crises. The estimated coefficient ?̂?6𝑖 are expected to enter with positive sign for country 
size.  
We also consider country’s credit rating and credit market regulation in 2007 as a control 
variable. Before the crisis, rapid foreign capital debt inflows followed from a high levels 
of country credit rating and low levels of credit market regulations. Additionally, 
liberalised financial systems, measured by low credit market regulations, also helped the 
emerging countries’ financial systems to borrow externally in the pre-crisis period. During 
the crisis episode, the majority of the emerging economies experienced currency 
devaluations (Abiad et al., 2009), that enhanced the probability of strong balance sheet 
effects and liquidity crises. In this regard, country’s credit rating108 and credit market 
regulations109 in 2007 are partially seen as responsible for the growth collapse during the 
crisis. Hence, coefficient ?̂?6𝑖 is expected to be estimated with a negative sign. 
                                                          
107 We collect the data from World Development Indicator (WDI). 
108 Country’s credit rating defined as rating index, which varies from 0 to 100. The value 100 indicates highly credit rated country and value 
0 indicates very poor credit rated country. We collect the data from Institutional Investor’s Country Credit Rating (2014). 
109 Country’s credit market regulations defined as rating index which varies from 1 to 10. The value 1 define as less freedom indicates high 
credit market regulations and 10 value define as more freedom specifies low credit market regulations. We collect the data from Economic 
Freedom of the World (2014). 
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The data are collected from a wide range of sources; please refer Table A5.1 for their 
sources and detailed definitions. We restrict our analysis to emerging countries and 
exclude low-income developing countries, not on the basis of their economic developments, 
but because they lack external balance sheet data for our analysis. In the cross-country 
data analysis, we have used Huber-White sandwich estimator method for specification 
(5.1). In the empirical findings, we report the estimation result based on white 
heteroscedasticity consistence covariance matrix. In the empirical findings, we report the 
estimation result based on white heteroscedasticity consistence covariance matrix. 
Similar to counter the potential issues arising from outliers (please refer Figure A5.1 
bivariate scatter plot). We have used weighted and reweighted OLS regression to control 
for the outlier. 
5.4 Empirical results 
5.4.1 The role of export demand and external debt 
Table 5.1 presents the cross-country estimation results for the output slowdown in 2008-
09. The results indicate that there is a weak relation between growth in 2008-09 with 
growth trend (1997-2007) and growth during 2005-07. The estimated coefficients of 
growth trend and growth 2005-07 are not consistently statistically significant and 
neighter are they estimated with the same sign across different specification (Table 5.1, 
Col 1-8). 
In specification (5.1), our key indicator is trading partner’s export demand (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖0809) 
that shows results that are consistent with as hypothesises earlier. Figure 5.3 (Panel A) 
reveals that the emerging countries experienced falls in export demand outlined in 2008-
09 by -5.04% (on average). At the same time they also experienced negative GDP gap (on 
average -4.42%)110. The cross-country regression result reveal positive estimated 
coefficients of export demand and they are statistically significant at 1% to 10% level 
(Table 5.1, Col 1 to 7). Table 5.1 cross-country estimates in Col 1 imply that a decrease in 
trading partners’ export demand by 1 percentage point is associated with a decrease in 
domestic GDP growth about 2.06 percentage points during the crisis time. Thus, the 
                                                          
110 Figure 5.3 (Panel A) suggests that trading partners’ export demand plays a dominant role for GDP loss in most countries, in particular, 
some of the Baltic countries’ export demand during the crisis time (2008-09) reduced by more than 8% compared to other emerging countries. 
During the crisis time, Baltic state countries also faced larger GDP loss from the earlier ten years growth trend. We have presented the trading 
partners’ export demand and GDP Gap data in Table A5.2. 
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trading partner’s low export demand during the crisis is appears as a major channels 
through which, the emerging countries’ growth is negatively affected by the crisis111.  
In empirical specification (5.1), our second set of key indicator (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖07) are measured by 
gross external debt to GDP. Figure 5.3 (Panel B) indicates that in 2007 the majority of the 
emerging economies that were financially open were in the net debtors, a clear source of 
vulnerability, especially if debt is foreign currency denominated112. Thus a high level of 
external debt can increase the country’s perceived risk and can enhance the probability of 
a “sudden stop” of foreign capital inflow. Large balance sheets effects combined with a 
reduction in foreign capital inflow can intensify the impact of the crisis on investment and 
growth collapse (see, for example, Bénétrix et al., 2015). In the regression analysis gross 
external debt coefficients are estimated with the expected negative sign and they are 
statistically significant (Table 5.1, Col 1 and 2). Table 5.1 cross-country regression 
analysis in Col 1 implies that an increase of 10 percentage points in the ratio of gross 
external debt to GDP during 2007 reduces GDP growth by 0.71 percentage points during 
2008-09 crisis.  
Next, we look at the gross external debt by their maturity structure. Based on our sample, 
on average emerging countries have 10.16% and 33.99% of gross external short and long-
term debt to GDP in 2007 respectively (Figure 5.4, Panel A and B). Countries with a high 
level of foreign currency denominated short-term debt just before the crisis face stronger 
balance sheets effects for every level of currency devaluation (Abiad et al., 2009). Overall, 
the currency and maturity mismatch enhance the liquidity constraints. This situation is 
closely associated with the investment and growth collapse. The coefficients are estimated 
with the correct negative signs for both long and short term external debt, and are 
statistically significant (Table 5.1). Table 5.1 regression analysis in Col 3 and Col 5 implies 
that an increase of 10 percentage points in the ratio of long and short-term debt to GDP 
during 2007 reduces GDP growth by 0.87 and 2.5 percentage points during the crisis time. 
It is important to note, Col 3 and Col 5 findings suggest that the quantitative effects of 
short-term debt to GDP are higher as compared to that of the long-term debt to GDP 
during 2007113. These findings support our arguments that debt maturity structure 
                                                          
111 Our findings are consistent with the previous literature (see, for example, Berg et al., 2013 and Blanchard et al., 2010). Berg et al., 2013 
suggest that low and middle income countries’ crisis time growth collapse is positively associated with their trading partner’s low export 
demand. Blanchard et al., 2010 find similar results for the emerging countries. 
112 Figure 5.3 (Panel B) reveals that Baltic States (i.e., Latvia and Estonia) and other emerging countries (i.e., Croatia, Bulgaria and Hungary) 
were financially open by more than 145% to GDP in 2007. At the same time, these group of countries were in net debtor condition (i.e., net 
foreign asset to GDP is more than -38%) compared to other emerging countries. 
113 We also find larger quantitative effect of short-term debt compared to long-term debt on GDP loss, while we control for both short and 
long-term debt together in the regression analysis (See, Table 5.1, Col 8 and 9).  
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matters for output loss during the crisis and countries suffered most were those with a 
high level of short-term debt114.  
 
 
We also include short-term debt to foreign reserves in 2007 in the regression. The 
argument is that foreign reserve decumulation can come into play to adjust the exchange 
                                                          
114 Our findings are consistent with the existing literature. For example, Blanchard et al., (2010) proposes that the emerging countries 
accumulated a large portion of their short-term debt externally during the pre-crisis time, which makes a country more valuable during the 
crisis, and intensifies the crisis shocks on the GDP growth. 
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rate that minimizes the balance sheets adverse impact on GDP growth during the crisis. 
Countries with a higher level of foreign reserves relative to short-term debt during pre-
crisis, suffered less from the crisis (see, for example, Blanchard et al., 2010). However, the 
estimated coefficients of short-term debt to reserve enter with correct negative sign with 
statistically significant result (Table 5.1, Col 7). This findings imply that foreign reserve 
decumulation played a limited role to minimize the balance sheet impact on growth loss.   
In summary, our findings suggest that trade collapse in 2008-09 and gross external debt, 
particularly the short-term gross external debt in 2007 played key role in the intensity of 
the crisis. 
We now turn to the potential role of fiscal and monetary policy variables (𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖0709). The 
positive coefficients of exchange rate regime (peg=1) indicates that countries with flexible 
exchange rate regime performed better to absorb the financial shock. However, the 
coefficients are not statistically significant. Existing evidence on this link is also mixed. 
For example, Ghosh et al., (2010) propose that the growth performance of the peg regimes 
were not different from that of the floating regimes during the crisis. On the contrary, 
Blanchard et al., (2010) show that countries with currency pegs suffered considerably, due 
to the strong balance sheets effects that arose from a high level of short-term external 
debt.  
We also include foreign reserves to GDP in our estimation of specification 5.1. It has been 
widely accepted that the emerging countries accumulated a large portion of foreign 
reserves before the crisis, due to the trade and financial openness (see, for example, 
Blanchard et al., 2010; Dominguez, 2012 and Bussière et al., 2013). The literature argues 
that the countries with a higher level of foreign reserves compared to short-term debt 
suffered less from the crisis. The estimated coefficients enter with a positive sign but they 
are not statistically significant (Table 5.1).  
We also address the role of countercyclical policy in response to the crisis. Regarding the 
monetary policy, we find that on average interest gap is around -5.51% that indicates 
monetary authorities’ willingness to loosen the monetary policy to cushion against the 
global financial crisis. The estimated coefficients of interest rate gap enter with the 
expected negative sign but they are statistically insignificant (Table 5.1). We also use the 
fiscal space in 2007 to capture ability to conduct countercyclical fiscal policy during the 
crisis. The coefficients of fiscal space are estimated with the expected positive sign; fiscal 
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space acted as a safeguard during the crisis time, albeit with lack of statistically 
significance (Table 5.1). 
We include a set of other control variables 𝑋𝑖0709 in equation 5.1. We incorporate GDP per-
capita in 2007, the estimated coefficients of which enter with a negative sign (Table 5.1). 
That is, growth declines were larger in more developed countries, as also documented by 
Lane and Milesi‐Ferretti (2011). However, we have not found a statistically significant 
relation between pre-crisis GDP per-capita and growth downfalls in 2008-09. We also 
include country size measured by natural log of population, which is estimated with a 
negative sign, though not statistically significant (Table 5.1). 
Next, we include two more control variables (𝑋𝑖0709) that are related to rapid capital 
inflows before the crisis; country credit rating and credit market regulations. Country’s 
credit ratings are seen as screening tools, which influence the composition of foreign 
investor’s investment portfolios, as well as their investment decisions. Country credit 
rating defined as rating index which varies from 0 (poor credit rating) to 100 (high credit 
rating). On average, emerging countries’ credit rating was 55 in 2007, based on our 38 
sample country. This value indicates that they were not poorly rated before the crisis. 
Favourable credit ratings help borrowing externally, raising short-term debt that is 
closely associated with growth collapse during the crisis. Surprisingly, the coefficients of 
credit rating are estimated with wrong positive signs and they are not statistically 
significant (Table 5.1). 
Low credit market regulations are also associated with significant external debts. 
Giannone et al., (2011) and Rose and Spiegel (2011) found that the countries with market-
friendly regulations experienced rapid credit (debt) inflow, and a considerably worse 
recession during the global crisis. Credit market regulation measure as 1 (high 
regulation/less freedom) to 10 (low regulation/more freedom). Based on 38 country sample, 
on average emerging economies’ credit market regulation was 8.62 in 2007. The value 
may indicates that high level of credit market freedom helped to accumulate a significant 
portion of their debt externally. Findings from our estimation support this argument. We 
find that flexible credit market regulations indirectly influenced the financial markets to 
absorb a high level of external debt in 2007 with consequences for the output collapse 
(Table 5.1). 
Results presented in Table 5.1 (Col 1 to 8) show that export demand and short-term 
external debt remain a strong determinants of the growth collapse during the crisis. To 
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explore further, we utilize alternative specification for (5.1). In this approach, we use the 
same explanatory variables that are discussed above, however dependent variable 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖0809 (i.e., the average real GDP growth in 2008-09) is replaced by 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖0809 (i.e., 
real GDP growth 2008-2009 minus real GDP growth trend 1997-2007). 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖0809 
allows us to measure the financial crisis impact on the deviation of growth (2008-09) from 
its previous ten year trend (1997-07). Higher negative values of 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖0809  indicate that 
greater output collapse during 2008-09. Table 5.1 (Col 10) show that low export demand 
and high short-term debt are important determinants in explaining the output losses 
during the crisis from its trend. Results are statistically significant at 1% level with the 
expected signs. 
To explore further, Table 5.1 (All RCol) investigate the robustness of the results related 
to outliers by using weighted and reweighted OLS regression (WLS and RWLS method). 
Interestingly, however, the statistical significance, the sign and the size of the coefficients 
of export demand and short-term external debt remain much the same after controlling 
for outliers and all other control variables. 
5.4.2 The role of external debt by economic sector 
The above findings indicate that the emerging economies have accumulated a significant 
portion of their debt externally before the crisis, which can explain its severity during the 
crisis. In this section, we closely investigate the institutional composition (i.e. 
government, central bank, bank and non-bank private sectors) of the external debt in 
2007. We use the specification (5.1) and results are presented in Table 5.2.  
Figure 5.5 (Panel A) shows that the majority of the emerging countries had high levels of 
financial sector’ external debt (bank115 and non-bank sector116), when compared to the 
public sectors’ debt (government and central bank) in 2007. Based on a sample of 30 
countries, on average emerging economies’ banking and non-bank sectors had an external 
debt of 52% and 56% of GDP respectively117. On the other hand, the government and 
central bank had external debt 49.23% and 2.37% of GDP respectively. These figures 
highlight the role of the financial institutions in the accumulation of most of the external 
                                                          
115 Deposit-taking corporations, except the central bank. 
116 Other sector defined as non-deposit taking corporation (i.e. finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension 
funds, and foreign exchange company) except bank and central bank. 
117 Figure 5.5 (Panel A) suggests that Baltic countries (i.e., Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) and other emerging countries (i.e., Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Hungary, Croatia, Ukraine and Bulgaria) experienced larger share of gross external debt to GDP in 2007, precisely banking and non-banking 
sectors’ debt to GDP have a dominant role for GDP loss during the global financial crisis. 
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debt in 2007. Now we turn to the role of this composition on the output collapse in 2008-
09. 
The estimated coefficient of banking sectors’ gross external debt enter with the expected 
negative sign and they are statistically significant (Table 5.2, Col 1 and 5). The non-bank 
sectors’ gross external debt coefficients are estimated with the expected negative sign, but 
they are not statistically significant. Table 5.2 estimated result in Col 1 indicates that an 
increase of 10 percentage points in the ratio of banking sectors’ gross external debt to GDP 
reduces the GDP growth by 0.44 percentage points during the 2008-09 crisis. We can 
conclude that banking sectors’ gross external debt is one of the major financial channels 
through which an adverse impact on GDP growth is mediated. The previous economic 
literature found similar results, for example, Joyce (2011) investigates the systematic 
banking crisis for the emerging markets and suggest that the initial level of foreign capital 
accumulation by the banking sectors penalised the emerging countries during the crisis. 
Al-Saffar et al., (2013) have looked at the pre-crisis time external balance sheet positions, 
and found similar results for the developed and emerging countries. In our sample, we do 
not find any significant negative relationship between external government and central 
bank’s debt in 2007 and GDP growth in 2008-09 (not reported).  
 
We also separate financial sectors’ gross external debt in 2007 by their maturity structure 
(short and long-term) and explore their link with GDP growth in 2008-09. The argument 
is that short-term debt is contractual and the debtor country’s financial sectors need to 
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repay their debt regardless of their economic condition. Based on our sample of 30 
countries, on average emerging economies’ banking and non-bank sectors had a short-
term external debt of 22% and 19% of GDP respectively. In this regard, the high level of 
short-term debt during the pre-crisis time, combined with the currency mismatch during 
the crisis puts a country in a more vulnerable position. Reduced net-capital inflow has an 
adverse impact on the country’s real economic performance. Figure 5.5 (Panel B) reveals 
that the countries with the high level of financial sectors’ (bank and non-bank) short-term 
external debt had experienced a larger negative GDP Gap during the crisis118. 
We find that banking and non-bank sectors’ short-term external debt have an adverse 
impact on GDP growth in 2008-09. However, only the bank’s external short-term debt are 
estimated with coefficients that are statistically significant with correct negative sign 
(Table 5.2, Col 3 and 7). On the other hand non-bank external short-term debt enter with 
a correct negative sign, but they are not statistically significant. It is also noticeable that 
the banking sectors’ short-term external debt are estimated with higher coefficient values 
when compared to the non-bank sectors. Table 5.2 estimated result in Col 3 implies that 
an increase of 10 percentage points in the ratio of banking sectors short-term debt to GDP 
reduces GDP growth by 0.76 percentage points during the crisis. These findings indicate 
that the banking sector’s external short-term debt is one of the major channels, through 
which the emerging countries are affected in 2008-09.  
To explore further, Table 5.2 investigates the robustness of the results (presented in RCol) 
related to the problem of outliers by using weighted and reweighted OLS regression (WLS 
and RWLS method). We also use alternative specification, where dependent variable 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖0809 is replaced by 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖0809. Interestingly, however, the statistical significance, 
the sign and the size of the coefficients of bank gross external debt and short-term external 
debt remain much the same after control for outliers and even if we include all the major 
control variables. 
5.4.3 Further extensions: the role of external leverage, 
domestic credit and foreign rollover risk 
We have seen in the previous section that the majority of the emerging countries exhibited 
high levels of gross external debt in 2007, where the financial sectors (i.e., bank and non-
bank sector) were, especially levered through borrowing from abroad. Pre-crisis high level 
                                                          
118 Figure 5.5 (Panel B) implies that Baltic countries (i.e., Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) and other emerging countries (i.e., Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Ukraine, Croatia and Tunisia) experienced larger share of banking sector’s short-term external debt to GDP in 2007 that have significant role 
for GDP loss during the financial crisis. 
Chapter 5. Macroeconomic Policy, Trade and External Debt in the Global Financial Crisis 
145 
 
of country credit rating and credit market deregulations can trigger a credit boom and 
lead to an excessive increase in the financial leverage by facilitating greater risk-taking. 
Rapid growth in domestic credit is another thread running through the narratives of 
events before the crises. Leverage build-ups and greater risk-taking combined with rapid 
domestic credit expansion increase the asset prices. This situation can lead to the crises. 
In the distant past, as well as during the recent crises episodes, a period of significant 
growth in credit (and external financing) was noted, followed by busts in the credit 
markets, along with sharp corrections in the asset prices (see, for example, Claessens and 
Kose, 2013). Notably, a drop in the prices triggered the financial institutions to experience 
a decline in the asset value struggle to attract short-term financing from external sources. 
Such “sudden stops” can lead to a cascade of forced sales and liquidations of assets, and 
further declines in asset prices. This situation brings conclusive consequences for the real 
economy. In this regard, external leverage is a good crisis predictor for a subsequent 
financial vulnerability in the financial sectors (see, for example, Haldane and Madouros, 
2012). To investigate the proposition, we use the specification (5.1) and present the results 
in Table 5.3.  
Financial sectors are the main channels, through which the emerging countries 
accumulate a significant portion of their debt externally. We construct an external 
leverage index, based on the proposed definition by Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012). 
Higher values of this index indicates that country is financing a large portion of its asset 
through external debt issuance. Based on our sample we find that on average emerging 
economies’ external leverage ratio was 1.15. This value indicates that country is financing 
13% of the domestic investment to GDP through external debt issuance before the 
crisis119. External leverage’s coefficients enter with the expected negative sign and they 
are strongly statistically significant (Table 5.3, Col 1 and 4)120. Table 5.3 estimated result 
in Col 1 implies that an increase of 10 percentage points in external leverage ratio to GDP 
in 2007 reduces GDP growth by 1.69 percentage points during the crisis. 
The above findings and arguments motivate us to investigate whether the external 
leverage stimulates the domestic credit growth during the pre-crisis time. A large number 
of studies find that the pre-crisis level of domestic credit growth is a good crisis indicator 
(see, for example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011, Hahm et al., 2013 and Rose and Spiegel, 
2011). The estimated coefficients of domestic credit to private sector enter with a correct 
                                                          
119 On average External Leverage Ratio =
Total Asset to GDP
Equity Debt to GDP
= 1.15. External debt issuance (1 −
1
1.15
) = 0.13.  
120 Schularick and Tylor (2012) and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) also find that the external leverage before crisis time plays a major role 
to predict the consequence of the crises. 
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negative sign, but they are not statistically significant (Table 5.3, Col 2 and 4). Negative 
coefficient indicate that one of the transmission channels, from the enormous external 
debt to the crisis was the large amount of capital inflow from the foreign countries, which 
fuelled the domestic credit booms, unsustainable asset price rise and economic activity. 
Indebtedness also increases perceived risk, exposing a country to the risk of sudden stops 
during crises. Financial sectors were the channels, through which financial fragility in 
the form of excessive borrowing was translated into output declines. 
The above findings show that the emerging market increases their leverage (i.e., assets 
relative to equity) during the pre-crisis period. In this case, financial sectors (bank and 
non-bank) must rely on cross-border lending and wholesale funding to achieve the 
increased leverage, especially in the countries with limited local lending and depositor 
base. Cross-border banking can potentially have some benefits, especially by diversifying 
the available sources of lending and borrowing and by increasing the banking competition. 
However, such flows can also give rise to financial stability risks, through increasing the 
vulnerabilities of the domestic financial sectors to external shocks. According to Hills and 
Hoggarth (2013), cross-border lending was in a much more volatile form from 2007 to 
2009. Consequently, the banking and non-bank sectors experienced a rapid balance sheet 
(i.e., liability side) growth before the crisis. During this period, a high level of cross-border 
lending, with maturity and currency mismatch appears to have played a major role in 
contributing to the vulnerabilities associated with foreign rollover risk121. 
We construct a foreign rollover risk index by taking a ratio of the foreign loan (external 
loan) to foreign deposit (external deposit). A high ratio indicates that the financial sector 
(i.e., affiliated foreign bank and non-bank sectors) might not have adequate liquidity to 
cover any unforeseen fund requirements, and the low ratio may indicate that they may 
not be earning enough profit to cover any unforeseen financial needs. Based on our sample 
of 38 countries, on an average, the ratio is 1.36 in 2007, which indicates that the emerging 
economies’ financial sectors did not have sufficient liquidity during the crisis, facing a 
serious risk of liquidity crisis122. The estimated coefficients of foreign rollover risk enter 
                                                          
121A large number of existing studies explored the relation between foreign rollover risk and reduced capital inflow. For example, Kashyap et 
al., (2008), and Morris and Shin (2008) claim that the exposure of banks to rollover risk, due to their extensive reliance on short-term financing 
is a major source of instability for the entire financial system. Specifically, they argue that the banks do not fully internalize the cost, which 
this liquidity risk imposes on the economy during the crisis. Additionally, Claessens and Van Horen (2012) find that the foreign banks which 
source the fund domestically, are less likely to reduce lending, due to the roll-over risk. Again, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) argue that the 
parent banks with funding shocks might withdraw money from their subsidiaries, which are more active in deposit-taking. On the other hand, 
Benmelech and Dvir (2013) propose that short-term debt leads to financial fragility and roll-over risk, which can enhance the probability of a 
“sudden stop” and funding crisis. 
122 Cerutti et al., (2012) define the term foreign rollover risk by foreign deposit to loan ratio. According to them, the lower the deposit to loan 
ratio, the higher is the share of local claims financed by parent banks resources and/or wholesale financing. According to the definition and 
based on 38 countries data, on average the ratio is around 0.73 in 2007. This lower value indicates that foreign affiliated parent banks financing 
large portion of their debt from external sources. The value also indicates that 0.27 of debt not financed by local consumer deposits , which 
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with a correct negative sign and they are statistically significant at 5% level (Table 5.3, 
Col 3 and 4). Table 5.3 estimated result in Col 3 implies that an increase of 10 percentage 
points in foreign rollover risk in 2007 reduces the GDP growth by 0.10 percentage points 
during the crisis. Our findings indicate that the pre-crisis time foreign rollover risks is 
one of the major sources of financial sectors’ vulnerability through which the emerging 
markets get affected during the crisis. 
5.4.4 Robustness checks 
We test the robustness of our findings by utilising an alternative measure of GDP growth 
2008-09. In this approach, we use our baseline specification (5.1) but the dependent 
variable of GDP growth (2008-09) is replaced by industrial production growth (2008-09). 
In relation to GDP growth 2008-09, the credit crisis may badly affect the industrial 
production in those emerging countries that were mostly dependent on credit expansion 
prior the crisis. More specifically, it is possible that those countries in which domestic 
credit was increasing rapidly and which were undergoing net capital flows during the per-
crisis period may have experienced the greatest adjustment difficulties once the financial 
crisis hit globally. These economies would have faced a greater readjustment challenge in 
dealing with the reduction in the supply of credit, and hence on investment and industrial 
production. Keeping the above arguments in mind, in this section we have considered 
alternative definitions of crisis intensity measured by industrial production growth in 
2008-09. On average the industrial production fell by -3% during 2008-09. In spite of the 
availability of the industrial production data that reduces the number of observations, the 
estimation results are conclusive, and they are presented in Table 5.4. 
The coefficients of trading partners’ export demand enter with a correct positive sign. 
However, they are not consistently statistically significant (Table 5.4). One possible 
explanation of the positive relation between reduced export demand and industrial 
production fall is that collapse in demand for durable goods, driven by uncertainty and 
credit constraints. The industrial goods are more cyclical and their products are more 
likely to suffer most (see, for example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011). Another possible 
channel is the collapse in demand for industrial goods (oil prices plummeted) that reduces 
the revenues of manufacturing exporters.  
                                                          
specifies during the pre-crisis time emerging countries’ banking sectors acquire large portion of their debt from external sources by using 
foreign affiliated financial sectors.  
The proportion of loans not financed by local consumer deposit (1 − 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛⁄ ) = (1 − 0.73) = 0.27 
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We also find that gross external debt played a major role the severity of the crisis as 
measured by the fall in industrial production (Table 5.4, Col 1). We do not find any 
systematic evidence for long-term external debt, but short-term debt’s estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant with the negative sign (Table 5.4, Col 3 and 4). 
Banking sectors’ gross external debt and short-debt coefficients are statistically 
significant with the expected negative sign (Table 5.4, Col 5 and 7). Their coefficient 
values are much higher compared to gross external debt, which point to short-term debt 
as a better crisis predictor. These findings are merely the reflection of our earlier results 
from Table 5.1 and 5.2. The estimated coefficients of foreign rollover risk are statistically 
significant with a correct negative sign (Table 5.4, Col 11). Given the above major 
variables significant adverse effect on crisis time industrial production growth, we 
conclude that our results are broadly robust to earlier results presented in Table 5.1 to 
5.3. 
5.5 Conclusions 
Our empirical results reveal that both the financial and trade channels played significant 
roles in output losses during the 2008-09 crisis. The divergent effects of the global 
financial crisis across emerging countries, arising from different financial and trade 
exposures and the growth performances of the trading partners explain much of the 
heterogonous growth performance of emerging economies during the crisis. We find that 
the trading partner’s reduced export demands can explain an important part of the output 
losses during the crisis. Our results also suggest that pre-crisis private/financial sector’s 
(bank and non-bank) gross external debt, particularly, short-term debt is important in 
understanding the intensity of the crisis. In this regard, the emerging countries with more 
leveraged domestic financial systems tended to suffer more during the crisis. When it 
comes to policy, we find little evidence for a central role of countercyclical fiscal and 
monetary policy to cushion against the global financial shock. We also did not find 
convincing econometric evidence that foreign reserves was essential buffers in the global 
crisis. Similarly, we find little evidence for flexible exchange rate regimes in absorbing 
external shocks during the crisis.  
The monetary and fiscal policy responses are considered to be complex during the crisis 
(see, for example, Blanchard et al., 2010). It is important to know which policy actions 
reduced the impact of the crisis shocks. Now, if a country has a significant amount of 
short-term debt just before the crisis that matures during the crisis, then the country may 
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experience high level of capital outflow on the eve of the crisis, requiring a raise in 
domestic interest rate (i.e., procyclical policy), but higher interest rates reduces domestic 
demand, which has an adverse impact on output. In this case, foreign reserve 
decumulation would be an effective policy to offset the capital outflow, and it also avoids 
large currency devaluation. Hence, a combination of foreign reserve decumulation and 
expansionary fiscal policy might be a better policy option provided there is fiscal space 
and foreign reserves. Fiscal space stimulates economic activity, and foreign reserve 
decumulation minimises the adverse effect on the balance sheets and hence on output.  
We did not find that the pre-crisis level of foreign reserves affected the output. Rather, it 
acted as a buffer for smaller currency depreciation (see, for example, Trivedi and Ahmed, 
2010). In this regard, the exchange rate regime played a crucial role during the crisis. 
However, exchange rate regime performance during the crisis was broadly determined by 
the intensity of the crisis shocks, size of the pre-crisis external debt and the prevailing 
macroeconomic conditions (see, for example, Blanchard et al., 2010). Although emerging 
countries utilised the fiscal space to counter against the crisis, fiscal space has contracted 
since the global recession and has not recovered to the pre-crisis level (see, for example, 
Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2010). In this regard, the policy prescription for emerging 
countries would be to redevelop the buffer fiscal space, for example, through a well-
designed fiscal rule, short and medium term expenditure policy and the stabilisation of 
funds. 
The majority of the emerging countries also pursued countercyclical monetary policy 
during the global financial crisis in contrast to the previous crisis episodes. Emerging 
economies in the past few decades showed improved macroeconomic fundamentals, such 
as strengthened international capital flows, trade openness, inflation targeting, and 
financial reforms (see, for example, Coulibaly, 2012). In this regard, as long as the 
emerging markets maintain robust economic fundamentals, by maintaining a credible 
monetary policy, with inflation targeting and financial sector reform, the conduct of 
countercyclical monetary policy will remain sustainable in future. 
Clearly, the room for manoeuvre regading fiscal and monetary tools is crucial during 
downturns. This chapter proposes that “prevention is better than cure”. Preventive 
measures, such as banking regulations can help countries to absorb risky assets and 
liabilities. Tucker (2012) suggests that all policy makers should pay attention to the 
national balance sheets and its components. Not only the national balance sheets but also 
the country’s external bank (domestic and foreign) balance sheets appear to contain 
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relevant information regarding its financial vulnerability. The bank’s consolidated 
balance sheets need to be monitored and supervised, although national supervisors have 
limited power to monitor the foreign bank activities. That is why, Basel III’s overhaul of 
banking regulation proposes to monitor cross-border banking activities. The regulation 
also calls for better supervision and monitoring of the risk characteristic in the national 
balance sheets. The Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform advise that 
the policy makers should reduce incentives for short-term lending and also asked to 




  TABLE 5.1: CROSS COUNTRY REGRESSIONS OF PRE-CRISIS TIME GROSS EXTERNAL DEBT BY THEIR MATURITY STRUCTURE AND CRISIS-TIME 
TRADING PARTNER’S EXPORT DEMAND 
 
ESTIMATION METHOD: OLS 
 Dependent Variable: :Avg. GDP Growth 2008-091 
Dependent Variable: 
GDP Gap 2008-092 
REGRESSORS Col 1 Col 2 Col 3 Col 4 Col 5 Col 6 Col 7 Col 8 RCol 9 Col 10 RCol 11 




































































         




























SHORT TERM EXTERNAL DEBT TO  FOREIGN RESERVE 2007       
-0.034** 
(0.014) 
    








































































































































































STATISTICS            
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 54.32% 56.88% 54.83% 58.42% 53.44% 59.31% 71.69% 60.48% 64.36% 70.55% 77.58% 
OBSERVATIONS 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
All data regression include intercept term. 
Col estimation is based on white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. 
RCol estimation is based on weighted and reweighted OLS regression to control for outliers. 
See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
1 Avg. GDP growth 2008-09 is calculated by taking average of real GDP growth in 2008 and 2009. 




TABLE 5.2: CROSS COUNTRY REGRESSIONS OF PRE-CRISIS TIME GROSS EXTERNAL DEBT OF BANK AND NON-BANK SECTOR AND BY THEIR 
MATURITY STRUCTURE AND CRISIS-TIME TRADING PARTNER’S EXPORT DEMAND  
 
ESTIMATION METHOD: OLS 
 Dependent Variable: Avg. GDP Growth 2008-091 Dependent Variable: GDP Gap 2008-092 
REGRESSORS Col 1 Col 2 Col 3 Col 4 Col 5 RCol 6 Col 7 RCol 8 Col 9 RCol 10 Col 11 RCol 12 

















    

















    

























BANK GROSS EXTERNAL DEBT TO GDP 2007 
-0.044** 
(0.016) 

























BANK SHORT-TERM EXTERNAL DEBT TO GDP 2007   
-0.076** 
(0.032) 































































































































































































































STATISTICS              
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 58.61% 48.56% 49.24% 41.90% 57.20% 53.21% 45.89% 49.17% 71.76% 68.79% 62.92% 67.90% 
OBSERVATIONS 30 31 29 31 30 30 29 29 30 30 29 29 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
All data regression include intercept term. 
Col estimation is based on white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. 
RCol estimation is based on weighted and reweighted OLS regression to control for outliers. 
See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
1 Avg. GDP growth 2008-09 is calculated by taking average of real GDP growth in 2008 and 2009. 





TABLE 5.3: CROSS COUNTRY REGRESSIONS OF PRE-CRISIS TIME FINANCIAL SECTORS’ VULNERABILITY 
AND CRISIS TIME TRADING PARTNER’S EXPORT DEMAND 
 
ESTIMATION METHOD: OLS 
 Dependent Variable: Avg. GDP Growth 2008-091 
Dependent Variable: 
GDP Gap 2008-092 
REGRESSORS Col 1 Col 2 Col 3 Col 4 RCol 5 Col 6 RCol 7 


































































































































































































STATISTICS        
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 64.41% 51.29% 57.59% 63.37% 75.00% 72.76% 83.23% 
OBSERVATIONS 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
All data regression include intercept term. 
Col estimation is based on white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. 
RCol estimation is based on weighted and reweighted OLS regression to control for outliers. 
See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
1 Avg. GDP growth 2008-09 is calculated by taking average of real GDP growth in 2008 and 2009. 





TABLE 5.4: ROBUSTNESS CHECK (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: AVG. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION GROWTH  2008-2009) 
 
ESTIMATION METHOD: OLS 
REGRESSORS Col 1 Col 2 Col 3 Col 4 Col 5 Col 6 Col 7 Col 8 Col 9 Col 10 Col 11 





































































GROSS EXTERNAL DEBT TO GDP 2007 
-0.062* 
(0.035) 
          
LONG TERM EXTERNAL DEBT TO GDP 2007  
-0.069 
(0.050) 
         
SHORT TERM EXTERNAL DEBT TO GDP 2007   
-0.280** 
(0.120) 
        
SHORT TERM EXTERNAL DEBT TO  FOREIGN RESERVE 
2007 
   
-0.058** 
(0.021) 
       
BANK GROSS EXTERNAL DEBT TO GDP 2007     
-0.040* 
(0.021) 
      
NON-BANK GROSS EXTERNAL DEB TO GDP 2007       
-0.076 
(0.086) 
     
BANK SHORT-TERM EXTERNAL DEBT TO GDP 2007       
-0.092** 
(0.038) 
    
NON-BANK SHORT-TERM EXTERNAL DEBT TO GDP 2007        
-0.187** 
(0.072) 
   








FOREIGN ROLLOVER RISK 2007           
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
























































































































































































STATISTICS            
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 37.18% 36.16% 44.42% 67.22% 28.87% 26.56% 34.05% 36.83% 31.82% 35.88% 31.29% 
OBSERVATIONS 32 32 32 32 26 27 25 27 32 32 32 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
All data regression include intercept term. 
Col estimation is based on white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. 
See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 







Our findings of the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy in this thesis suggest that fiscal 
procyclicality has become the norm rather than the exception in emerging and low-income 
developing countries compared to advanced world. More specifically, in Chapter 2, we find 
that over the last 45 years, a substantial number of emerging and low-income developing 
countries are trapped within the procyclical policy, in the sense of not being able to move 
from procyclical to countercyclical stance. The empirical findings confirm that political 
and institutional factors plays an important role for procyclical fiscal policy along with 
financial constraints variables. Most of the variables on the government quality and 
financial constraints variables are statistically significant. Our findings point to the 
importance of government quality and financial constraints, as a key determinant of a 
country’s inability to escape from “procyclicality trap”. 
Can the fiscal policy in emerging and developing countries be improved by improving 
institution/government quality? One of the major obstacles to stabilisation policy in these 
countries is rent extraction behaviour of the benevolent government (see, for example, 
Alesina and Tabellini, 2005). In a country with poor governance and high level of 
corruption combined with less transparency, the priorities would be to establish the 
strengthen the institutional framework, rule of law, more transparency and its 
accountability (see, for example, Jeff and Anwar, 2000). A potential solution may be an 
appropriate anti-corruption programme (i.e., anti-corruption agencies/bureau) that may 
ensure transparency in tax collection and public resource redistribution process among 
the social groups. As a part of better institutional quality, appropriate checks and 
balances may also constrain fiscal policy decision-making process, particularly, for the 
countries with high level of rent extraction. Strong institutions and transparency would 
also help reduce the “voracity effect”, relating output volatility to power dispersion, 
which in turn, would facilitate the accumulation of foreign capital and build up 
confidence among investors to raise funds during economic recessions (see, for 
example, Erbil, 2011).  
A number of recommendations from earlier studies point to the importance of establishing 
self-governing Fiscal Policy Councils (FPC) that would regulate deficit limits to maintain 
a sustainable debt level (see, for example, Eichengreen et al., 1999; Wyplosz, 2002; Perry, 
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2002; De Gregorio, 2002). According to the literature, there may be scope for tight fiscal 
discipline or fiscal rules. Fiscal rules may improve the policymaking process by avoiding 
the discretion for procyclical fiscal policy during upturns in the business cycle. Explicit 
budgetary rules such as spending limits or balanced budget requirements may include 
constraints on procyclical policy.  Under this proposal, politicians would have to formulate 
policy within the budgetary limits. Fiscal Policy Council may be particularly effective in 
countries that are characterised by polarisation and high fragmentation, since these 
factors are important determinants of procyclical fiscal policy.  
In Chapter 3, we found that many countries, especially emerging and low-income 
developing countries also face challenges in implementing countercyclical monetary 
policies. We document that over the last 55 years, a substantial number of emerging and 
developing countries consistently followed procyclical monetary policy or have recently 
turned procyclical. We provide evidence that procyclical stop-and-go policies are 
intensified in the presence of “fear of free floating”, forcing central banks to raise interest 
rates to avoid large swings in the exchange rates. The fear mainly arises from reliance on 
debt financing from external sources that are denominated in the foreign currency. A 
sudden stop and abrupt reversal of capital inflows may lead country to insolvency, leading 
to costly insolvency and large unpredicted movements in relative prices. In this case 
cyclicality of monetary policy is predominantly determined by the exchange rate regime. 
This is particularly the case for developing countries with a large amount of foreign 
currency denominated obligations which render the exchange rate regime even more 
important.   
An obvious policy prescription is to follow a monetary framework is to follow a monetary 
framework with inflation targeting regime to pursue countercyclical policy (see, for 
example, Lane, 2003 and Coulibaly, 2012). The argument of replacing exchange rate 
anchors with implicit and explicit inflation targeting is based on the notion that inflation 
targets enable monetary tools to be used for domestic stabilisation purposes. Clearly, a 
successful and credible policy response requires a capable (i.e., better institutional 
quality) and independent central banks (i.e., an autonomous institution without 
government intervention), ensuring that inflation target anchors the price expectations 
in the medium-term that would allow the monetary authority to stabilise the business 
cycle fluctuations.  
Our findings also highlight the importance of financial development as an important 
factor in improving cyclical properties of macroeconomic policy. Financial development, 
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such as development in financial market and its integration with international capital 
markets enable emerging countries to borrow in local domestic currency (see, for example, 
Coulibaly, 2012). The larger share of domestic currency denominated debt reduces the 
risk of rapid capital outflow, the risk of maturity and currency mismatch, facilitating the 
pursuit of countercyclical policies. However, it is also essential to strengthen the 
institutional quality to gain foreign investors’ confidence. Improvement of institutional 
quality is also important as a barometer of foreign investor’s risk perception that 
determines the capital inflows. Consequently, countries with weak institutions combined 
with poor credit ratings may be exposed to the whims of international borrowing. As long 
as developing countries maintain strong economic fundamentals, better institutional 
quality and integration with international capital markets, the conduct of countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies as a macroeconomic stabiliser will be more likely to be 
sustainable.  
In Chapter 4, we investigated the potential macroeconomic cost of pursuing procyclical 
fiscal and monetary policy. Our empirical findings reveal that procyclical countries have 
high level of output volatility and inflation volatility. Our analysis also shows that 
procyclical macroeconomic policies are positively associated with lower economic growth, 
pointing to the importance of shifting from procyclical fiscal and monetary policy to 
countercyclical one. What is the prerequisite condition to shift from procyclical stance to 
countercyclical policy? In line with the earlier recommendation, better 
institutional/government quality, credible policy (i.e., the appropriate exchange rate 
regime and inflation targeting) and better financial integration with international capital 
markets appear as prerequisites in the conduct of countercyclical policy. 
In Chapter 2 and 3, we also show that over the last decades a good number of emerging 
economies have been able to escape the procyclicality trap and become countercyclical. 
During the global financial crisis 2008-09, these countries pursued countercyclical 
macroeconomic policy to counter the sharp drop in economic activity. However, in Chapter 
5, using cross-country data from 38 countries, we find little evidence for a central role of 
countercyclical policy to cushion against the global financial shock. Our findings suggest 
that trading partner’s weak export demand had a positive impact on growth collapse 
during the crisis (2008-09). Sharp growth declines are widely observed in the emerging 
countries, with a high level of short-term external debt, especially in the banking sector. 
Additionally, we found that external leverage and foreign rollover risk played key roles in 
the intensity of the crisis.  
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During the global financial crisis 2008-09, many emerging countries pursued 
countercyclical policy to cushion against the global financial shock. Our cross-country 
analysis finds little evidence of a central role of countercyclical policy to cushion against 
the crisis intensity. Nevertheless, countercyclical policy response is a remarkable 
departure from the earlier crisis episodes during which emerging countries had to cut 
government spending due to less creditworthiness and to raise interest rates to defend 
the value of the domestic currency to maintain capital inflows. The recent shift of cyclical 
properties of policy heralds a new era for emerging countries. However, they require 
better preventive measure combined with better institutional quality on financial sectors 
to reduce the future financial crisis impact.   
Our findings also point to the importance of the link between the structure of gross capital 
inflows as well as cyclical pattern of net capital inflow (see, for example, Al-Saffar et al., 
2013; Tucker, 2012 and Fiscal Policy Committee BOE, 2014). For example, large external 
gross debt may increase currency and maturity mismatch risk, increasing the risk profile 
of the financial sectors. This particularly applies to the banking sector that borrows from 
external sources in short-term agreements to finance long-term domestic investments. 
More attention needs to be devoted on the sources of the finances that are used for the 
domestic credit expansion (see, for example, Tucker, 2012). Indeed, Basel III 
(international banking regulation) includes net stable funding ratio (NFSR) requirements 
regarding external liabilities, as well as requirements towards monitoring cross-border 
banking activities. 
Several possibilities for future research emerge from our findings in this thesis. First, it 
would be informative to extend the Chapter 2’s empirical analysis by evaluating the short 
and long-term movement of fiscal balances and revenues with the business cycle. In 
addition, it would also be interesting to deepen the empirical investigation by utilising 
higher frequency data. Second, we construct the government quality index by considering 
three separate measures based corruption, transparency and democratic equality. 
Naturally, there remains an important question regarding the most efficient ways to 
compose and measure the government quality and its link with procyclical outcomes. 
Third, our findings in Chapter 3 links “fear of free floating” with cyclical properties of 
monetary policy, highlighting the importance of understanding the relationship between 
the two in more formal set-ups. Fourth, it would be interesting to consider a formal 
framework to examine the relation between procyclical policies with macroeconomic cost 
(e.g., inflation and output volatility and low growth). For example, in line with the 
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empirical findings in Chapter 4, one could develop a formal framework establishing, how 
the short-term structural components of macroeconomic stabilisation policies is likely to 
impact on the long-run economic performance (i.e., growth). This would be an interesting 
avenue for future research. 

























TABLE A2.1: DATA USED TO ESTIMATE THE CYCLICAL PROPERTIES OF FISCAL 
POLICY 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE 








∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺 is annual growth rate of real general government final consumption expenditure and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐶𝑌𝐶 is 
cyclical component of real general government final consumption expenditure derived from logarithm 
deviation of its Hodrick-Prescott trend. Data are covered over the time horizon 1970-2014. Real annual 
consumption converted from its nominal values, where possible, using GDP deflator and otherwise by using 
CPI. Data are in current local currency. Data are obtained from World Development Indicator (2015) and 
IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) (2015). Access through UK data services. 
 
Cyclical component of 
real output (𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷) 
Cyclical component of real GDP derived from logarithm deviation of its Hodrick-Prescott trend. Real annual 
GDP converted from its nominal values, where possible, using GDP deflation and otherwise by using CPI. 
Data are in current local currency. Data are covered over the time horizon 1970-2014. Data are obtained from 
World Development Indicator (2015) and IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) (2015). Access through 




Real external export demand measured by weighted average of GDP growth in country’s export partners, 
weighted by share of partner in total export. Data-set are covered over the time horizon 1985-2014. Data are 
obtained from Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) (2015), Berg et al., (2011) and IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) (2015). IFS data access through UK data services. 
GDP deflator 
(𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑫𝑬𝑭𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑶𝑹) 
The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. 
The base year varies by country. Annual data for time period 1970-2004 are obtained from World 
Development Indicator (2015) and IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) (2015). Access through UK 
data services. 
Consumer price index 
(𝑪𝑷𝑰) 
Consumer price index reflects changes in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods 
and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is 
generally used. Annual data for the time period 1970-2014 are obtained from World Development Indicator 
(2015) and IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) (2015). Access through UK data services. 
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TABLE A2.2: DATA USED IN THE CROSS COUNTRY AND PANEL REGRESSION 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE 
Government Quality 
(𝑮𝑸) 
Government quality is a composite index of political corruption (𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅), release of information by 
government (𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹), egalitarian democracy index (𝐸𝐺𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂), where these three variables’ annual data 
are equally weighted by taking averaged for each country for each year over the time horizon 1970-2014. The 
Government quality is a normalized index, ranges between 0 (lowest government quality) and 1 (highest 
government quality). Government quality index are averaged over 1970-2014 for cross-country estimation 
and annual data are used for panel-data estimation. 
 
𝑷𝑶𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑹: Political corruption index by taking the average of (a) public sector corruption; (b) executive 
corruption; (c) legislative corruption; and (d) judicial corruption. In other words, these four different 
government spheres are weighted equally by taking average for each country for each year over the time 
horizon 1970-2014 to construct the index. The index ranges from 0 (greater political corruption) to 1 (lowest 
political corruption). Data are obtained from Coppedge et al. (2015). 
 
𝑹𝑬𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭: Release of information by government as a measure of government transparency more specifically 
economic (both monetary and fiscal policy) and social data released by governments. It is a normalized annual 
data index ranges from 0 (lowest release of information) to 1 (highest release of information). Data are 
obtained from Williams (2015). 
 
𝑬𝑮𝑳𝑫𝑬𝑴𝑶: An assessment of ideal egalitarian democracy. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when rights 
and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; and resources are distributed 
equally across all social groups. The distribution of resources must be sufficient to ensure that citizens’ basic 
needs are met in a way that enables their meaningful participation. Additionally, an equal distribution of 
resources ensures the potential for greater equality in the distribution of power. It is a normalized annual data 
index ranges from 0 (lowest egalitarian democracy) to 1 (highest egalitarian democracy). Data are obtained 
from Coppedge et al. (2015). 
Initial real GDP per-
capita 1970 
(𝑳𝑹𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑪𝑯) 
Initial real GDP per-capita measured by Log of real GDP per-capita in 1970. Data are obtained from Penn 
World Table (PWT Version 6.3). 
Government 
expenditure to GDP 
(𝑮𝑬𝑿𝑷) 
General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP). Data are averaged over 1970-2014 for cross 
country estimation and annual data are used for panel-data estimation. Data are obtained from World 
Development Indicator (2015) and IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) (2015). Access through UK 
data services. 
Trade openness to 
GDP (𝑻𝑹𝑨𝑫𝑬) 
Measures trade openness of a country. Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured 
as a share of gross domestic product. Data are averaged over 1970-2014 for cross-country estimation and 
annual data are used for panel-data estimation. Data are obtained from World Development Indicator (2015). 
Political instability 
(𝑷𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑩) 
Measure political instability of the country. Only one variable cannot explain the political instability of the 
country. We use five indicator political motivated assassination (ASSASSIN), government crisis 
(GOVCRIS), revolution (REVOLS), military coups (COUPS), and constitutional changes (CONSTCHG) 
used to calculate the political instability. We give weight for each of the variable proposed by Woo (2009). 
𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 weight is estimated by using statistical techniques for each sample country for each year. More 
precisely the annual weight for each country is defined as 
PINSTAB=0.04*GOVTCRIS+0.24*REVOLS+0.44*COUPS+0.33*CONSTCHG+0.07*ASSASSIN. 
Data are averaged over 1970-2009 for cross-country estimation and annual data are used for panel-data 
estimation. Data are obtained from The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (2009). 
Political constrain 
(𝑷𝑶𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑵) 
Measure the political constrain, to implement the policy executives face political constrain which is depend 
on the number of institutionally embedded vote players among various branches of government.  High value 
reflect high political constrain and low value indicate low political constrain. Data are averaged over 1970-
2014 for cross-country estimation and annual data are used for panel-data estimation. Data are obtained from 
Henisz (2012). Access through Management Department, University of Pennsylvania. 
Cabinet size 
(𝑪𝑨𝑩𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬) 
Cabinet size refers to ministers’ number in "cabinet rank", excluding parliamentary secretaries, 
undersecretaries, ministerial alternates and others. Includes the vice-president and president under the 
presidential system, but not under a parliamentary system. In many cases, counts are approximate, since 
sources often differ (particularly in regard to "ministers of state") as to what constitutes cabinet status. 
Generally, the number of ministries, not of individuals holding multiple offices. Data are averaged over 1970-
2009 for cross-country estimation and annual data are used for panel-data estimation. Data are obtained from 
The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (2009). 
 
Appendix: Chapter 2 
163 
 
TABLE A2.2 (CONTINUED): DATA USED IN THE CROSS COUNTRY AND PANEL 
REGRESSION 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE 
Country credit ratings 
(𝑪𝑪𝑹) 
The Trading Economics credit rating (TE Rating) scores the credit worthiness of a country between 100 
(riskless) and 0 (likely to default). Unlike the ratings provided by the major credit agencies, the index is 
numerical because it is easier to understand and more insightful when comparing multiple countries. Data are 
obtained from Trading Economics Credit rating (TE Rating 2014) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
Checks and balances 
(𝑪𝑯𝑬𝑲𝑩𝑨𝑳𝑪) 
Measures political institutions constrains by appropriate checks and balanced; face by politicians to monitor 
their activity. Stronger check and balances restrain politicians in their policy making process and they held 
become more accountable to public. An 18-category scale, from 1 to 18, with a higher score indicating more 
political checks and balances. Data are averaged over 1975-2012 for cross-country estimation and annual data 
are used for panel-data estimation. Data are obtained from Beck et al., (2001). We use updated data which 
covers from 1975-2012. Data access through Econ.worldbank.org. 
Financial openness 
(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑵) 
Measured with the Chinn-Ito financial openness index. The index measures a country’s degree of capital 
account openness. The index ranges from 0 (lowest financial openness) to 1 (highest financial openness). Data 
are obtained from Chinn and Ito (2006). We use updated data which covers from 1970-2014. Data are averaged 




Measures country’s liquid liabilities over the GDP. Data are averaged over 1970-2014 for cross-country 
estimation and annual data are used for panel-data estimation. Data are obtained from International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) (2015), International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2015). Access through UK data services. 
European settlements 
(𝑬𝑼𝑺𝑬𝑻𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻) 
European settlements is percent of population that was European or of European descent in 1900 across their 
Colony. Europeans experienced high level of mortality rates (recorded among bishops, soldiers, and sailors 
stationed in the Colonies), they failed to settle and they were more likely to set-up worse government 
institutions. Data are obtained from Acemoglu et al., (2012). 
English law 
(𝑩𝑹𝑰𝑻𝑳𝑨𝑾) 
We divide our sample based on national commercial legal traditions into English law, French civil law, 
German civil law, Scandinavian law and Socialist law. The variable 𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐿𝐴𝑊 measures English common 
law and it is a dummy variable (1 if country follow English common law, and 0 otherwise). Data are obtained 
from La Porta et al., (1999). 
Colonial dummy 
(𝑩𝑹𝑰𝑻𝑪𝑶𝑳) 
Colonial dummies: Dummy indicating whether country was a British, French, German, Spanish, Italian, 
Belgian, Dutch. or Portuguese Colony. We give emphasis on British Colony, so that the variable is 1 if the 
country is Colonized by British and 0 otherwise. Data are obtained from La Porta et al., (1999). 
Cyclicality index of 
Frankel et al., (2013) 
(𝑭𝑽𝑽𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟑) 
Fiscal cyclicality index obtained from Frankel et al., (2013). They calculate the index based on country’s 
yearly data correlations between the cyclicality components of real GDP and real central government 
expenditures sample of 94 countries for the time 1960-2009. 
Cyclicality index of 
Talvi and Vegh 
(𝑻𝑽𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓) 
Fiscal cyclicality index obtained from Talvi and Végh (2005). They calculate the index based on country’s 
yearly data correlation between the cyclical component of real GDP and general government expenditure 
sample of 56 countries for the time 1970-1994. 
Cyclicality index of 
Kaminsky et al., (2004) 
(𝑲𝑹𝑽𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟒𝑪𝑮𝑬𝑿𝑷) 
Fiscal cyclicality index obtained from Kaminsky et al., (2004). They calculate the index based on country’s 
yearly data correlation between cyclical components of real GDP with cyclical components central 
government spending for 104 sample countries for 1960 to 2003. 
Cyclicality index of  
Kaminsky et al., (2004) 
(𝑲𝑹𝑽𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟒𝑰𝑵𝑭𝑻𝑨𝑿) 
Fiscal cyclicality index obtained from Kaminsky et al., (2004). They calculate the index based on country’s 
yearly data correlation between cyclical components of real GDP with cyclical components of inflation tax as 
a proxy for tax rate for 104 sample countries for 1960 to 2003. 
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TABLE A2.2 (CONTINUED): DATA USED IN THE CROSS COUNTRY AND PANEL 
REGRESSION 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE 
Cyclicality index of 
Kaminsky et al., (2004) 
(𝑲𝑹𝑽𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟒𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑿) 
A composite index of fiscal cyclicality based on the yearly data correlation of cyclical components of real 
GDP and real government expenditures, correlation between the cyclical components of real GDP and 
inflation tax, and the amplitude of the real government expenditure cycle. The index is developed for 104 
sample countries for 1960 to 2003. Index from Kaminsky et al., (2004). 
Cyclicality index of  
Alesina and Tabellini 
(2005) 
(𝑨𝑻𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷𝑳𝑼𝑺) 
Fiscal cyclicality index obtained from Alesina and Tabellini (2005). They estimate the index by using 
regression-based fiscal cyclicality indicator, a statistics of county’s budget surplus is regressed on cyclical 
component of output (using Hodrick-Prescott filter) and the estimated coefficient from time-series regression 
is considered as the behaviour of fiscal cyclicality for each country. The index is developed for 87 countries 
with a time variability across countries.  
Cyclicality index of 
Alesina and Tabellini 
(2005) 
(𝑨𝑻𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝑹𝑬𝑽𝑬𝑵𝑼𝑬) 
Fiscal cyclicality index obtained from Alesina and Tabellini (2005). They estimate the index by using 
regression-based fiscal cyclicality indicator, a statistics of county’s tax revenue is regressed on cyclical 
component of output (using Hodrick-Prescott filter) and the estimated coefficient from time-series regression 
is considered as the behaviour of fiscal cyclicality for each country. The index is developed for 87 countries 

















Appendix: Chapter 2 
165 
 
TABLE A2.3: CYCLICAL PROPERTIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND GOVERNMENT 

































Govt. Quality (𝐺𝑄𝑖) 
over the time period 
1970-2014 
Country’s fiscal cyclicality indicators over the time 
1970-2014, where ?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̅?𝑖
̂ 𝐼𝑉are estimated by 
using time-series regression model (2.1), (2.4) and 
(2.7) respectively. 
 
Please Note: level of significance: ***1%, **5%, 
*10% for the estimated coefficient ?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̅?𝑖
̂ 𝐼𝑉 
Fiscal cyclicality stance over the time 1970-2014. We estimate ?̂?𝐼 
and ?̅?𝑖
̂  for two sub-time period 1970-1999 (pre-1999s, 30 years) 
and 2000-2014 (post-1999s, 15 years) for each country.  Due to 
lack of data availability for the instrument 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡, we 
estimate ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 for two sub-time period 1985-1999 (pre-1999s, 15 
years) and 2000-2014 (post-1999s, 15 years) for each country. 
We estimate the cyclicality statistics ?̂?𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖
̂  and  ?̅?𝑖
̂ 𝐼𝑉 by using 
time-series model (2.1), (2.4) and (2.7) respectively. 
 
Please Note: PT=Procyclicality Trap means conducting 
procyclical fiscal policy in both sub-time period; PC=From 
Procyclical to Countercyclical; CP=From Countercyclical to 
Procyclical; C=Countercyclical in both sub-time period.  
𝑮𝑸𝒊 ?̂?𝒊 ?̅?𝒊̂ ?̅?𝒊̂
𝑰𝑽
 ?̂?𝒊 ?̅?𝒊̂ ?̅?𝒊̂
𝑰𝑽
 
Australia  1970-2014 0.81 -0.21 -0.13 -0.65 CP C C 
Austria 1970-2014 0.78 0.47** -0.01 -0.34 PT PC C 
Belgium 1970-2014 0.78 -0.41** -0.04 -0.47* PT PC C 
Canada 1970-2014 0.82 -0.34** -0.52*** -0.87* C C C 
Cyprus 1970-2014 0.61 -0.14* 0.50* -0.34 CP PT C 
Denmark 1970-2014 0.84 -0.11 -0.32** -0.56** C C PC 
Finland 1970-2014 0.84 0.40* 0.11 0.15 PT PT PT 
France 1970-2014 0.81 -0.16 -0.21** -0.25 C C C 
Germany 1971-2014 0.68 0.29** 0.07 -0.34 PC PC PC 
Greece 1970-2014 0.61 0.41 0.36 1.52 CP CP PT 
Hong Kong 1970-2014 NA -0.14 -0.14 -0.26 C C C 
Iceland 1970-2014 0.79 0.72*** 0.85 0.65*** PT PT PT 
Ireland 1970-2014 0.74 0.92*** 0.39 0.05 PT PT PT 
Israel 1970-2014 0.66 1.08** 1.20*** 0.81** PT PC PT 
Italy 1970-2014 0.71 0.26 0.16 0.28 PC PT PT 
Japan 1970-2014 0.80 0.17 0.17 0.23** PC PC PT 
Korea, Rep. 1970-2014 0.60 -0.09 -0.20 0.14 CP CP PT 
Luxembourg 1970-2014 0.79 -0.23 -0.26 -0.26 C C PC 
Macao  1980-2014 NA -0.04 -0.21 NA C C NA 
Netherlands 1970-2014 0.82 0.55*** -0.04 -0.09 PT PT PT 
New Zealand 1971-2014 0.82 0.37** 0.18 0.09 PT PT PT 
Norway 1970-2014 0.80 -0.14 -0.08 -0.16 PC PC PC 
Portugal 1970-2014 0.72 0.48** 0.70*** 1.78*** PT PT PT 
Puerto Rico 1970-2014 NA 0.34 0.59** NA PT PT NA 
Singapore 1970-2014 0.58 -0.11 -0.07 -0.38 C C PC 
Spain 1970-2014 0.76 0.67*** 0.48* 0.63 PT PT PT 
Sweden 1970-2014 0.86 -0.17 -0.06 0.00 CP CP CP 
Switzerland 1980-2014 0.83 0.47** 0.11 -0.10 PC PC PC 
United 
Kingdom 1970-2014 
0.80 -0.08 -0.29 -0.39 CP C C 
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TABLE A2.4: CYCLICAL PROPERTIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND GOVERNMENT 

































(𝐺𝑄𝑖) over the 
time period 1970-
2014 
Country’s fiscal cyclicality indicators over the 
time 1970-2014, where ?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̅?𝑖
̂ 𝐼𝑉are 
estimated by using time-series regression model 
(2.1), (2.4) and (2.7) respectively. 
 
Please Note: level of significance: ***1%, 




Fiscal cyclicality stance over the time 1970-2014. We estimate ?̂?𝐼 
and ?̅?𝑖
̂  for two sub-time period 1970-1999 (pre-1999s, 30 years) 
and 2000-2014 (post-1999s, 15 years) for each country.  Due to 
lack of data availability for the instrument 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡, we 
estimate ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 for two sub-time period 1985-1999 (pre-1999s, 15 
years) and 2000-2014 (post-1999s, 15 years) for each country. 
We estimate the cyclicality statistics ?̂?𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖
̂  and  ?̅?𝑖
̂ 𝐼𝑉 by using 
time-series model (2.1), (2.4) and (2.7) respectively. 
 
Please Note: PT=Procyclicality Trap means conducting 
procyclical fiscal policy in both sub-time period; PC=From 
Procyclical to Countercyclical; CP=From Countercyclical to 






Albania 1980-2014 0.43 0.67** 0.02 0.18 PT CP PT 
Algeria 1970-2014 0.37 2.22 2.38 0.44 PC PC PT 
Antigua And Barbuda 1977-2014 0.52 0.49** 0.41** 0.92 PT PT PT 
Argentina 1970-2014 0.57 1.93** 1.75** 3.86** PT PT PT 
Bahamas 1973-2014 0.70 0.21 0.25 0.26 PC PC PC 
Bahrain 1975-2014 0.40 0.12 0.18 0.93 PC PC PC 
Barbados 1972-2014 0.57 0.67* 0.86*** 0.58 CP PT PT 
Belize 1973-2014 0.65 0.15 -0.05 0.91 PT PC CP 
Botswana 1970-2014 0.55 0.62** 0.19 NA PT PT NA 
Brazil 1970-2014 0.47 0.69* 0.92** 1.48 PT PT PC 
Bulgaria 1980-2014 0.49 0.40 0.26 0.46 PT PT PT 
Chile 1970-2014 0.60 0.79** 0.73*** 1.11 PC PC PC 
China 1970-2014 0.41 0.30 0.33 0.82 PT PT PT 
Colombia 1970-2014 0.46 1.46** 1.23** 2.98 PC PT PC 
Costa Rica 1970-2014 0.71 0.93*** 0.96*** -0.77 PC PC PC 
Cuba 1971-2014 0.34 0.88*** 0.89*** NA PT PT NA 
Dominican Republic 1970-2014 0.36 1.97** 2.08** 4.78*** PT PT PT 
Ecuador 1970-2014 0.47 2.13*** 2.39*** -0.21 PC PC PC 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1970-2014 0.30 0.53* 0.56 -0.87 PC PC PC 
El Salvador 1970-2014 0.30 0.52*** 0.35** 0.20 PC PC PC 
Equatorial Guinea 1980-2014 0.41 0.46 0.55 0.78** PC PC PC 
Fiji 1970-2014 0.49 1.01* 1.19* 4.88 PT PT PT 
Gabon 1970-2014 0.26 0.61** 0.52** 1.14 PT PT PT 
Guatemala 1970-2014 0.29 0.90* 0.73 3.51 PC PC PC 
Hungary 1971-2014 0.61 0.62** 0.78*** 0.15 PT PT PT 
India 1970-2014 0.53 1.01*** 0.80** 0.21 PT PT PT 
Indonesia 1970-2014 0.32 0.46 1.39*** 0.48 PC PC PC 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1970-2014 0.38 0.33 0.71*** 0.19 PT PT PT 
Iraq 1971-2014 0.23 1.06*** 0.81*** 4.74 PT PT PT 
Jamaica 1970-2014 0.52 0.29 0.84** -0.60 PT PT CP 
Jordan 1970-2014 0.50 0.35* 1.00*** 1.65* PT PT PT 
Kuwait 1970-2014 0.39 -0.23 -0.04 NA C PC NA 
Malaysia 1970-2014 0.45 0.17 0.38 0.05 PC PC PC 
Mauritius 1970-2014 0.57 0.78*** 0.61* 1.73 PC PC PC 
Mexico 1970-2014 0.40 0.86** 1.07*** 0.05 PT PC C 
Morocco 1970-2014 0.35 0.68 0.77 0.07 PT PT PT 
Namibia 1980-2014 0.54 1.64** 1.01 NA PT PT NA 
Oman 1970-2014 0.35 1.03*** 0.36 1.60 PT PT PT 
Pakistan 1970-2014 0.36 1.48** 1.09* 3.42** PT PT PT 
Panama 1970-2014 0.45 0.64*** 0.65*** 0.64 PT PT PT 
Paraguay 1970-2014 0.29 1.01*** 1.00*** 2.35* PC PT PC 
Peru 1970-2014 0.48 0.82*** 1.28*** 1.15 PC PC PC 
Philippines 1970-2014 0.43 1.13** 1.43*** 1.48 PT PT PT 
Poland 1980-2014 0.61 0.46 0.45 -0.81 PT PT CP 
Quater 1980-2014 0.31 0.45 0.95** 1.53** PT PT PT 
Romania 1981-2014 0.43 0.53* 0.23 0.66 PT PT PT 
Saudi Arabia 1970-2014 0.37 0.18 -0.07 -0.59 C C PC 
Seychelles 1976-2014 0.40 0.81** 0.94* 2.51 PT PT PT 
South Africa 1970-2014 0.50 0.89*** 0.68* 0.49 PT PC PC 
Sri Lanka 1970-2014 0.54 0.60 0.55 2.33 PT PT PT 
St. Kitts And Nevis 1977-2014 0.57 0.13 0.32 0.87 CP CP PT 
Swaziland 1970-2014 0.34 0.33 0.50 NA PC PC NA 
Thailand 1970-2014 0.36 0.56 0.40 0.24 PT PC PC 
Trinidad And Tobago 1970-2014 0.65 1.09*** 0.69* 0.52 PT PT PT 
Tunisia 1970-2014 0.42 -0.04 -0.04 0.21 PC PC PC 
Turkey 1970-2014 0.53 0.72** 0.61** -0.01 PT PT PT 
Uruguay 1970-2014 0.71 0.76*** 0.89*** 1.01* PT PT CP 
Venezuela 1970-2014 0.49 1.11*** 1.26 0.91 PT PT PT 
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TABLE A2.5: CYCLICAL PROPERTIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND GOVERNMENT 













































(𝐺𝑄𝑖) over the 
time period 
1970-2014 
Country’s fiscal cyclicality indicators over the time 
1970-2014, where ?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̅?𝑖
̂ 𝐼𝑉are estimated by 
using time-series regression model (2.1), (2.4) and 
(2.7) respectively. 
 
Please Note: level of significance: ***1%, **5%, 
*10% for the estimated coefficient ?̂?𝑖, ?̅?𝑖
̂  and ?̅?𝑖
̂ 𝐼𝑉 
Fiscal cyclicality stance over the time 1970-2014. We estimate ?̂?𝐼 
and ?̅?𝑖
̂  for two sub-time period 1970-1999 (pre-1999s, 30 years) 
and 2000-2014 (post-1999s, 15 years) for each country.  Due to 
lack of data availability for the instrument 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡, we 
estimate ?̂̅?𝑖
𝐼𝑉 for two sub-time period 1985-1999 (pre-1999s, 15 
years) and 2000-2014 (post-1999s, 15 years) for each country. We 
estimate the cyclicality statistics ?̂?𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖
̂  and  ?̅?𝑖
̂ 𝐼𝑉 by using time-
series model (2.1), (2.4) and (2.7) respectively. 
 
Please Note: PT=Procyclicality Trap means conducting 
procyclical fiscal policy in both sub-time period; PC=From 
Procyclical to Countercyclical; CP=From Countercyclical to 
Procyclical; C=Countercyclical in both sub-time period.  





Bangladesh 1973-2014 0.32 2.89** 3.22*** 2.05 PT PT PT 
Benin 1970-2014 0.39 1.14* 1.18*** 4.88 PC PC PT 
Bhutan 1980-2014 0.44 -0.11 -0.17 NA CP CP NA 
Bolivia 1970-2014 0.40 2.20*** 1.99* 0.87 PT PC PC 
Burkina Faso 1970-2014 0.40 0.71 1.26* 0.89 PT PT CP 
Burundi 1970-2014 0.38 2.10*** 0.96 2.57 PT PT PT 
Cameroon 1970-2014 0.28 1.00* 0.85*** 1.94 PT PT PT 
Central African Rep. 1970-2014 0.23 0.65** 0.44 0.02 PT PT PT 
Chad 1970-2014 0.21 1.10** 1.31*** 1.16 PT PT PT 
Comoros 1981-2014 0.27 0.42 0.22 4.67 C C C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1970-2014 0.22 2.80*** 2.20 3.31 PC PC PC 
Congo, Rep. 1970-2014 0.22 0.52 0.02 3.69 PC PC PC 
Cote d'Ivoire 1970-2014 0.33 1.37*** 1.48*** 3.45 PT PT PT 
Dominica 1975-2014 0.60 -0.53 -0.81*** -0.71 C C PT 
Ethiopia 1970-2014 0.31 1.17*** 1.05*** 3.24 PT PT PT 
Gambia, The 1976-2014 0.41 2.67 0.65*** 1.14** PT PT PT 
Georgia 1980-2014 0.43 0.46 1.30*** 1.18** PT PT PT 
Ghana 1970-2014 0.40 1.66** 2.64*** 4.50 PT PT PT 
Grenada 1973-2014 0.58 0.68*** 0.81*** -0.32 PT PT PT 
Guinea 1985-2014 0.22 0.29 0.22 1.21 PC PC PC 
Guinea-Bissau 1971-2014 0.23 0.23 0.54 3.19 PT PT PT 
Guyana 1970-2014 0.38 1.73*** 1.48** 2.82 PT PC PC 
Honduras 1970-2014 0.31 -0.08 0.05 1.20 CP CP PT 
Kenya 1970-2014 0.30 0.70** 1.19*** 1.19 PC PC PC 
Lesotho 1970-2014 0.40 -0.08 -0.31 NA CP CP NA 
Madagascar 1970-2014 0.27 1.14* 1.53*** 3.02 PT PT PT 
Malawi 1970-2014 0.42 -0.33 -0.94** 3.08 CP CP CP 
Mali 1970-2014 0.36 0.76 0.96*** 2.99 PT PT PT 
Mauritania 1970-2014 0.25 0.44 0.65 -0.12 PT PT PT 
Mongolia 1981-2014 0.46 1.29* 1.35*** 1.61 PT PT PT 
Mozambique 1980-2014 0.39 1.19** 0.29 -0.41 PT PT CP 
Nepal 1975-2014 0.28 0.79 0.78 1.35 PT PT PT 
Nicaragua 1970-2014 0.37 0.57 0.10 2.60 PT PT PT 
Niger 1970-2014 0.37 0.73** 0.98*** 0.34 PC PC PC 
Nigeria 1970-2014 0.24 1.17** 0.33 2.36 PT PT PT 
Rwanda 1970-2014 0.35 1.09*** 1.17*** 2.46 PC PC PT 
Senegal 1970-2014 0.44 0.58 0.29 1.48 PC PC PT 
Sierra Leone 1970-2014 0.24 0.76*** 0.75*** 1.11 PT PT PT 
St. Lucia 1975-2014 0.60 0.23 0.37** 0.43 PC PC PT 
St. Vincent Grenadines 1975-2014 0.57 0.74*** 0.53*** 1.14 PT PT PT 
Sudan 1970-2014 0.28 0.12 0.64 0.20 PT PT PT 
Tajikistan 1985-2014 0.24 0.61 0.26 0.59 CP CP PT 
Togo 1970-2014 0.32 0.41 0.64** 0.68 PT PT PT 
Tonga 1975-2014 0.52 0.81*** 0.98*** -0.05 PC CP PC 
Uganda 1982-2014 0.28 1.27 0.88 2.30 PT PT PT 
Vanuatu 1980-2014 0.48 1.53*** 1.74*** 2.12** PT PT PT 
Vietnam 1985-2014 0.33 0.69 2.39*** 2.01 PC PC PC 














TABLE A2.6: CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION OF FISCAL CYCLICALITY WITH THE COMPONENTS OF GOVERNMENT QUALITY (𝑮𝑸), 1970-2014 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  CYCLICALITY OF FISCAL POLICY) 
 ESTIMATION METHOD: OLS 
 
Dependent Variable: Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy ?̂?𝒊 Dependent Variable: Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy ?̅?𝒊
̂ Dependent Variable: Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy ?̅?𝒊
̂𝑰𝑽 
All Countries Procyclicality Trap Sample All Countries Procyclicality Trap Sample All Countries Procyclicality Trap Sample 


















































































































































































































STATISTICS                
ADJUSTED 𝑹𝟐 14.72% 18.61% 15.53% 5.55% 6.12% 18.53% 18.68% 14.88% 5.46% 6.86% 23.14% 23.76% 23.22% 7.93% 11.23% 
OBSERVATIONS 134 126 126 71 71 134 126 126 65 65 127 119 119 67 67 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
All data regression include intercept term. 
Col estimation is based on white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. 
RCol estimation is based on weighted and reweighted OLS regression to control for outliers. 
Procyclicality trap are the sample countries conducting procyclical fiscal policy in both sub-period 1970-1999 and 2000-2014. 
See data appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
 
Correlation Matrix of Government Quality Components – Political Corruption (POLCORR) 
Transparency (RELINF) and Egalitarian Democracy (EGLDEMO) 
 POLCORR RELINF EGLDEMO Observations 
POLCORR 1   134 
RELINF 0.43 1  134 
EGLDEMO 0.63 0.38 1 134 
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?̂?𝒊 137 0.68 0.64 -0.53 2.89 
?̅?𝒊
̂ 137 0.66 0.70 -0.94 3.22 
?̅?𝒊
̂𝑰𝑽 128 1.11 1.42 -0.87 4.88 
𝑭𝑽𝑽𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟑 85 0.22 0.33 -0.56 0.80 
𝑻𝑽𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓 54 0.41 0.30 -0.28 0.85 
𝑲𝑹𝑽𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟒𝑪𝑮𝑬𝑿𝑷 88 0.22 0.35 -0.80 0.87 
𝑲𝑹𝑽𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟒𝑰𝑵𝑭𝑻𝑨𝑿 92 -0.08 0.27 -0.74 0.74 
𝑲𝑹𝑽𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟒𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑿 88 0.16 0.24 -0.51 0.63 
𝑨𝑻𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷𝑳𝑼𝑺 83 0.03 0.28 -0.80 0.84 
𝑨𝑻𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝑹𝑬𝑽𝑬𝑵𝑼𝑬 76 0.04 0.19 -0.58 0.63 
𝑮𝑸 134 0.48 0.18 0.21 0.86 
𝑷𝑶𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑹 134 0.52 0.25 0.12 0.99 
𝑹𝑬𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭 134 0.49 0.13 0.21 0.74 
𝑬𝑮𝑳𝑫𝑬𝑴𝑶 134 0.42 0.27 0.09 1 
𝑳𝑹𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑪𝑯 137 3.60 0.46 2.53 4.99 
𝑮𝑬𝑿𝑷 137 15.81 4.99 4.97 32.03 
𝑻𝑹𝑨𝑫𝑬 135 80.00 47.59 20.12 342.61 
𝑷𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑩 128 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.42 
𝑷𝑶𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑵 126 0.25 0.15 0.00 0.67 
𝑪𝑨𝑩𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬 122 20.72 5.69 7.55 40.00 
𝑪𝑯𝑬𝑲𝑩𝑨𝑳𝑪 122 2.64 1.12 1.00 5.89 
𝑪𝑪𝑹 99 49.72 23.25 11.42 100 
𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑵 122 0.44 0 .28 0.10 1.00 
𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑷𝑻𝑯 135 0.49 0.37 0.04 2.37 
𝑬𝑼𝑺𝑬𝑻𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻 102 25.23 37.61 0.00 100 
𝑬𝑵𝑮𝑳𝑨𝑾 137 0.29 0 .46 0.00 1.00 
𝑩𝑹𝑰𝑻𝑪𝑶𝑳 137 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
∆𝒍𝒐𝒈𝑮𝒊𝒕
𝑪𝒀𝑪 5859 3.49e-14 0.054 -0.787 0.419 
𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷 5859 3.83e-14 0.024 -0.270 0.206 
𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷 ∗ 𝑳𝑹𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑪𝑯 5859 1.37e-13 0.088 -1.348 0.773 
𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷 ∗ 𝑮𝑬𝑿𝑷 5675 -0.005 0.474 -20.601 3.122 
𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷 ∗ 𝑮𝑸 4893 0.0001 0.009 -0.076 0.055 
𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷 ∗ 𝑮𝑸𝟏𝟗𝟕𝟎(𝑰𝑵𝑰𝑻𝑰𝑨𝑳) 4893 0.0001 0.008 -0.106 0.060 
𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷 ∗ ∆𝑮𝑸 4780 0.00004 0.002 -0.021 0.032 
𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷 ∗ 𝑻𝑹𝑨𝑫𝑬 5600 0.031 2.855 -70.370 60.823 
𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷 ∗ 𝑷𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑩 3980 -0.0003 0.008 -0.204 0.155 
𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷 ∗ 𝑷𝑶𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑵 5355 3.14e-06 0.006 -0.113 0.067 
𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷 ∗ 𝑪𝑨𝑩𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬 3953 -0.008 0.594 -6.541 6.268 
𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷 ∗ 𝑪𝑯𝑬𝑪𝑲𝑩𝑨𝑳 4567 0.0003 0.056 -0.647 0.403 
𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷 ∗ 𝑪𝑪𝑹 1759 0.076 0.809 -5.449 5.042 
𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷 ∗ 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑵 5352 0.0001 0.010 -0.270 0.118 
𝑶𝑼𝑻_𝑮𝑨𝑷 ∗ 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑷𝑻𝑯 5358 -.0001 0.013 -0.516 0.112 
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TABLE A3.1: DATA USED TO MEASURE CYCLICAL PROPERTIES OF MONETARY 
POLICY AND FEAR OF FREE FLOATING 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE 
Interest rate cycle 
(𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) 
𝑖𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒  is the cyclical component of the central bank’s nominal short term-policy rate derived from deviation of its 
Hodrick-Prescott Trend. We use discount window interest rate depending on data availability as a proxy for 
monetary policy instruments. For countries whenever the discount rate is not available, we use money market rate, 
lending rate or treasury bill rate. The rates are in percentage terms. 
 
We exclude observations of very large nominal interest rates during hyperinflation episodes above the 99th 
percentile to remove outliers. We start our analysis just after the hyperinflation period (i.e. inflation rate below 99th 
percentile) for the sample countries, which has experienced hyperinflation.  
 
Annual and quarterly data are covered over the time horizon 1960-2014. Data are obtained from Vegh and Vuletin 
(2012) and IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2015), code 60ZF (Discount Rate), 60B-ZF (Money Market 
Rate) and 60P-ZF (Lending Rate). Access through UK data services. 
Output gap (𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) 
𝑦𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒  is the cyclical components of real GDP derived from logarithm deviation of its Hodrick-Prescott Trend. Real 
GDP converted from its nominal values, where possible, using GDP deflator and otherwise by using Consumer 
Price Index (CPI).  
 
Annual and quarterly data are covered over the time horizon 1960-2014. Seasonally adjusted data are used for 
quarterly frequency. For countries, whenever the seasonally adjusted data is not available, we use X12 
multiplicative method to remove the seasonal components. For countries, whenever the nominal GDP data is not 
available in quarterly frequency for long horizon time period, we use real GDP volume index. Data are obtained 
from World Development Indicator (WDI, 2015) and IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2015), code 
99BVR (seasonally adjusted) or 99BVP (not seasonally adjusted) depending on the data availability. Access 
through UK data services. Access through UK data services. 
Inflation cycle 
(𝝅𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) 
𝜋𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 is the cyclical components of inflation derived from deviation of its Hodrick-Prescott Trend. Inflation is 
calculated using consumer price index (CPI) percentage change over corresponding period of previous year. For 
countries whenever the CPI is not available, we used GDP Deflator to calculate inflation. The rates are in percentage 
terms. 
 
We exclude observations of very large inflation during hyperinflation episodes above the 99th percentile to remove 
outliers. We start our analysis just after the hyperinflation period (i.e. inflation rate below 99th percentile) for the 
sample countries, which has experienced hyperinflation.  
 
Annual and quarterly data are covered over the time horizon 1960-2014. We use non-seasonally adjusted data for 
quarterly frequency, where we use X12 multiplicative method to remove the seasonal components. Data are 
obtained from World Development Indicator (WDI, 2015) and IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2015), 
code 64-XZF (not seasonally adjusted). Access through UK data services. 




𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 is the cyclical component of the rate of change of the nominal exchange rates derived from deviation of 
its Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Trend. The rate of change of currency deprecation or appreciation is calculated by taking 
percentage change over corresponding period of previous year. To be precise, a positive value of 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 is the 
currency depreciation and a negative value of 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 is the currency appreciation. We use nominal exchange 
rate of domestic currency against US dollar. For European countries, we use the nominal effective exchange rate.  
 
We restrict our sample to include countries with floating or dirty floating exchange rate regimes (classified as pre 
announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, de facto peg, pre announced crawling peg, pre 
announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, de factor crawling peg, de facto crawling band 
that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%, de facto 
crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%, moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., 
allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time), managed floating, freely floating, freely falling) with at 
least 15 consecutive observations. We do not incorporate countries or the time period with exchange rate that follow 
no separate legal tender and pre announced peg or currency board arrangement. We follow Ilzetzki et al. (2011) 
for exchange rate fine classification. 
 
Annual and quarterly data are covered over the time horizon 1960-2014. Data are obtained from World 
Development Indicator (WDI, 2015) and IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2015), code AH (nominal 
exchange rate against the US Dollar) and NEC or NEU (nominal effective exchange rate). Access through UK data 
services.  
Derivation of 
Cyclical Components  
The cyclical component is defined as the difference between the variables (𝑖, 𝑦, 𝜋 and 𝐸𝑋𝐸) and their trend, where 
the trend is computed by using Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. We use HP filter with a frequency 𝜆 = 100 for annual 
data and 𝜆 = 1600 for quarterly data. These values are referred to as the “de facto industry standards” (Giorno et 
al., 1995).  
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TABLE A3.2: DATA USED IN THE CROSS COUNTRY AND PANEL REGRESSION 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE 
Fear of free floating 
(𝑭𝑶𝑭) 
Fear of free floating is the correlation between the cyclical components of the short-term nominal interest rate cycle 
(𝑖𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and the rate of exchange rate cycle (𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) for the period 1960-2014. Cyclical components of short-
term nominal interest rate (𝑖𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and exchange rate cycle (𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) are measured by using HP filter. For annual 
data we denote them as 𝐹𝑂𝐹 and quarterly data we denote them as 𝐹𝑂𝐹𝑄. The cyclical component is defined as 
the difference between the variables (𝑖𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒  and 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒) and their trend, where the trend is computed by using 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. We use seasonally adjusted data while we compute 𝐹𝑂𝐹𝑄. We use HP filter with a 
frequency 𝜆 = 100 for annual data and 𝜆 = 1600 for quarterly data. Data are obtained from World Development 
Indicator (WDI, 2015) and IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2015). Access through UK data services. 
Cyclicality of fiscal 
policy (𝑭𝑰𝑺𝑪𝒀𝑪) 
For panel regression analysis 𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑌𝐶 indicator is constructed by using 10 years rolling backward correlation 
between the cyclical components of real government consumption and the real GDP. A positive (negative) value 
of 𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑌𝐶 specifies that government take procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. The cyclical components are 
calculated by using Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
 
For cross country regression analysis, we estimate the fiscal cyclicality by using the equation ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑌𝐶 = ?̅?𝑖 +
?̅?𝑖  𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡, where ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑌𝐶 is the deviation of the log of real government consumption from its Hodrick-
Prescott trend and output gap (𝑂𝑈𝑇_𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡) defined as the log deviation of real GDP from its Hodrick-Prescott 
trend. Estimated coefficient ?̅?𝑖
̂  positive (negative) value specifies that government take procyclical 
(countercyclical) fiscal policy. Data are obtained from World Development Indicator (WDI, 2015) and IMF 
International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2015). Access through UK data services. 
Institutional quality 
(𝑰𝑸) 
Institutional quality is a composite index of political corruption (𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅), release of information by government 
(𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹), where these variables’ annual data are equally weighted by taking averaged for each country for each 
year over the time horizon 1960-2014. The institutional quality is a normalized index, ranges between 0 (lowest 
institutional quality) to 1 (highest institutional quality). For cross country regression, institutional quality index are 
averaged over 1960-2014. 
 
𝑷𝑶𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑹: Political corruption index is constructed by taking the average of (a) public sector corruption; (b) 
executive corruption; (c) legislative corruption; and (d) judicial corruption. In other words, these four different 
government spheres are weighted equally by taking average for each country for each year over the time horizon 
1960-2014 to construct the index. The index ranges from 0 (greater political corruption) to 1 (lowest political 
corruption). Data are obtained from Coppedge et al. (2015). 
 
𝑹𝑬𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭: Release of information by government as a measure of government transparency more specifically 
economic (both monetary and fiscal policy) and social data released by the government. It is a normalized annual 
data index ranges from 0 (lowest release of information) to 1 (highest release of information). Data are obtained 
from Williams (2015). 
Central bank 
independence (𝑪𝑩𝑰) 
Central bank independence is the set of restrictions to the government’s influence on the central bank management 
of monetary policy. We use the weighted index of CBI, ranging from 0 (lowest CBI) to 1 (highest CBI). For cross 
country regression, data are averaged over 1960-2014. We collect the data from Garriga (2016). 
Monetary freedom 
(𝑴𝑭) 
Monetary freedom combines a measure of price stability with an assessment of price controls. Both inflation and 
price controls distort market activity. Price stability without sector-specific government intervention is the ideal 
state for the free market.  Monetary freedom score ranges from 0 (lowest monetary freedom) to 100 (highest 
monetary freedom). For cross country regression, data are averaged over 1960-2014. Data are obtained from Index 
of Economic Freedom (2016). Access through Heritage.org (2016) 
Inflation targeting 
(𝑰𝑻) 
The adoption date of inflation targeting from Hammond (2012) and Ebeke and Azangue (2015). Inflation targeting 




Measured with the Chinn-Ito financial openness index. The index measures a country’s degree of capital account 
openness. The index ranges from 0 (lowest financial openness) to 1 (highest financial openness). Data are obtained 
from Chinn and Ito (2006). We use updated data which covers from 1970-2014. For cross country regression, data 
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TABLE A3.2 (CONTINUED): DATA USED IN THE CROSS COUNTRY AND PANEL 
REGRESSION 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE 
Financial depth 
(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑷𝑻𝑯) 
Measures country’s liquid liabilities over the GDP in percentage terms. For cross country regression, data are 
averaged over 1960-2014. Data are obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2015) and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF, 2015). Access through UK data services. 
Number of external 
debt crisis (𝑵𝑬𝑬𝑫) 
Number of episodes of sovereign external default from 1800 to 1960 for the sample country. External debt crisis 
as any failure to meet contractual repayment obligations on foreign debts, including both rescheduling or 
repayments and outright default. Please note that if the sample country is not independent, then we use their colonial 
regime data. Data are obtained from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). 
Number of IMF 
programme (𝑰𝑴𝑭) 
Number of episodes of IMF programme to help a member country to improve an economy to recover from its crisis 
(i.e. financial support) from 1945 to 1960. Please note that if the sample country is not independent, then we use 
their colonial regime data. Data obtained from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). 
Number of currency 
crisis (𝑪𝑪) 
Number of episodes of currency crisis from 1800 to 1960. Please note that if the sample country is not independent, 
then we use their colonial regime data. The crisis episodes are obtained from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). 
Number of other 
crisis (𝑶𝑪) 
Combined number of episodes of other crisis (i.e. inflation crisis, stock market crashes, domestic debt crisis, 
external debt crisis and banking crisis) from 1800 to 1960. Please note that if the sample country is not independent, 














TABLE A3.3: MONETARY POLICY CYCLICALITY, FEAR OF FLOATING, POLICY RATE, 
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Australia 1975 2014 39 0.63 1.06** 0.66 0.27 C -0.07 Discount Rate NA June 1993 1960-1974 
Austria 1972 1998 26 0.55 1.10*** 0.55 NA NA -0.01 Discount Rate 1921-1922 NA 1960-1971 
Belgium 1980 2014 34 0.55 0.45*** 0.46 0.79 C 0.05 T-Bill Rate NA NA NA 
Canada 1972 2014 42 0.58 0.97*** 0.58 0.63 C -0.27 Discount Rate NA February 1991 1960-1971 
Cyprus 1970 2007 37 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.30 C 0.01 Discount Rate NA NA 1960-1973 
Czech Rep 1993 2014 21 0.30 -0.03 0.12 0.49 C 0.18 Lending Rate NA NA NA 
Denmark 1972 2011 39 0.05 0.60** -0.26 0.88 PC 0.16 Discount Rate NA NA 1960-1971 
Finland 1978 2014 36 0.29 0.09 0.14 0.86 C 0.25 Money Market Rate NA NA 1968-1972 
France 1970 2014 44 0.41 0.61** 0.35 0.82 C 0.37 T-Bill Rate NA NA NA 
Germany 1971 2012 41 0.59 0.50** 0.57 0.88 C 0.06 Money Market Rate 1923-1924 NA 1960-1970 
Greece 1974 2014 40 0.16 0.15 -0.02 0.44 PC 0.09 T-Bill Rate 1941-1944 NA 1960-1965 
Ireland 1971 2014 43 0.19 0.10 0.06 0.70 C 0.03 Money Market Rate NA NA 1960-1975 
Israel 1986 2014 28 0.38 1.32** 0.60 0.03 C -0.17 Discount Rate 1982-1985 June 1997 1962-1970 
Italy 1973 2012 39 0.48 0.79** 0.44 0.72 C 0.25 Discount Rate 1944 NA 1960-1972 
Japan 1960 2014 54 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.63 C 0.36 Lending Rate 1945 NA NA 
Korea, rep. 1980 2014 34 0.46 0.54*** 0.46 0.47 C 0.01 Discount Rate NA April 1998 1974-1979 
Macao 1989 2014 25 -0.07 -0.04 -0.57 0.30 PC 0.40 Lending Rate NA NA NA 
Malta 1975 2014 39 0.23 0.05 0.16 0.55 C 0.17 Lending Rate NA NA 1960-1972 
Netherlands 1978 2012 34 0.49 0.79*** 0.47 0.74 C 0.01 Lending Rate NA NA 1960-1970 
New 
Zealand 
1974 2014 40 0.65 1.28*** 0.64 0.78 C -0.26 Discount Rate NA December 1989 1960-1973 
Norway 1961 2014 53 0.38 0.68** 0.31 0.61 C -0.26 Discount Rate NA March 2001 NA 
Portugal 1973 1999 26 0.04 0.15 0.04 NA NA 0.45 Discount Rate NA NA 1960-1972 
Singapore 1972 2014 42 0.48 0.27** 0.49 0.57 C -0.08 Money Market Rate NA NA 1960-1971 
Slovenia 1995 2014 19 0.36 0.24 NA NA NA 0.10 Money Market Rate NA NA NA 
Spain 1974 2014 40 0.37 0.55* 0.35 0.65 C 0.35 Money Market Rate NA NA 1960-1972 
Sweden 1973 2014 41 0.30 0.26*** 0.17 0.65 C -0.14 T-Bill Rate NA 1995 1960-1972 
Switzerland 1980 2014 34 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.67 C 0.32 Discount Rate NA NA 1960-1972 
UK 1973 2014 41 0.59 0.92*** 0.56 0.78 C -0.25 Discount Rate NA October 1992 1960-1972 
USA 1973 2014 41 0.46 0.83*** 0.36 0.69 C -0.03 Discount Rate NA NA 1960-1972 
1 The cyclicality statistics of 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) is the correlation between the cyclical components of the short-term nominal interest rate cycle (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and the real GDP (𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) for the time 1960-
2014, where cyclical components of 𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆 and 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆 are measured by using HP filter. The ?̂?𝒀 is the estimated coefficient shows the relation between cyclical components of the short-term nominal 
interest rate cycle (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and the real GDP (𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆). The ?̂?𝒀 is the estimated coefficient using Tylor Rule for the time 1960-2014, where level of significance is indicated by ***1%, **5%, *10% . A 
positive (negative) value of  𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and  ?̂?𝒀 indicates countercyclical (procyclical) monetary policy.  
 
2  Monetary policy cyclicality stance over the time 1960-2014. We divide the time 1960-2014 into two sub-time periods: 1960-1999 and 2000-2014. We compute the two sub-time period cyclicality 
stance by utilizing a simple correlation between the cyclical components of the short-term nominal interest rate cycle (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and the real GDP (𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) for the time 1960-1999 and 2000-2014. Please 
note PT=Procyclicality Trap means conducting procyclical monetary policy in both sub-time period; PC=From Procyclical (1960-1999) to Countercyclical (2000-2014); CP=From Countercyclical 
(1960-1999) to Procyclical (2000-2014); C=Countercyclical in both sub-time period. 
 
3 Fear of free floating (𝑭𝑶𝑭) is the correlation between the cyclical components of the short-term nominal interest rate cycle (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and nominal exchange rate  (𝑬𝑿𝑬𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) for the time 1960-2014, 









TABLE A3.4: MONETARY POLICY CYCLICALITY, FEAR OF FLOATING, POLICY RATE, 
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Albania 1993 2014 21 -0.58 -0.74* -0.77 0.11 PC 0.67 Discount Rate NA NA NA 
Algeria 1980 2014 34 -0.53 -0.83* -0.53 -0.51 PT 0.24 T-Bill Rate NA NA 1960-1963 






Azerbaijan 1996 2014 18 0.36 0.04 0.80 0.34 C -0.36 Discount Rate 1992-1995 NA NA 
Botswana 1980 2014 34 -0.10 -0.59 -0.07 -0.34 PT 0.33 Lending Rate NA NA 1960-1979 
Brazil 1995 2014 19 0.19 0.79 0.41 -0.02 CP 0.23 Money Market Rate 1981-1994 June 1999 NA 





China 1980 2014 34 0.36 0.10 0.27 0.60 C 0.00 Lending Rate 1946-1948 NA NA 
Colombia 1961 2014 53 0.62 2.14* 0.53 0.91 C -0.12 Discount Rate NA October 1999 NA 
Costa Rica 1982 2014 32 -0.28 -1.09* -0.02 -0.75 PT 0.49 Lending Rate NA NA 
1970-1971 
1974-1980 
Croatia 1995 2014 19 0.03 0.11 -0.24 0.15 PC -0.15 Lending Rate 1993-1994 NA NA 
Dominican rep. 1991 2014 23 -0.71 -1.15** -0.48 -0.79 PT 0.59 Lending Rate NA NA NA 
Egypt 1976 2014 38 -0.28 -0.22 -0.19 -0.71 PT 0.38 Lending Rate NA NA NA 
Equatorial guinea 1986 2007 21 0.51 0.04* 0.55 0.42 C -0.06 Lending Rate NA NA 1960-1979 
Fiji 1977 2014 37 -0.04 -0.03 -0.19 0.18 PC 0.12 Discount Rate  NA NA 
Guatemala 1986 2014 28 -0.20 -0.99 -0.63 0.26 PC 0.14 Lending Rate NA 2005 1960-1984 
Hungary 1988 2014 26 -0.23 -0.01 -0.22 -0.16 PT 0.17 T-Bill Rate 1945-1946 June 2001 NA 
India 1978 2014 36 -0.17 -0.07 -0.35 0.04 PC 0.39 Lending Rate NA NA 1960-1975 
Indonesia 1974 2014 40 -0.17 0.27 -0.30 0.73 PC 0.86 Money Market Rate 1966 July 2005 NA 
Jamaica 1978 2014 36 0.29 0.17 0.35 -0.07 CP 0.12 T-Bill Rate NA NA 1960-1977 
Jordan 1989 2014 25 -0.03 -0.01 -0.28 0.18 PC 0.14 Lending Rate NA NA 1960-1988 
Kuwait 1979 2014 35 -0.12 0.00 -0.41 0.57 PC 0.13 Lending Rate NA NA 1960 
Latvia 1995 2014 19 0.12 -0.51* 0.32 0.11 C -0.14 Lending Rate NA NA NA 
Libya 1990 2014 24 -0.43 -0.01* -0.65 -0.45 PT 0.38 Lending Rate NA NA 1960-1971 
Lithuania 1995 2014 19 0.32 0.05 0.00 0.81 PC -0.14 Money Market Rate NA NA 
1995-2003 
2007-2008 
Malaysia 1976 2014 38 0.60 0.35*** 0.58 0.65 C 0.15 Discount Rate NA NA 1960-1975 
Mauritius 1978 2014 36 -0.14 -0.07 -0.17 -0.18 PT 0.11 Discount Rate NA NA 1960-1968 
Mexico 1989 2014 25 -0.50 -0.42 -0.84 0.33 PC 0.82 Discount Rate 1987-1988 2001 1960-1977 
Morocco 1973 2014 41 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.51 PC 0.16 Discount Rate NA NA 1960-1972 
Pakistan 1982 2014 32 0.25 0.16 -0.24 0.41 PC 0.53 Money Market Rate NA NA 1971-1981 
Paraguay 1990 2014 24 -0.20 -0.62 -0.14 -0.21 PT 0.25 Lending Rate NA NA NA 
Peru 1994 2014 20 -0.24 -0.25** 0.32 0.63 C 0.61 Discount Rate 1988-1991 January 2002 1960-1967 
Philippines 1961 2014 53 -0.10 -0.10 -0.16 0.32 PC 0.40 Discount Rate NA January 2002 1966-1969 




Romania 1998 2014 16 -0.37 -0.84*** NA -0.37 NA 0.88 Lending Rate 1997 August 2005 NA 




Seychelles 1980 2014 34 -0.15 -0.20 -0.41 -0.08 PT 0.61 T-Bill Rate NA NA NA 
South Africa 1973 2014 41 0.48 1.25*** 0.46 0.60 C 0.45 Discount Rate NA February 2000 1960-1971 
Sri Lanka 1968 2014 46 0.52 0.81*** 0.30 0.89 C 0.05 Discount Rate NA NA 1960-1967 
Swaziland 1979 2011 32 -0.28 -0.33 -0.38 0.52 PC 0.56 Lending Rate NA NA 
1960-1974 
1974-1978 
Thailand 1978 2014 36 0.34 0.09 0.26 0.60 C 0.56 Lending Rate NA May 2000 1964-1977 
Trinidad 1965 2014 49 0.13 0.18 -0.15 0.46 PC 0.01 T-Bill Rate NA NA NA 
Tunisia 1981 2014 33 0.28 0.22 0.36 0.17 C -0.33 Money Market Rate NA NA 1960-1973 
Turkey 1961 2010 49 -0.31 -0.31 -0.24 -0.50 PT 0.26 Discount Rate NA January 2006 NA 
Uruguay 1976 2014 38 -0.42 -1.66** -0.41 -0.46 PT 0.65 Lending Rate NA NA 1968-1970 
Venezuela 1984 2014 30 -0.02 -0.07 0.04 -0.16 CP 0.10 Lending Rate NA NA 1960-1983 
1 The cyclicality statistics of 𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) is the correlation between the cyclical components of the short-term nominal interest rate cycle (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and the real GDP (𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) for the time 1960-2014, 
where cyclical components of 𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆 and 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆 are measured by using HP filter. The ?̂?𝒀 is the estimated coefficient shows the relation between cyclical components of the short-term nominal interest rate 
cycle (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and the real GDP (𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆). The ?̂?𝒀 is the estimated coefficient using Tylor Rule for the time 1960-2014, where level of significance is indicated by ***1%, **5%, *10% . A positive (negative) 
value of  𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and  ?̂?𝒀 indicates countercyclical (procyclical) monetary policy.  
2  Monetary policy cyclicality stance over the time 1960-2014. We divide the time 1960-2014 into two sub-time periods: 1960-1999 and 2000-2014. We compute the two sub-time period cyclicality stance 
by utilizing a simple correlation between the cyclical components of the short-term nominal interest rate cycle (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and the real GDP (𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) for the time 1960-1999 and 2000-2014. Please note 
PT=Procyclicality Trap means conducting procyclical monetary policy in both sub-time period; PC=From Procyclical (1960-1999) to Countercyclical (2000-2014); CP=From Countercyclical (1960-1999) 
to Procyclical (2000-2014); C=Countercyclical in both sub-time period. 
3 Fear of free floating (𝑭𝑶𝑭) is the correlation between the cyclical components of the short-term nominal interest rate cycle (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and nominal exchange rate  (𝑬𝑿𝑬𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) for the time 1960-2014, where 
cyclical components of 𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆 and 𝑬𝑿𝑬𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆 are measured by using HP filter. A positive value of 𝑭𝑶𝑭 indicates the evidence of 𝑭𝑶𝑭 and 𝑭𝑶𝑭 ≤ 𝟎 indicates no evidence of 𝑭𝑶𝑭. 




TABLE A3.5: MONETARY POLICY CYCLICALITY, FEAR OF FLOATING, POLICY RATE, 
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Armenia 1996 2014 18 0.24 -0.03 0.03 0.98 C 0.14 Lending Rate NA NA NA 
Bangladesh 1972 2014 42 0.05 0.11 0.28 0.00 C 0.60 Discount Rate NA NA NA 
Bolivia 1987 2014 27 0.46 1.25 0.25 0.26 C 0.72 Lending Rate 1980-1986 NA NA 
Burundi 1983 2014 31 -0.30 -0.29 -0.16 -0.32 PT -0.43 Lending Rate NA NA 1970-1982 
Ethiopia 1990 2008 18 -0.36 -0.34* 0.49 -0.45 PT -0.01 T-Bill Rate NA NA 1978-1989 
Gambia, the 1978 2014 36 0.26 0.06 0.30 0.25 C 0.58 Discount Rate NA NA 1960-1980 
Ghana 1984 2014 30 0.02 0.51 0.10 -0.16 PC 0.05 Discount Rate 1983 May 2007 1960-1971 
Guyana 1982 2014 32 -0.60 -0.64*** 0.63 -0.66 PC 0.17 Discount Rate NA NA 
1960-1965 1966-
1981 
Honduras 1985 2014 29 -0.24 -0.34 -0.17 -0.19 PT -0.45 Lending Rate NA NA 1960-1984 
Kyrgyz republic 1996 2014 18 0.09 0.04 0.41 -0.32 PC 0.27 T-Bill Rate NA NA NA 
Liberia 1988 2014 26 0.30 0.04 0.03 0.34 C 0.28 Lending Rate NA NA 1960-1987 
Madagascar 1989 2014 25 0.10 0.42 0.00 -0.42 PC 0.35 Lending Rate NA NA 
1960-1971 1974-
1981 
Malawi 1980 2014 34 -0.12 -0.36 0.19 0.04 CP -0.29 Lending Rate NA NA 1960-1973 
Mauritania 1980 2012 32 0.43 0.37* 0.28 0.15 C 0.78 Lending Rate NA NA 1960-1971 
Myanmar 1976 2009 33 0.19 0.08 -0.01 0.27 CP -0.13 Lending Rate NA NA 1960-1974 
Nepal 1976 2014 38 -0.07 0.04 0.31 -0.10 PC 0.09 Discount Rate NA NA 1960-1977 
Nicaragua 1992 2014 22 -0.09 -0.29 -0.01 -0.21 PT -0.03 Lending Rate 1985-1990 NA 1963-1978 
Nigeria 1972 2014 42 -0.10 -0.04 0.18 0.07 CP -0.48 Lending Rate NA NA 1960-1971 
Papua guinea 1980 2014 34 -0.44 -0.32* 0.34 -0.58 PC 0.17 Lending Rate NA NA NA 
Rwanda 1966 2010 44 -0.02 0.02 0.50 -0.03 PC 0.08 Discount Rate NA NA NA 
Sierra Leone 1965 2014 49 0.17 -0.01 0.08 0.22 CP -0.02 Lending Rate NA NA NA 
Solomon islands 1981 2014 33 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.32 PC 0.26 Lending Rate NA NA NA 
Tonga 1980 2014 34 -0.26 -0.01 0.13 -0.25 PT -0.63 Lending Rate NA NA NA 
Vanuatu 1981 2014 33 0.01 0.04 0.10 -0.15 PC 0.33 Lending Rate NA NA NA 
Zambia 1994 2014 20 0.02 0.21 0.10 0.65 CP -0.03 Lending Rate 1989-1993 NA 1960-1971 
 
1 The cyclicality statistics of 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) is the correlation between the cyclical components of the short-term nominal interest rate cycle (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and the real GDP (𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) for the time 1960-2014, 
where cyclical components of 𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆 and 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆 are measured by using HP filter. The ?̂?𝒀 is the estimated coefficient shows the relation between cyclical components of the short-term nominal interest rate 
cycle (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and the real GDP (𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆). The ?̂?𝒀 is the estimated coefficient using Tylor Rule for the time 1960-2014, where level of significance is indicated by ***1%, **5%, *10% . A positive (negative) 
value of  𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆, 𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and  ?̂?𝒀 indicates countercyclical (procyclical) monetary policy.  
 
2  Monetary policy cyclicality stance over the time 1960-2014. We divide the time 1960-2014 into two sub-time periods: 1960-1999 and 2000-2014. We compute the two sub-time period cyclicality stance 
by utilizing a simple correlation between the cyclical components of the short-term nominal interest rate cycle (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and the real GDP (𝒀𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) for the time 1960-1999 and 2000-2014. Please note 
PT=Procyclicality Trap means conducting procyclical monetary policy in both sub-time period; PC=From Procyclical (1960-1999) to Countercyclical (2000-2014); CP=From Countercyclical (1960-1999) 
to Procyclical (2000-2014); C=Countercyclical in both sub-time period. 
 
3 Fear of free floating (𝑭𝑶𝑭) is the correlation between the cyclical components of the short-term nominal interest rate cycle (𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) and nominal exchange rate  (𝑬𝑿𝑬𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆) for the time 1960-2014, where 
cyclical components of 𝒊𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆 and 𝑬𝑿𝑬𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆 are measured by using HP filter. A positive value of 𝑭𝑶𝑭 indicates the evidence of 𝑭𝑶𝑭 and 𝑭𝑶𝑭 ≤ 𝟎 indicates no evidence of 𝑭𝑶𝑭. 
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TABLE A3.6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  








) 100 0.088 0.339 -0.707 0.652 
?̂?𝒊
𝒀 100 0.111 0.586 -1.659 2.136 
𝑭𝑶𝑭𝑨 100 0.187 0.279 -0.381 0.881 
FISCALCYC 78 0.58 0.605 -0.517 2.376 
IQ 94 0.563 0.174 0.201 0.843 
CBI 97 0.489 0.157 0.153 0.830 
MF 98 74.033 8.646 42.537 90.3 
IT 100 0.24 0.429 0 1 
FINOPEN 99 0.523 0.286 0.096 1 
FINDEPTH 100 0.514 0.302 0.114 1.573 
NEED 41 1.731 1.949 0 6 
IMF 41 0.560 0.975 0 4 
CC 43 6.511 5.443 0 22 
OC 43 36 30.484 0 131 
VV2012 36 0.069 0.204 -0.29 0.53 
YYCORR2008 25 0.075 0.333 -0.69 0.63 
YYTSLS2008 23 -0.02 0.403 -0.63 0.81 
MCCORR2013 31 0.066 0.241 -0.39 0.54 
MCTR2013 31 -0.068 0.393 -1.06 0.85 
RD2014 46 0.127 0.241 -0.53 0.64 
INTEREST RATE CYCLE [𝒊𝒊
𝑪] 2383 0.0014 0.036 -0.179 0.691 
RGDP CYCLE [𝒚𝒊
𝒄] 2383 0.0006 0.030 -0.381 0.737 
INFLATION CYCLE [𝝅𝒊
𝒄] 2383 0.0005 0.063 -0.442 1.004 
𝑭𝑶𝑭𝑨 2383 0.1315 0.388 -0.905 0.978 
RGDP CYCLE [𝒚𝒊
𝒄]× 𝑭𝑶𝑭𝑨 2383 -0.0001 0.010 -0.159 0.079 
EXCHNAGE RATE CYCLE [∆𝒆𝒊
𝒄] 2383 -0.0012 0.145 -1.018 2.802 
RGDP CYCLE [𝒚𝒊
𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆
] × FISCYC 2171 0.0004 0.012 -0.217 0.135 
RGDP CYCLE [𝒚𝒊
𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆
] × IQ  1922 0.0006 0.013 -0.168 0.316 
RGDP CYCLE [𝒚𝒊
𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆
] × CBI 2033 0.0005 0.014 -0.183 0.354 
RGDP CYCLE [𝒚𝒊
𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆
] × MF 1558 0.0713 1.977 -23.939 48.278 
RGDP CYCLE [𝒚𝒊
𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆
] × IT 2380 -.00006 0.004 -0.029 0.071 
RGDP CYCLE [𝒚𝒊
𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆
] × FINOPEN 2350 0.0003 0.015 -0.269 0.209 
RGDP CYCLE [𝒚𝒊
𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆
] × FINDEPTH 2290 -.0004 0.017 -0.514 0.159 
INTEREST RATE CYCLE [𝒊𝒊
𝑸𝑪
] 5104 0.00006 0.024 -0.173 0.593 
RGDP CYCLE [𝒚𝒊
𝑸𝑪
] 5104 -0.00002 0.011 -0.097 0.097 
INFLATION CYCLE [𝝅𝒊
𝑸𝑪
] 5104 -0.0001 0.020 -0.162 0.301 
𝑭𝑶𝑭𝑸 5104 0.0270 0.317 -0.760 0.975 
RGDP CYCLE [𝒚𝒊
𝑸𝑪
]× 𝑭𝑶𝑭𝑸 5104 -0.0003 0.004 -0.029 0.048 
EXCHNAGE RATE CYCLE [∆𝒆𝒊
𝑸𝑪
] 5104 -0.0001 0.043 -0.222 0.827 
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TABLE A4.1: DATA USED IN THE CROSS COUNTRY REGRESSION AND IV GMM 
REGRESSION 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE 
Growth rate of real GDP per 
capita (𝑮𝑹𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑪) 
Average growth rate of real GDP per capita. Data are averaged over 1960-2014. Data are obtained from 
Penn World Table (PWT Version 7). 
Output volatility 
(𝑹𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑪𝑯𝑽𝑶𝑳) 
Measures the volatility of growth rate of real GDP per-capita in percentage terms. The volatility is 
calculated by taking the standard deviation of annual percentage change of real GDP per-capita for the 
period 1960-2014. Data are obtained from World Development Indicator (WDI, 2015). Access through 
UK data services. 
Inflation volatility (𝑰𝑵𝑭𝑽𝑶𝑳) 
Measures the GDP price deflator volatility in percentage terms. The volatility is calculated by taking the 
standard deviation of the annual percentage change of GDP deflator. The GDP price deflator 𝜋𝑡 is obtained 
from World Development Indicator (WDI, 2016) and IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2016). 
Following Cukierman et al. (1992), price deflator 𝜋𝑡 is transformed using 𝜋𝑡 (1 + 𝜋𝑡)⁄  to remove the high 
inflation outliers; using the raw inflation figures would give undue weight to a few outliers with very high 
inflation rates. 
Initial real GDP per-capita 
(𝑳𝑵𝑳𝑹𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑪𝑯) 
Initial real GDP per-capita measured by natural logarithm of real GDP per-capita in 1960. Data are 
obtained from Penn World Table (PWT Version 6.3). 
Educational attainment 
(𝑳𝑺𝒀𝑹) 
Log of average years of secondary schooling in the population over age fifteen, 1960. Data are obtained 
from Barro and Lee (2001). 
Avg. Population (𝑷𝑶𝑷) 
Population size measured by natural logarithm of number of population. Data are obtained from World 
Development Indicator (WDI, 2015). Access through UK data services. 
Government expenditure to 
GDP (𝑮𝑬𝑿𝑷) 
General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) in percentage terms. Data are averaged 
over 1960-2014. Data are obtained from World Development Indicator (WDI, 2015) and IMF 
International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2015). Access through UK data services. 
 
Trade openness (𝑻𝑹𝑨𝑫𝑬) 
Measures the trade openness (sum of export and import) to GDP in percentage terms. Data are averaged 
over 1960-2014. Data are obtained from World Development Indicator (WDI, 2015). Access through UK 
data services. 
 
Exchange rate volatility 
(𝑬𝑿𝑬𝑽𝑶𝑳) 
Measures the exchange rate volatility in percentage term. The volatility is calculated by taking the standard 
deviation of the annual nominal exchange rates between the sample country and the USA. For European 
countries, we use the nominal effective exchange rate. We do not incorporate countries with an exchange 
rate that follow no separate legal tender and pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement. More 
specifically, we restrict our sample to include the countries with a period of dirty floating and floating 
exchange rate regimes with at least 15 observations by following Ilzetzki et al., (2011) for exchange rate 
de facto fine classification. Data are obtained from World Development Indicator (WDI, 2015) and IMF 
International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2015). Access through UK data services. 
 
Terms of trade volatility 
(𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑽𝑶𝑳) 
Measures the growth rate of net barter terms of trade volatility in percentage term. The volatility is 
calculated by taking the standard deviation of annual percentage change of terms of trade for the period 





Measures country’s liquid liabilities over the GDP in percentage terms. Data are averaged over 1960-
2014. Data are obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2015) and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF, 2015). Access through UK data services. 
 
Monetary freedom (𝑴𝑭) 
Monetary freedom combines a measure of price stability with an assessment of price controls. Both 
inflation and price controls distort market activity. Price stability without sector-specific government 
intervention is the ideal state for the free market.  Monetary freedom score ranges from 0 (lowest monetary 
freedom) to 100 (highest monetary freedom). Data are averaged over 1960-2014. Data are obtained from 
Index of Economic Freedom (2016). Access through Heritage.org (2016) 
 
Fertility rate (𝑭𝑬𝑹𝑻) 
Fertility rate (births per woman) in percentage term. Data are averaged over 1960-2014. Data are obtained 
from World Development Indicator (WDI, 2015). Access through UK data services. 
 
Life expectancy rate 
(𝑳𝑰𝑭𝑬𝑬𝑿𝑷) 
The log of the life expectancy at birth. Data are obtained from World Development Indicator (WDI, 2015). 




Initial level of executive corruption in 1946. The executive corruption is measured based on the question; 
how routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favours in exchange for bribes, 
kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public 
funds or other state resources for personal or family use? The index ranges from 0 (lower executive 
corruption) to 1 (highest executive corruption). Data are obtained from Coppedge et al. (2015). 
 
Initial country credit ratings 
(𝑰𝑵𝑰𝑪𝑹) 
Initial level of institutional investor credit ratings in 1979. The index ranges from 0 (lower credit ratings) 
to 100 (highest credit ratings). Data are obtained from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
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Australia -0.21 -0.13 0.63 1.06 Albania 0.67 0.02 -0.58 -0.74 Armenia NA NA 0.24 -0.03 
Austria 0.47 -0.01 0.55 1.10 Algeria 2.22 2.38 -0.53 -0.83 Bangladesh 2.89 3.22 0.05 0.11 
Belgium -0.41 -0.04 0.55 0.45 Antigua  0.49 0.41 NA NA Benin 1.14 1.18 NA NA 
Canada -0.34 -0.52 0.58 0.97 Argentina 1.93 1.75 -0.54 -0.81 Bhutan -0.11 -0.17 NA NA 
Cyprus -0.14 0.50 0.05 0.00 Azerbaijan NA NA 0.36 0.04 Bolivia 2.20 1.99 0.46 1.25 
Czech republic NA NA 0.30 -0.03 Bahamas 0.21 0.25 NA NA Burkina Faso 0.71 1.26 NA NA 
Denmark -0.11 -0.32 0.05 0.60 Bahrain 0.12 0.18 NA NA Burundi 2.10 0.96 -0.30 -0.29 
Finland 0.40 0.11 0.29 0.09 Barbados 0.67 0.86 NA NA Cameroon 1.00 0.85 NA NA 
France -0.16 -0.21 0.41 0.61 Belize 0.15 -0.05 NA NA African Rep. 0.65 0.44 NA NA 
Germany 0.29 0.07 0.59 0.50 Botswana 0.62 0.19 -0.10 -0.59 Chad 1.10 1.31 NA NA 
Greece 0.41 0.36 0.16 0.15 Brazil 0.69 0.92 0.19 0.79 Comoros 0.42 0.22 NA NA 
Hong Kong -0.14 -0.14 NA NA Bulgaria 0.40 0.26 NA NA Congo, D. Rep. 2.80 2.20 NA NA 
Iceland 0.72 0.85 0.19 0.10 Chile 0.79 0.73 -0.31 -0.12 Congo, Rep. 0.52 0.02 NA NA 
Ireland 0.92 0.39 0.38 1.32 China 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.10 Cote D'ivoire 1.37 1.48 NA NA 
Israel 1.08 1.20 0.19 0.10 Colombia 1.46 1.23 0.62 2.14 Dominica -0.53 -0.81 NA NA 
Italy 0.26 0.16 0.48 0.79 Costa Rica 0.93 0.96 -0.28 -1.09 Ethiopia 1.17 1.05 -0.36 -0.34 
Japan 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.22 Cuba 0.88 0.89 NA NA Gambia, The 2.67 0.65 0.26 0.06 
Korea, rep. -0.09 -0.20 0.46 0.54 Croatia NA NA 0.03 0.11 Georgia 0.46 1.30 NA NA 
Luxembourg -0.23 -0.26 NA NA Dominican Rep 1.97 2.08 -0.71 -1.15 Ghana 1.66 2.64 0.02 0.51 
Macao Sar,  -0.04 -0.21 -0.07 -0.04 Ecuador 2.13 2.39 NA NA Grenada 0.68 0.81 NA NA 
Malta NA NA 0.23 0.05 Egypt 0.53 0.56 -0.28 -0.22 Guinea 0.29 0.22 NA NA 
Netherlands 0.55 -0.04 0.49 0.79 El Salvador 0.52 0.35 NA NA Guinea-Bissau 0.23 0.54 NA NA 
New Zealand 0.37 0.18 0.65 1.28 Guinea 0.46 0.55 0.51 0.04 Guyana 1.73 1.48 -0.60 -0.64 
Norway -0.14 -0.08 0.38 0.68 Fiji 1.01 1.19 -0.04 -0.03 Honduras -0.08 0.05 -0.24 -0.34 
Portugal 0.48 0.70 0.04 0.15 Gabon 0.61 0.52 NA NA Kyrgyz Rep NA NA 0.09 0.04 
Puerto Rico 0.34 0.59 NA NA Guatemala 0.90 0.73 -0.20 -0.99 Kenya 0.70 1.19 NA NA 
Singapore -0.11 -0.07 0.48 0.27 Hungary 0.62 0.78 -0.23 -0.01 Liberia NA NA 0.30 0.04 
Slovenia NA NA 0.36 0.24 India 1.01 0.80 -0.17 -0.07 Lesotho -0.08 -0.31 NA NA 
Spain 0.67 0.48 0.37 0.55 Indonesia 0.46 1.39 -0.17 0.27 Madagascar 1.14 1.53 0.10 0.42 
Sweden -0.17 -0.06 0.30 0.26 Iran 0.33 0.71 NA NA Malawi -0.33 -0.94 -0.12 -0.36 
Switzerland 0.47 0.11 0.64 0.65 Iraq 1.06 0.81 NA NA Mali 0.76 0.96 NA NA 
UK -0.08 -0.29 0.59 0.92 Jamaica 0.29 0.84 0.29 0.17 Mauritania 0.44 0.65 0.43 0.37 
United states -0.10 -0.14 0.46 0.83 Jordan 0.35 1.00 -0.03 -0.01 Mongolia 1.29 1.35 NA NA 
     Kuwait -0.23 -0.04 -0.12 0.00 Mozambique 1.19 0.29 NA NA 
     Latvia NA NA 0.12 -0.51 Myanmar NA NA 0.19 0.08 
     Libya NA NA -0.43 -0.01 Nepal 0.79 0.78 -0.07 0.04 
     Lithuania NA NA 0.32 0.05 Nicaragua 0.57 0.10 -0.09 -0.29 
     Malaysia 0.17 0.38 0.60 0.35 Niger 0.73 0.98 NA NA 
     Mauritius 0.78 0.61 -0.14 -0.07 Nigeria 1.17 0.33 -0.10 -0.04 
     Mexico 0.86 1.07 -0.50 -0.42 Papua Guinea NA NA -0.44 -0.32 
     Morocco 0.68 0.77 0.04 0.08 Rwanda 1.09 1.17 -0.02 0.02 
     Namibia 1.64 1.01 NA NA Senegal 0.58 0.29 NA NA 
     Oman 1.03 0.36 NA NA Sierra Leone 0.76 0.75 0.17 -0.01 
     Pakistan 1.48 1.09 0.25 0.16 Solomon Is. NA NA -0.01 0.00 
     Panama 0.64 0.65 NA NA St. Lucia 0.23 0.37 NA NA 
     Paraguay 1.01 1.00 -0.20 -0.62 St. Vincent 0.74 0.53 NA NA 
     Peru 0.82 1.28 -0.24 -0.25 Sudan 0.12 0.64 NA NA 
     Philippines 1.13 1.43 -0.10 -0.10 Tajikistan 0.61 0.26 NA NA 
     Poland 0.46 0.45 0.50 1.14 Togo 0.41 0.64 NA NA 
     Quater 0.45 0.95 NA NA Tonga 0.81 0.98 -0.26 -0.01 
     Romania 0.53 0.23 -0.37 -0.84 Uganda 1.27 0.88 NA NA 
     Russia NA NA -0.09 -0.40 Vanuatu 1.53 1.74 0.01 0.04 
     Saudi Arabia 0.18 -0.07 NA NA Vietnam 0.69 2.39 NA NA 
     Seychelles 0.81 0.94 -0.15 -0.20 Zambia 1.20 1.25 0.02 0.21 
     South Africa 0.89 0.68 0.48 1.25      
     Sri Lanka 0.60 0.55 0.52 0.81      
     St. Kitts Nevis 0.13 0.32 NA NA      
     Swaziland 0.33 0.50 -0.28 -0.33      
     Thailand 0.56 0.40 0.34 0.09      
     Trinidad 1.09 0.69 0.13 0.18      
     Tunisia -0.04 -0.04 0.28 0.22      
     Turkey 0.72 0.61 -0.31 -0.31      
     Uruguay 0.76 0.89 -0.42 -1.66      
     Venezuela 1.11 1.26 -0.02 -0.07      
     Zimbabwe 0.96 2.06 NA NA      
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TABLE A4.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CROSS 









?̂?𝒊 137 0.678 0.644 -0.526 2.885 
?̅?𝒊
̂ 137 0.655 0.700 -0.935 3.216 
RGDPCHVOL 131 0.055 0.025 0.006 0.132 
INFVOL 131 0.091 0.069 0.014 0.289 
GRGDPC 136 0.023 0.016 -0.022 0.097 
LNLRGDPCH 137 8.072 1.195 5.703 10.828 
LSYR 115 0.666 0.522 -0.744 1.631 
POP 137 15.505 1.991 10.734 20.758 
GEXP 137 0.153 0.048 0.036 0.320 
TRADE 137 0.764 0.447 0.188 3.305 
EXEVOL 117 0.329 0.796 0.002 7.388 
TOTVOL 136 0.093 0.074 0.011 0.622 
FINDEPTH 135 0.465 0.336 0.039 2.369 
MF 129 73.913 10.299 27.515 90.3 
FERT 137 0.0041 0.016 0.016 0.076 
LIFEEXP 137 1.794 0.076 1.586 1.889 
INEXECORR 104 0.409 0.282 0.009 0.968 
INICR 56 61.012 21.206 21 98.9 
 
 
TABLE A4.4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CROSS 













) 100 0.088 0.339 -0.707 0.652 
?̂?𝒊
𝒀 100 0.111 0.586 -1.659 2.136 
RGDPCHVOL 92 0.052 0.025 0.017 0.117 
INFVOL 93 0.076 0.056 0.018 0.288 
GRGDPC 98 0.025 0.017 -0.014 0.097 
LNLRGDPCH 98 8.101 1.127 5.555 10.331 
LSYR 92 0.790 0.460 -0.537 1.633 
POP 100 15.916 1.845 11.110 20.758 
GEXP 99 0.158 0.051 0.036 0.315 
TRADE 100 0.745 0.453 0.071 3.305 
EXEVOL 99 0.157 0.185 0.002 1.597 
TOTVOL 100   0.080 0.058 0.010 0.269 
FINDEPTH 100 0.473 0.287 0.123 1.573 
MF 97 73.371 9.380 42.537 90.3 
FERT 100 0.036 0.016 0.016 0.071 
LIFEEXP 100 1.809 0.068 1.586 1.888 
INEXECORR 91 0.363 0.269 0.009 0.968 
INICR 57 61.059 23.499 10.4 98.9 
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TABLE A5.1: VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE 
GDP growth 2008-09 
 
GDP growth 2005-07 
 




GDP gap 2008-09 
GDP growth 2008-2009 is calculated by taking average of real GDP growth in 2008 and 2009. Similarly, 
GDP growth 2005-2007 is calculated by taking average of real GDP growth in 2005, 2006 and 2007. GDP 
growth trend is calculated by taking average of real GDP growth over 1997 to 2007. GDP gap is measured 
by average real GDP growth 2008-2009 minus real GDP growth trend 1997-2007. Here, real GDP growth 
calculated based on GDP constructed on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP 
(Current international dollar). Please note the term "real" has a different meaning when considering data in 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. While "nominal" GDP in the International Comparison Program 
does refer to the regular national accounts GDP in current prices, "real" GDP is considered to be the PPP 
GDP in current prices. Data definition and data source are from World Development Indicator (2014) and 
IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) (2014). Access through UK data services. 
Industrial production growth 
2008-09 
Industrial production growth 2008-2009 is calculated by taking average of real industrial production 
growth in 2008 and 2009. Here, real industrial production that measures changes in output for the 
industrial sector of the economy. The industrial sector includes manufacturing, mining, and utilities. Data 
is in constant US$, seasonally adjusted. The base year is 2005. Data definition and data source are from 
World Bank staff calculations based on DataStream data (2014). 
Real GDP per-capita 2007 
Real GDP per-capita 2007 in natural logarithm. Real GDP per-capita is calculated as PPP converted GDP 
per-capita (Chain Series), at 2005 constant prices. Data are obtained from Penn World Table (PWT 
Version 6.3). 
Trading partner’s export 
demand 2008-09 
Trading partner GDP Gap (2008-09) multiplied by merchandise export (2007). Below is the simplified 
equation that has been used for each emerging country (i) in order to calculate its trading partner’s (j) 
export demand. 




Here, Trading Partner′s Export Demandi2008−2009 is declined export demand of partner country. 
GDPGrowth̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅J2008−2009 − GDPGrowth̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅J1997−2007 is the trading partner’s GDPGapj2008−09. Here Wi2007 is 







Data collected from Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) (2014). Access through UK data services. 
Gross external debt to GDP 
2007 
Total external debt is debt owed to non-residents repayable in currency, goods, or services. Total external 
debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF 
credit, and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or 
less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. Data are in current U.S. dollars (% of GDP). Data collected 
from World Bank, International Debt Statistics (2014). 
Long-term external debt to 
GDP 2007 
Long-term debt that has an original maturity of more than one year. It has three components: public, 
publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed debt. Data are in current U.S. dollars (% of GDP). Data 
collected from World Bank, International Debt Statistics (2014) and World Bank, Quarterly External Debt 
Statistics (2014). 
Short-term external debt to 
GDP 2007 and short-term 
external debt to foreign 
reserve 2007 
Short-term external debt is defined as debt that has an original maturity of one year or less. Short-term 
external accumulated debt data for end of the year 2007 (fourth quarter) has been collected which will be 
mature during end of 2008 (fourth quarter) or beginning of 2009 (first quarter). Data are in current U.S. 
dollars (% of GDP or foreign reserve). Data collected from World Bank, International Debt Statistics 
(2014) and World Bank, Quarterly External Debt Statistics (2014). 
Bank gross external debt to 
GDP 2007 
Deposit-taking corporations’ (except the central bank) gross external debt, which composed of short-term 
and long-term external debt. We collect the accumulated data of the gross external debt for end of the year 
2007. Data are in current U.S. dollars (% of GDP). Data collected from World Bank, Quarterly External 
Debt Statistics (2014). 
Non-bank gross external debt 
to GDP 2007 
Non-Bank sector defined as non-deposit taking corporations’ (e.g. finance and leasing companies, money 
lenders, insurance corporations, pension funds, and foreign exchange company) external debt. The external 
debt is composed of short-term and long-term external debt. We collect the accumulated data of the gross 
external debt for end of the year 2007. Data are in current U.S. dollars (% of GDP). Data collected from 
World Bank, Quarterly External Debt Statistics (2014). 
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TABLE A5.1 (CONTINUED): VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE 
Bank short-term external 
debt to GDP 2007 
Deposit-taking corporations’ (except the central bank) short-term external debt. Short-term external debt is 
defined as debt that has an original maturity of one year or less. Short-term external accumulated debt data 
for end of the year 2007 (fourth quarter) has been collected which will be mature during end of 2008 
(fourth quarter) or beginning of 2009 (first quarter). Data are in current U.S. dollars (% of GDP). Data 
collected from World Bank, Quarterly External Debt Statistics (2014). In October 2014, the World Bank 
launched the new Quarterly External Debt Statistics (QEDS) SDDS database. Sort-term debt data are 
segregated based on excel template (country’s external balance sheet position) provided by World Bank. 
The template is publicly available at 
//databank.worldbank.org/data/.../debt/SDDS_QEDS_template_v2.1.xlsx.// 
Non-bank short-term 
external debt to GDP 2007 
Non-Bank sector defined as non-deposit taking corporations’ (e.g. finance and leasing companies, money 
lenders, insurance corporations, pension funds, and foreign exchange company) short-term external debt. 
Short-term external debt is defined as debt that has an original maturity of one year or less. Short-term 
external accumulated debt data for end of the year 2007 (fourth quarter) has been collected which will be 
mature during end of 2008 (fourth quarter) or beginning of 2009 (first quarter). Data are in current U.S. 
dollars (% of GDP). Data collected from World Bank, Quarterly External Debt Statistics (2014). 
 
Net foreign asset to GDP 2007 
Net foreign assets are the sum of foreign assets held by monetary authorities and deposit money banks, less 
their foreign liabilities. Data are in current U.S. dollar and it is a percent of GDP (current U.S. dollar). 
Here total foreign asset is the sum of debt asset, FDI asset and portfolio asset and reserves minus gold. 
Total liability is the sum of debt liability, FDI equity liability and portfolio equity liability. Data collected 
from External Wealth of Nations Mark II database (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, "The External Wealth of 
Nations Mark II", Journal of International Economics, November 2007).  
 
Financial openness to GDP 
2007 
Financial openness measured as sum of total foreign asset and external liability as a percentage of GDP 
(current U.S. dollar). Here total foreign asset is the sum of debt asset, FDI asset and portfolio asset and 
reserves minus gold. Total liability is the sum of debt liability, FDI equity liability and portfolio equity 
liability (all the variables are current U.S. dollar). Data collected from External Wealth of Nations Mark II 
database (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, "The External Wealth of Nations Mark II", Journal of International 
Economics, November 2007).  
  
Private sector domestic credit 
to GDP 2007 
Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by financial 
corporations, such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other 
accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. The financial corporations include monetary 
authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other financial corporations where data are available. 
Examples of other financial corporations are finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance 
corporations, pension funds, and foreign exchange companies. Data are in current U.S. dollars (% of 
GDP). Data collected from World Development Indicator (WDI)-World Bank (2014). Access through UK 
data services. 
 
External leverage 2007 
External leverage is calculated as the ratio of total asset relative to equity liability. Where total asset is sum 
of the value of domestic assets and the value of gross holdings of equity and direct investment in the rest of 
the world (resp. of foreign debt, loans and portfolio debt). On the other hand total equity liability defined 
as the gross foreign holdings of domestic equity and direct investment (resp. domestic debt); a residual 
item that measures the “net worth” of country's residents. Data Definition from Gourinchas and Obstfeld 
(p. 48, 2012). Data collected from External Wealth of Nations Mark II database (see Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, "The External Wealth of Nations Mark II", Journal of International Economics, November 2007). 
  
To define further, for example, a country has total assets valued at $2 billion and total equity debt of $1 
billion. The leverage ratio would be 2.0 ($2 billion / $1 billion), meaning that one half of a county’s assets 
are financed by equity debt. The balance must be financed by external debt. Now consider, if a country has 
a high amount of foreign currency denominated external debt during the pre-crisis period, and if the 
currency devaluation has taken place during crisis time, then the country has to pay back a higher level of 
principle and interest amount during the crisis. In this case, the balance sheet shock mainly arise from the 
high amount of external debt, with maturity and currency mismatch, which can lead to liquidity crisis. In 
contrast, the external equity debt are nothing else but the foreign owners’ equity. Therefore, equity claims 
have the flexibility over the timing, and the size of the dividend payments, thereby allowing risk sharing 
between foreign investors and domestic issuers. So, the equity debt have a minimum impact on the balance 
sheet impact. 
Foreign rollover risk 2007 
Foreign rollover risk is defined as the sum of BIS banks’ consolidated direct cross-border claims on a 
country and their local affiliates’ claims that are not financed by local consumer deposits. It is proxied by 
bank-level information on loan to deposit ratios of foreign affiliates. Data Definition from Cerutti, 
Claessens and McGuire (2012). Data collected from Bank for International Settlements (BIS)-Locational 
Banking Statistics database (2014). 
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TABLE A5.1 (CONTINUED): VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE 
Credit market regulation 
2007 
Credit market regulation Index refer policy regulation on credit market to maintain foreign capital inflow. 
Credit market regulation defined as rating index which varies from 1 to 10. 1=high credit market 
regulations (less freedom) and 10=low credit market regulations (more freedom). Data is measured in 
natural logarithm. Data collected from Fraser institute’s “Economic Freedom of the World” Annual Report 
(2014); Rose and Spiegel (2011). 
 
Country credit rating 2007 
Institutional Investor’s overall country credit rating index defined as country credit rating from 100 (highly 
credit rated country) to 0 (very poor credit rated country). Data is measured in natural logarithm. Data 
collected from Institutional Investor’s Country Credit Rating, Annual Report 2007, 2008 & 2009. 
 
Exchange rate regime 
(dummy) 2008-09 
Exchange rate regime classified as based on 1 to 6 scaling rating, where 1=fixed exchange rate regime, 
6=fully flexible exchange rate regime. This paper use dummy variable for exchange rate; 1=country have 
fixed exchange rate in 2008 and zero otherwise. Data collected from Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). 
Foreign reserves to GDP 2007 
Total reserves minus gold comprise special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members held by the IMF, and 
holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities. Gold holdings are excluded. Data 
are in current U.S. dollars (% of GDP). Data collected from World development indicator, World Bank 
(2014). Access through UK data services. 
Interest rate gap 2008-09 
Measured by average interest rate 2008-2009 minus interest rate trend 1997-2007. Interest rate trend is the 
average of interest rate over 1997 to 2007. We use discount window interest rate depending on data 
availability as a proxy for monetary policy instruments. For countries whenever the discount rate is not 
available, we use money market rate, lending rate or treasury bill rate. The rates are in percentage terms. 
Data obtained from Vegh and Vuletin (2012) and IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2016), code 
60ZF (Discount Rate), 60B-ZF (Money Market Rate) and 60P-ZF (Lending Rate). Access through UK 
data services. 
 
Fiscal space to GDP 2007 
Fiscal space calculated as general government revenue minus total expenditure as percent of GDP. Data 
collected from World development indicator, World Bank (2014). Access through UK data services. 
Country size or population 
2008 
Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal 
status or citizenship--except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are 
generally considered part of the population of the country of origin. Data is measured in natural logarithm. 
Data collected from World development indicator, World Bank (2014). Access through UK data services. 
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TABLE A5.2: GDP GAP, AVG. GDP GROWTH, EXPORT DEMAND, EXTERNAL DEBT 
AND OTHER STATISTICS 






























































































































































































































































































































































Albania (ALB) -0.93 6.89 2.52 -5.52 27.09 18.87 18.77 1.09 0.22 0 19.71 -5.91 -3.28 
Argentina (ARG) -2.58 2.97 NA -3.05 36.57 6.70 1.64 1.11 0.53 0 13.60 -0.81 -2.11 
Belarus (BLR) -3.43 6.68 -2.07 -6.99 27.58 21.00 12.90 1.09 0.54 0 8.76 -19.98 1.52 
Brazil (BRA) -1.34 3.83 -8.87 -4.10 17.44 20.33 11.39 1.06 1.61 0 13.13 -8.88 -2.66 
Bulgaria (BGR) -4.75 1.76 -3.38 -5.54 80.51 59.70 43.41 1.21 1.44 1 39.24 -7.89 3.26 
Chile (CHL) -4.05 2.49 11.96 -3.74 29.33 20.35 2.14 1.09 1.08 0 9.73 -0.44 -19.37 
China (CHN) -1.39 10.91 -4.13 -4.79 10.61 NA NA 1.03 0.47 0 43.70 -0.87 0.87 
Colombia (COL) -1.41 4.00 NA -4.35 20.92 6.89 4.27 1.07 0.82 0 10.02 -9.06 -0.85 
Costa Rica (CRI) -5.64 2.24 -3.66 -4.49 32.10 20.54 13.74 1.09 0.86 0 15.63 -5.36 0.32 
Croatia (CRS) -7.32 -1.08 -2.44 -5.32 75.74 88.68 24.81 1.26 1.94 0 23.01 -1.41 -2.12 
Ecuador (ECU) -0.55 4.89 2.47 -4.25 35.03 0.23 NA 1.12 0.54 1 5.61 -0.09 1.76 
Egypt (EGY) -0.16 7.36 -1.26 -4.10 26.26 6.51 2.42 1.08 0.37 0 23.26 -1.05 -7.55 
El Salvador (ELS) -4.84 0.43 -14.27 -4.75 49.02 25.48 7.21 1.17 1.04 1 10.55 -5.26 -1.29 
Estonia (EST) -18.61 -8.78 -9.13 -8.34 98.90 230.81 84.21 1.30 3.93 1 14.66 1.02 2.82 
Hungary (HUG) -7.45 -1.59 4.01 -4.34 128.24 119.37 36.55 1.27 3.96 0 17.62 -2.62 -5.08 
India (IDN) -1.61 7.62 2.11 -4.29 16.48 14.66 0.26 1.05 2.15 0 21.61 0.61 -4.41 
Indonesia (IDN) 1.57 6.76 3.66 -4.22 34.20 8.40 5.64 1.12 3.23 0 12.75 -9.29 -1.03 
Kazakhstan (KAZ) -6.35 3.65 -10.57 -4.58 91.78 167.98 22.69 1.21 1.32 1 15.16 0.01 5.22 
Latvia (LAV) -19.15 -8.97 -4.49 -8.95 115.49 310.96 167.29 1.48 4.52 0 19.40 3.87 0.64 
Lithuania (LIU) -13.79 -4.63 -1.78 -8.35 63.23 116.66 36.84 1.24 4.48 1 19.24 -1.52 -1.01 
FYR Macedonia (MKD) -1.83 3.42 -3.33 -5.61 51.05 22.39 10.27 1.14 0.25 1 25.62 -0.13 0.59 
Mexico (MEX) -5.84 -0.29 NA -5.32 19.09 3.83 1.47 1.07 0.88 0 8.35 -4.51 -1.16 
Morocco (MOR) 0.42 6.61 -2.35 -4.90 32.74 NA NA 1.08 0.41 1 32.12 -0.83 -0.13 
Pakistan (PAK) -2.84 4.09 NA -4.77 27.55 NA NA 1.10 0.30 1 9.29 4.48 -5.12 
Paraguay (PAG) -1.50 2.60 1.04 -2.55 26.03 1.62 1.47 1.51 0.57 0 17.84 -4.86 1.37 
Peru (PER) -0.24 6.55 -5.91 -3.95 31.55 10.38 6.57 1.10 0.68 0 26.34 -4.28 3.19 
Philippines (PHI) -2.51 4.06 -0.82 -4.73 39.58 NA NA 1.15 0.69 0 20.38 -3.44 -0.30 
Poland (POL) -1.98 4.79 -1.50 -5.94 47.71 29.38 13.33 1.15 1.35 0 14.84 -7.09 -1.88 
Romania (ROM) -3.55 1.79 -4.40 -5.43 49.42 NA NA 1.14 5.10 1 21.89 -19.23 -3.12 
Russia (RUS) -7.65 0.11 NA -5.32 31.90 42.59 14.24 1.10 0.64 0 35.97 -5.14 6.75 
Serbia (SER) -6.21 1.54 -7.02 -5.47 66.94 NA NA 1.21 1.10 1 35.54 -0.28 -1.36 
South Africa (SOA) -3.48 2.44 -1.26 -4.14 24.27 25.77 22.07 1.06 0.50 0 10.43 -9.10 1.39 
Thailand (THL) -3.83 1.45 -0.62 -4.00 25.40 11.17 6.26 1.08 0.54 0 34.57 -3.05 0.23 
Tunisia (TUS) -2.09 5.20 -5.74 -5.36 52.70 43.15 25.84 1.19 0.47 0 20.21 -0.97 -2.01 
Turkey (TUK) -7.50 -0.73 -13.55 -5.29 39.98 28.04 10.23 1.14 1.85 0 11.38 -27.73 -1.95 
Ukraine (UKR) -12.22 -4.92 4.09 -5.53 55.34 66.77 25.86 1.17 1.11 0 22.30 -9.02 -1.98 
Uruguay (URG) 2.28 6.20 -5.03 -3.79 45.62 NA NA 1.21 0.18 0 17.54 -31.50 0.01 
Venezuela (VEZ) -3.36 2.44 2.52 -5.18 22.02 NA NA 1.05 0.15 1 11.22 -4.27 -2.82 
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TABLE A5.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 




GDP Gap 2008-09 38 -0.04 0.05 -0.19 0.02 
GDP Growth 2008-2009 38 0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.11 
GDP Growth 2005-2007 38 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.16 
GDP Growth Trend 1997-07 38 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.12 
Industrial Production Growth 2008-09 32 -0.03 0.05 -0.14 0.12 
Trading Partner’s Reduced Export Demand 2008-09   38 -0.05 0.013 -0.09 -0.03 
Gross External Debt to GDP 2007  38 0.45 0.28 0.11 1.28 
Long Term External Debt to GDP 2007  38 0.34 0.21 0.05 1.04 
Short Term External Debt to GDP 2007  38 0.095 0.096 0.002 0.49 
Short Term External Debt to  Foreign Reserve 2007 38 0.554 0.541 0.012 2.568 
Bank Gross External Debt to GDP 2007  30 0.52 0.72 0.002 3.11 
Non-Bank Gross External Debt to GDP 2007  31 0.56 0.29 0.13 1.27 
Bank Short-Term External Debt to GDP 2007  29 0.22 0.33 0.003 1.67 
Non-Bank Short-Term External Debt to GDP 2007  31 0.19 0.15 0.004 0.59 
External Leverage 2007  38 1.15 0.11 1.03 1.51 
Domestic Credit to Private Sector to GDP 2007  38 0.49 0.31 0.14 1.68 
Foreign Rollover Risk 2007  38 1.36 1.36 0.15 5.09 
Foreign Reserve to GDP 2007  38 0.19 0.09 0.06 0.44 
Exchange Rate Dummy (Peg=1) 38 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Interest Rate Gap 2008-09 38 -0.054 0.077 -0.314 0.045 
Fiscal Space to GDP 2007  38 -0.011 0.041 -0.19 0.07 
Real GDP Per-Capita 2007  38 8.97 0.55 7.69 9.86 
Ln of Population 2008 38 0.59 0.98 -1.48 2.46 
Ln of Credit Market Freedom 2007  38 2.14 0.13 1.79 2.30 
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